IMAGINING PAKISTAN

MODERNISM, STATE, AND THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIC REVIVAL

RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Imagining Pakistan

Imagining Pakistan

*Modernism, State, and the
Politics of Islamic Revival*

Rasul Bakhsh Rais

I dedicate this book to my mothers, Nuri and Hurmat, for their unbounded love, selflessness, and care.

Contents

Preface

A continuing debate about what has gone wrong with Pakistan, the second largest Muslim majority state with a population of nearly 200,000,000 and nuclear power, agitated me and resultantly developed my interest in writing this book. There are many symptoms of things having seriously gone wrong, but three indicators will suffice to predicate the argument. First, the military generals have staged four coups, abrogated the constitutions, wrote their own ones, or amended the 1973 Constitution to suit their power interests, subverted institutions, including the judiciary and fragmented the political parties to create their political façade. The third military regime (1977–1988) hanged a popular prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), and the fourth (1999–2008), humiliated another popular prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, convicted him on laughable charges of "hijacking" a passenger plane and forced him into exile. More laughable is the fact that the Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf took over the country when Prime Minister Sharif removed him from power in October 1999. When not in power, the military has continued to exercise extraordinary influence over critical foreign and domestic policy issues that makes Pakistan's transition to democracy vague, troublesome, and at best incomplete. All post-military regimes have been handicapped by the lingering, stubborn, and deep legacies of the military regimes.

Second, the political class of Pakistan has failed to rise to the occasion and provide honest, effective, and visionary leadership to address country's complex problems accumulated both under the military and populist civilian regimes. When given power and opportunity the dynastic political class running the political parties as family businesses have disappointed their electorate—the hapless, poor populations. They have weakened institutions of law and accountability and have shown apathy towards institutionalized corrup-

tion that they have often used to benefit themselves and aligned political families. The sad fact is that while the country is at the top of the list of corrupt countries, hardly any political leader has been convicted on charges of corruption. The culture of corruption has seeped throughout the society, including media, bureaucracy, businesses and even civil society organizations, creating impunity for the powerful sections of the country. The pervasive culture of corruption has caused institutional decay, deterioration of values and disorientation of society, stunting growth of creative national energies, innovation, value of hard work, and recognition of merit.

Third, political violence, religious extremism, and ethnic conflict have become enduring problems of the state and society. These are some of the outcomes of elite corruption, state's institutional decline and wrong choice of national security policies—direct and indirect intervention in the Afghan wars. The society has become polarized along ethnic, sectarian, and political lines, making it hard to build national consensus on critical national issues. These are the issues that determine the success and failure of nations.

Finding a clear vision of state and nation building in the context of postcolonial Islamic states has been both difficult as well as controversial, but in the case of Pakistan, persistence of crisis in civil-military relations and confrontational politics among the political parties—better to be termed as factions—are some of the factors that have eroded vital elements of political modernity inherited from the British colonial rule. The central argument of the book is that the creation of Pakistan was a result of Muslim modernism that greatly shaped an epic struggle for identity, nationalism, and empowerment of the Muslim communities, while smoothly incorporating the non-Muslim sections. The focus is on political modernity defined as inclusive politics, equal rights as citizen within a constitutional framework and shared sense of political community among diverse ethnic and religious groups of the constituent regions of present-day Pakistan. My argument is that this was the ideal the founders had in mind, to pursue an independent Pakistan.

The ideal of an essentially democratic, constitutional and pluralistic Pakistan, countered resistance from the Islamists in the early years who wanted an Islamic state in quest for recovering the lost mythical glory of Islam and the Muslims. However, the real threat to political modernism came from the military that wanted to create a strong, secure and development oriented Pakistan through "guided," "controlled," and "graduated" democracy. All military regimes have pursued economic developmentalism in the belief that it would produce an "appropriate," better and more durable and fertile social ground for the development of "genuine" democracy. Contrary to their "good" intentions and strategy, interventions by the military in politics and frequent deviations from the foundational republican ideas for decades, have often left Pakistan in the rough sea of power struggles and have created and entrenched multiple polarizations. The threat of radical Islam and terrorism

are simply consequences of one big failure—not resting and building Pakistan on the foundations of politically liberal ideas of its founders. These consequences have never been so sharp and violent anytime in Pakistan's history than what we have seen and experienced during the last two decades.

This book is a modest attempt to explore how Pakistan's national identity has become conflictive and how this populous Muslim country at the juncture of three strategic regions, and occupying a critical geopolitical space can be stabilized, secured and put on the course of progress. There are some hopeful signs in the restoration of parliamentary democracy, rise of middle class, freeing of media and its growth and emerging national consensus on countering terrorism and extremism. I argue that mere resilience of the society, or use of military means to defeat terrorism may not be enough for a stable and peaceful Pakistan. What the country may require is a robust, effective, and consistent effort to reengage with the founding ideas of political modernity and rebuild state institutions that would support a moderate, tolerant and pluralist society. Such a society will find that Islam and modernity are not conflictive but converge in support of universal values of peace, tolerance, humanity, and progress. This will certainly make Pakistan at peace within and without.

For more than four decades, besides other themes, I have been writing and teaching about Pakistan at several universities in Pakistan and abroad. Some of the ideas and views that I have expressed, and arguments advanced in this book, have developed during this time, but more intensively during my teaching at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) since 2002. At times, conflicting demands of teaching and institutional commitments have made it difficult to find time and opportunity to engage in serious academic work. Had it not been for the fledging scholarly community, bright and diverse students body and academic atmosphere of LUMS, I might have found it hard to keep writing. In this, and other such endeavors, I have been inspired by the example of classical scholars who believe that teaching and research are integral parts of the academic profession; one cannot excel in one without the other. It is in this spirit that I wish to engage in conversation on Pakistan in a holistic sense, and by using sub-disciplinary lenses of history, sociology, politics, and humanities. For this, I have greatly benefitted from national and international scholars of Pakistan Studies. I owe profound debt of gratitude to all of them. In particular, I would like to mention two of my academic friends, Professor M. Rafique Afzal and Professor Charles H. Kennedy for encouragement, support, and feedback on some of the central ideas of the book. They have critically appraised my work and given constructive advice.

I am also indebted to the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan for awarding me research grant to rework on the first draft of the manuscript. That was highly valuable in hiring research assistants and meeting travel

expenses for interviews. I owe greater debt to the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, LUMS for giving me research grants whenever I needed to support this work. I wish to extend a special note of gratitude to Dr. Ali Khan, the head of the HSS Department, and often an "acting" dean of the Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani School of Humanities and Social Sciences for his unflinching support to my research.

No less important, I am highly obliged to a number of my research assistants over the past many years for collecting material, reading chapters and helping with notes, bibliography, and references. Anam Husain and Shaza Fatima Khawaja devoted lot of their time and energy in helping me shape the first draft of the manuscript. I am deeply grateful to both of them. Muhammad Usman and Hooriya Rashid were also very helpful in assisting with references. Towards the end, Anam Fatima made excellent contributions to the polishing of the manuscript by editing and proofreading the content. I cannot thank her enough. Zainab Saeed deserves my special thanks for copyediting and making the manuscript more readable, which couldn't have been without her involvement. I would also like to acknowledge assistance of Ateeb Gul in editing the introduction of the book.

Brian Hill, acquisitions editor, and Eric Kuntzman, assistant acquisitions editor at Lexington Books, an imprint of Rowman & Littlefield, were encouraging and very supporting of this manuscript, guiding me competently to its completion. I also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for their very useful comments and suggestions for its improvement.

Finally, the support of my extended family—Faiza, Shan, Zainab, Sana and Ahad—has in many ways supported my academic work. Their love and affection, believing in me and cheering me up in my lows, have given me tremendous optimism and emotional support. My wife, Khalida, has been tolerant of long absence from home, keeping it warm for me, and welcoming me back over the weekends and during vacations. I appreciate her understanding and unfailing support to my academic career, and devotion to our family.

Chapter One

Introduction

The underlying proposition of this book is that Pakistan was a civic, republican project of the modernist Muslims in undivided India under the British rule. Most of them were intellectually influenced by the enlightenment ideas of European modernity—natural rights, rule of law, equality, justice and liberty—which they skillfully applied to the question of Muslims' empowerment. The Muslim reformers in the later part of the nineteenth century in the colonized Muslim world,[1] and in particular in India attempted to combine values of Islam and modernity. They believed that universal values of democracy and Islam were compatible.[2] Their modernism was however, contextualized in the Muslim political awakening—struggle for power, identity, and rights—and equally connected to Muslim culture and civilization. The Muslim modernists embraced Western learning, rationality, and democratic ideas as a way forward in an evolving political order at the national and global level.

The rise of Muslim political consciousness and Muslim modernity emerged around the same time—the late nineteenth century under colonial rule; both were reflected in the Muslim movements of religious and political revivalism. Without modern education, liberal social and political ideas, and political activism for rights, thus creation of a Muslim state of Pakistan could not have been possible. We also need to understand that modernism for the Muslims was not a rejection of religion, nor an absolute belief in secularism, as has largely been the case in the Western world. Muslim modernism aimed at the revival of the Muslim society by seeking the empowerment of Muslims through modern education, science, and technology, while retaining its Indo-Islamic civilization and traditions.

The Muslim modernist thought in the Subcontinent was as highly influenced by colonial undercurrents and rival communal struggles for identity, as

it was by a string of Islamic revivalist philosophies.[3] Two distinctly different influences produced two different streams of social movements among the Muslims to shape the destiny of Muslim society and to answer questions about power, identity, and participation in politics. These streams can be categorized as modernists and traditionalists. The modernist Muslim leaders embraced Western political ideas, such as democracy, parliament, popular sovereignty, and constitutionalism to empower the Muslims. They accepted these philosophical notions as universal in nature without any cultural or religious barriers and regarded them as essential tools of progress in the context of their times.

The modernists aimed to remove doubts and skepticism regarding notions of Islam being in conflict with scientific knowledge or being at odds with modern political institutions that embed the concept of popular sovereignty. Through Western learning, the modernists reached the conclusion that modernity and its political manifestation were the best means to help realize the dream of Muslim liberation.[4] Hence, they rejected the idea that Islam could be a barrier to human progress or that it clashed with the empowering and liberating principles of Western civilization.

The modernists had a broader civilizational view of Islam. They thought of Islam as a cultural and social force for defining Muslims' sense of individual and community. In the defining years of the independence movement Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, made a number of references to Islam and Islamic principles to support the two-nation theory, but he had a territorial state in mind where all religious communities would have equal rights as citizens of Pakistan.[5] According to the late Lawrence Ziring, one of the outstanding scholars of Pakistani politics, "Although he (Jinnah) didn't use the term "secularism," there can be little question that his vision of Pakistan was shaped by his immersion in the European experience."[6] This view of Jinnah's vision has become contested over the decades because of the political use of Islam, and Pakistan's search for an Islam identity.

The other stream of Muslim revivalism was essentially religious in character that sought empowerment through Muslim religious thought, purification of Muslim practices, and by investing in an autonomous religious institution—madrassa. It produced institutions of learning like Darul-Uloom, Deoband, translations of great Islamic books in Urdu and proliferation of Deobandi madrassas network throughout the Subcontinent. Although in the present context of Islamist-modernist dichotomy and controversies, the Deoband religious movement—the most strident, assertive, and expansionist—is generally labeled as traditionalist, it is a manifestation of Muslim modernity, as it also seeks empowerment using alternative intellectual means and resources but similar modern agencies of organization, group consciousness, identity, leadership, and other political tools. Both in our view converge on the question of Muslim identity. The traditionalists of Deoband, however,

rejected the idea of a separate Muslim state, but once it was founded, they sought the establishment of an Islamic state by interpreting the Pakistan movement in more religious than political terms. They have continued to challenge the modernist/secular perspective of Pakistan's creation.

This book represents an effort to understand how Pakistan's modernist destiny has become disputed as a result of the conflicting thoughts and struggles to shape it. The central questions this book seeks to answer are: why and how the idea behind Pakistan's creation has become disputed between two rival interpretations; one claiming Pakistan was created to represent the aspirations and interests of the Muslims and provide equal rights of citizenship to all as asserted by its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and the other claiming the purpose of creation was to become an Islamic state.[7] At the center of our engagement with this subject are three questions: 1) Is the emergence and growth of political Islam, including its radical fringe, organic to the character of the Pakistani society, or did it emerge out of a questionable choice of national security policy, and the convenient use of religion for popular politics? 2) How strong are Pakistan's modernist political traditions and state capacities to defeat the challenge of radical Islam? 3) Can Pakistan re-embrace its founding ideas of Muslim modernity—progressivism, pluralism and representation? In answering these questions, we need to explain the country's drift at the formative stage away from principles that define political modernity toward praetorianism, monopolization of power, centralization, and questionable pursuit of foreign and security policies.

When the euphoria of Muslim nationalism and common struggle for independence was over, the new Muslim nation state had to confront the hard facts of its geopolitical existence—ethnic diversity, two separate territorial units separated by not so friendly, and often hostile India, and multiple challenges of state and nation building. The crucial issues like the essential character of the new state—Islamic, secular, Muslim, or civic republic—and an agreement on societal goals were left open in the rhetoric and political language of the independence movement. The immediate heirs of the founders, who died or were killed within a few years, were not able to lead with a clear vision about the direction of the country. The bouts of power struggle among them, often personal and factional disoriented the country. Pakistan's biggest failure was a clear and decisive shift away from republicanism—the central idea of political modernity—to a growing dominance of civil and military establishment.[8] The ascendancy of the statist elite subverted constitutionalism, retarded democracy and pushed the ideals that defined the struggle for Pakistan, like autonomy of the constituent units and representation of the peoples to the sidelines of power politics.

The institutional imbalance of the early years has lingered on and continues to cast a heavy shadow in the form of unsettled civil-military relations, chaotic, dynastic politics, and low institutional development.[9] Disruptive

intervention by the military four times, ruling the country for more than thirty years, and when not in power, influencing political process from the shadows has left stubborn legacies that have made it hard for the successive civilian regimes to restore democratic normalcy or effectively address serious challenges of state and nation building. The deviation from political modernity—constitutionalism, rule of law and representative government—certainly under the military as well as authoritarian civilian elites has often created a legitimacy vacuum for the state. The country has witnessed a recurring phenomenon of appropriation of economic and political means by dictatorial, dynastic, undemocratic, corrupt military and civilian elites. The usurpation of power, through the centralization of authority around a single military general, has raised serious questions about federalism, national integrity, and nationhood. Lack of genuine representation alienated diverse ethnic groups, generating multiple strands of ethnicity and even insurgencies as in the case of Balochistan. At the societal level the weaker, minority ethnic groups found themselves disenfranchised, underrepresented, and thus distrustful of central political authority and the political process that they have seen as subverted and manufactured to suit the interests of the military dictators and their subordinate political leaders and parties. The military regimes and their hybrid "true" democracy have created social and political conditions that have been supportive of a security state model. We argue that even with a feudalistic character and stubborn social hierarchies, the logic of competitive, electoral politics would have compelled the elites of Pakistan to improve the quality of democracy, federalism, and representation. Their failure lies in the legacies of military rule more than in the social structures of the society. The political elites have found it difficult to reverse the institutional decay caused by the long years of military rule, because the military rulers by political necessity subverted the constitution, parliament, judiciary, bureaucracy and political parties—each vital in its own right—to stay in power and implement their personalized agenda of reforms. While in power, they co-opted and promoted a corrupt political class, made alliances with extremist, violent religious and political groups, and changed the character of the constitution from parliamentary to variants of an of executive presidential model.

Therefore, the real cause of Pakistan's decline as a state is political dysfunctionalism—the institutional subversion and alternation between the military interventions and dynastic political leaders. Neither regime-type has had any regard for democratic principles or the rule of law, but we feel that relative openness and the competitive nature of politics of the civilian, democratic regimes have demonstrated a possibility of transitioning to a genuine democracy. After every military rule, they started with a deficient democratic culture. The praetorian rule had suffocated the natural growth of democracy by stunting the institutional development and creating an imbalance among the state institutions, and between the civilian and military sectors of pow-

er.[10] When democracy got restored, it confronted stubborn legacies in the form of constitutional subversion and political fragmentation.[11] Therefore, the record of the political forces has been limited with respect to institutional development, economic performance and governance, often resulting in the crisis of legitimacy for elected politicians and parties. Besides the legacies of military rule, the elite social structures, dynastic character of politics and low level of civic engagement, make the state apparatus relatively autonomous from the civil society—meaning that it is not responsive to the society, as it is not sufficiently impacted by the general public.

After seventy years of independence, Pakistan remains a nation and state in the making with troubled legacies and conflicting views on its national identity, civil-military relations, federalism, democracy, and the rightful place of Islam in politics and state affairs. These controversies have given rise to a much broader debate on Islam and modernity, which is at the heart of this book. How to harmonize modernity with Islam or Islam with modernization has proved to be an unsettling, lingering, and often an explosive issue in politics. The reason is that Pakistan's genesis as a Muslim nation state owing to the two-nation theory coupled with state-sponsored Islamization of politics and society have made the accommodation between the different views of Islam and problematic. Pakistan is not unique in this regard, as other post-colonial Muslim states in the Middle East and elsewhere have faced similar issues.[12] Contrary to the perspective of Muslim modernists who argue that Islam and modernity have no philosophical or value conflict, many scholars of Islam and Islamic history have asserted that Islam, the religion itself and its culture, are not in harmony with the universal ideas of modernity. This is the basis for much of the intellectual thought of the orientalists and their uncritical followers in Muslim societies.[13] They argue that unless Islam goes through re-interpretation and revision on fundamental modern day issues of politics, economy, and social attitudes, Muslim societies will continue to face a duel between religious extremists, with terrorism and violence as their weapon of choice, and moderate sections that are seeking protection and refuge within the weakened states. This view of Islam and Islamic societies is questionable and has been widely contested by many scholars of Islam and Islamic societies.[14]

As we argue in this book, there have been multiple streams of Islamic thought and practices in the Subcontinent, and now in Pakistan that may broadly be characterized as traditionalism, fundamentalism, political Islam or Islamism and Islamic radicalism. Diversity within the Islamic faith is a historical fact and a current political reality. Muslim societies have historically been at peace with religious diversity, and at peace with a pluralistic, modernist, and democratic political framework. Historically, the "binaries of tradition and the modern" have merged as the traditional ulema stressed the importance of "acquiring knowledge, while modernist Muslims were merely

interested in degrees of for jobs," which "raises political and philosophical questions about the relationship between traditional groups and modernizing tendencies under colonialism."[15] Vast Muslim populations of Pakistan are by large moderate and practice the popular, syncretic version of Islam. Compared to a long history of peaceful co-existence and harmony among different sects of Islam and a creative, self-reflective religious and social dialogue among them for centuries, the rise of dangerous strands of extremism, sectarianism and militancy is largely a Cold War phenomenon and wars of Afghanistan.[16] A jihadist mind-set has been in the making as one of the major consequences of the state policy of supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen and the Afghan Taliban. Consequently, Pakistan has found itself embroiled in a long war with the Islamic militant groups, like Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and a variety of sectarian groups that are involved in terrorism against the state and society.[17] We cannot understand the current problems of Pakistani state and society ranging from institutional decay to extremism without explaining how it became insecure by attempting to secure itself through a policy of 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan. Our argument is that much of the chaos that Pakistan faces today, is a result of mistaken security and foreign polices related to Afghanistan and the adjacent the regions.

Fed on conspiracy theories for decades, the Pakistani society has lost a sense of self-reflection. The result is that the laymen and women and even the political class do not recognize internal failures, institutional as well as personal, but instead they tend to blame invisible external "adversaries" for what has happened to the country over the past three decades or so. This is primarily due to a weak tradition of critical self-refection in Pakistan that is compounded by a rampant conspiratorial worldview.[18] This prevents the ruling elites, political groups, and the media from paying attention to real issues and exploring the real reasons for 'failure', on both domestic as well as on the external policy fronts. For instance, while the reign of terror unleashed by the homegrown Islamic radical groups—TTP and the notorious Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—targeted innocent citizen, security personnel and civil society activists for almost a decade, the media persons and even the liberal intellectuals refused to acknowledge the growth of sectarian and extremist tendencies in the society.[19] They saw it more as a work of foreign adversaries rather than the growing power and influence of transnational Jihadist networks—once allies in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. There has been very slow awakening of the country to the challenge of radical Islam. The murder of more than 17,000 citizens (including the security forces), injuries to more than 42,000 people, and repeated attacks on widespread locations including places of worship, religious rallies, hotels, markets and even the General Head Quarters of the armed forces did not create enough of a national consensus that radical Islam posed the gravest threat to national security.[20] It was finally, the massacre of school children at the Army Public School in

Peshawar on December 16, 2014 that has changed the discourse on radical Islam and the threat it poses to national security.[21]

The point that needs to be emphasized is that it is not Islam being in conflict with modernity but, more important, how the state handles this relationship and isolates the state from the disruptive influence of the radical Islamic fringe. Islam and modernity, or modernity in Islamic societies with strong Islamic culture would produce few conflicts if they would allow the two respective spheres to take their specific paths—politics by the state and religion as a private matter that would be secure in the custody of the society. This conventional two-sphere perspective ensured peace, stability, and order in the Muslim society for over a millennium until the reconfiguration of Islam as a political ideology in both colonial and post-colonial settings.[22] Pakistan lost social consensus on this dual-track accommodation less than three decades ago. Before the creation of Pakistan, its constituent regions exhibited great diversity, including religious pluralism and tolerance toward other religious groups. The interfaith harmony was lost in the years preceding the partition of British India into two states of India and Pakistan.[23] The communalization of religious identities, communal atrocities, and forced migration of minorities have forever changed the old social milieu of Pakistan—for the worst. With the departure of Hindus and Sikhs in large numbers particularly from the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan lost its religious pluralism and centuries-old structure of social relations. However, there are places left in Pakistan where we can see some glimpses of the old social order with a common culture and inclusive multi-religious communities living in peaceful accommodation.[24]

Not all is lost and what has been lost can be recovered by appropriate, reformist, and effective state policies. The most remarkable thing about Pakistan is that it has survived all the challenges since independence—wars with India, great power interventions in Afghanistan and their spillover effects on the state and society, multiple insurgencies by ethnic and religious groups, and four military interventions, disrupting natural institutional development. Even with some corrosion, Pakistan is one of the most robust states in its institutional frame. It has managed its diversity and ethnic pluralism, diffused or defeated insurgencies, and shown resilience in pulling itself back from the precipice several times. The bureaucracy and the military and its allied institutional networks, along with the judiciary have continued to steer the country out of crises. The political and constitutional battles have often stretched them beyond their normal capacity. The bureaucracy and judiciary have been weakened because of interventions by the military and greater influence over them. These two critical institutions have also been challenged by the dynastic political regimes through political patronage. They have worked under tremendous pressure and with minimal institutional autonomy, but when given the space and opportunity they have performed with professionalism.[25]

There have been periods of stability and order during which Pakistan has made good progress. It achieved a higher economic growth than its neighbors, built up its industrial infrastructure, and connected with the western world as an ally, besides taking initiatives to forge unity among Muslim counties. Cumulatively, Pakistan's economic progress, despite problems often self-inflected, has not been meager. Its GDP has grown at the average rate of 5 percent annually between 1947 and 2014.[26] Its economy despite many shocks has grown many folds and now it is in the range of per capita income that according to the World Bank index is ranked as a low-middle-income country.[27] Due to the development of a parallel informal economy—a sign of state weakness—the real wealth of the nation is not reflected in the official figures.

A political consensus on parliamentary democracy is one of the most enduring achievements of Pakistan. While the military regimes turned the political system into presidential or semi-presidential, the political parties, with remarkable unanimity, have amended the Constitution to restore its parliamentary character.[28] This is important in a sense since it shows elite consensus or a social compact on the basic political framework of the country. There has been further progress on constitutional development with the passage of the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution that has greatly redefined federalism in Pakistan.[29] However there are serious questions about the quality of democracy in the country, which is often dysfunctional, lacks effective institutions of accountability, and is marred by massive elite corruption.[30] Patronage politics and weakened rule of law and issue of governance raise serious questions about the efficacy of the elected, "democratic" governments.

There are also problems of consolidating democracy. What are needed for transforming Pakistani democracy from being procedural, as it is, to substantive are a series of peaceful transitions from one party to another, electoral reforms, transparent and free elections, and preventing the military to play an interventionist role behind the scenes. In 2013, for the first time in its history, political power has changed hands from one elected party to another. If democracy remains on the rails, even with a slower pace, more transitions would make it harder for the military to intervene.[31] Such democratic continuity along with a modicum of better governance will address the issue of Pakistan's troubled civil-military relations, and will increasingly create more policy space for the civilian sector.

The biggest untold story of Pakistan is rise of the middle class, which is estimated to be between 38 and 42 percent, around 84,000,000, a population size that is bigger than the entire population of Germany.[32] It is both in the urban areas as well as in the green belts of the Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). On account of the rapid expansion of education, the professional and service sectors have expanded in the urban areas. In the

rural regions, the capitalization of agriculture and rise in the value of agricultural commodities has produced new wealth that has added great numbers to the rural middle class. This class is different in many ways from its urban equivalent from the urban middle class, but due to a solid, independent source of income, the rural middle has achieved autonomy, and social and physical mobility. One of the major consequences of the expansion of agricultural wealth is the two-way effect on migration to urban areas. First, the relatively richer sections now have the economic means to move to suitable urban areas, starting from district town to provincial metropolis, aspiring for education, security and asserting their new identity. The landless, the poor in the rural areas left jobless by the capitalization of agriculture or just for seeking better employment avenues have also been moving in great numbers to the district towns and major cities around the country. Indeed, Pakistan is the fastest urbanizing country in the region.[33] This will have positive effects on democracy, civil society activism, and economic productivity. With all the initial problems of urban sprawling and unorganized growth, which plagues most of the developing countries, the development of urban areas creates clusters, which are estimated to cover more than fifty percent of the population, will change the locus of power from the feudal dynastic families to performance based political parties and new urban social and political movements.

Pakistan has one of the most robust civil societies in the developing world.[34] The civil society organizations have grown into tens of thousands and operate in every part of the country in every field of activity from advocacy of rights of certain groups to development at local levels.[35] The space for civil society and its activism has grown over the last three decades. It is one of the positive gains of the deep-rooted tradition of freedom of expression and association since the colonial times. Very few developing democracies can match the degree of freedoms that Pakistan civil society exercises, ranging from gender equality advocates to the ethnic, religious, and all forms of political parties and groups.

The development of electronic media is also one of the big stories of success and future hope in the country. Unlike the first half-century of independence, Pakistan has now hundreds of twenty-four-hour radio and television stations. The Pakistani state doesn't have monopoly over the information or political communication that it once possessed. The civil society, public intellectuals, and the political parties have captured far greater space than the representatives of any ruling parties. Sometimes, the free media "breaking the news" and more interested in viewer numbers and ranking promotes political conflict and informational chaos. However, it is one of the problems of its sudden growth that raises issues about professionalism, norms and code of conduct, as well as adequacy of regulation. A remarkable thing about the media is that its diversity from national to regional levels

provides the viewers with a wide range in the articulation of opinions and brings into debate national issues with plural perspectives. Its growth reflects new accommodation between the state and the civil society, but at a larger scale, it is a manifestation of the globalization of information and a consequence of new technologies. Its openness carries the promise of cultivating a culture of open debate and discussion in Pakistan that has deep roots.

What provides greater hope for further progress of the country than any other thing is the resilience of the Pakistani society. It has youthfulness, spirit, energy, habit of hard work, and a culture of giving to charity that empowers it to work toward collective good.[36] These characteristics have kept the Pakistani society hardy and robust and have filled in many of the gaps in social and economic development left by the chronic weakness of the state. It is often the disconnect between an autonomous state in the habit of borrowing and seeking foreign aid and an amorphous, individualistic society that prevents the state from harnessing the energies of the society for national development.[37] This is the reason why Pakistan has performed far below its potential in social development as compared to some of its other South Asian neighbors.[38] We have argued that better performance of governments, people-centered policy outlook, reconstruction of welfare state and focus on the rule of law and governability would produce multiple strands of connectivity, reciprocity, and responsiveness between the state and society. The two develop and grow organically in cooperation and mutual assistance, more through democratic politics than by any other means.

Finally, Pakistan has achieved a greater sense of national solidarity and unity than it is often recognized. Trans-ethnic and regional migration, urbanization and the greater mobility of the middle classes have played a major role in developing a deeper sense of Pakistani nationalism. The Urdu language and Urdu media from radio and television to wide national circulation of Urdu news papers and literature in every genre from religious to secular has quietly promoted a sense of composite national culture as an overlay of regional cultures. It is not just the role of Urdu which found its roots in salient areas of the constituent regions of present-day Pakistan almost a century before the idea of Pakistan was conceived. It was then the language of the poets, literates, and intellectuals. Now it has become a mass language. In developing national culture, a common language is one of the many critical factors. In the case of Pakistan, it has been common religion, history, shared political aspirations and struggle for independence, and survival in the face of critical challenges that have played a role of a catalyst in forging unity.

There are many hopeful signs of Pakistan rebalancing itself as a modernist and moderate Muslim state in the image of its founders. However there the deeper challenges it faces, which are ideological and structural, and have grown too complex in the vital areas of domestic security and governance. Pakistan's ability to overcome these problems and achieve greater degree of

political modernity would rest on the ability of its political elites to develop inclusive politics, promote wider political participation, guarantee equal rights on the basis of citizenship and deepen a shared sense of Pakistani nationalism among the constituent regions of the country. While pursing a constitutional, democratic course for its identity, it will have to re-engage itself with ethnic pluralism, religious tolerance and cultivate primacy of republican ideas over the praetorian impulses.

NOTES

1. Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964* (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1967); Hafeez Malik, *Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

2. Charles Kurzman, ed., *Modernist Islam, 1840–1940*: *A Sourcebook* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Sir Syed Ahmed Khan the founder of first Muslim University, the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College that later developed into Aligarh Muslim University in India, first founded a Scientific Society to translate Western scientific works into Urdu, the language of the Muslim literary class of central Indian Muslims. Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan*, 37.

3. S. Moinul Haq, *Islamic Thought and Movements in the Subcontinent, 711–1947* (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1979); Muhammad Khalid Masud, *Atharween Sadi Esavi Mein Bar-e-Saghir Mein Islami Fikr key Rahnuma* (Leaders of Islamic thought in the subcontinent in the eighteenth century) (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, 2008).

4. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, "Muslim Reformer," "Countrymen and Progress in Education," and "Oriental Sciences and Arts," all in *Selected Essays of Sir Syed Ahmad,* Vol. 1., trans. Muhammad Hameedullah (Aligarh, India: Aligarh Muslim University Press, 2004), 9–23, 67–81, and 83–95; Muhammad Iqbal, "Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal," in *Modernist Islam*, ed. Charles Kurzman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 304–313; Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, *Islamic Renaissance in South Asia, 1707–1867: The Role of Shāh Walī Allāh and His Successors* (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, 2002), 165–262.

5. Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusfi, *Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam*, Vol. 4: *1946–1948* (Lahore: Bazm-e-Iqbal, 1996).

6. Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan: The Vision and the Reality," *Asian Affairs* 4, no. 6 (July–August, 1977), 386.

7. Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in his speech on August 11, 1947 before the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Liaquat H. Merchant and Sharif Al Mujahid, eds., *The Jinnah Anthology*, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 115.

8. Allen McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996).

9. Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

10. Ibid.

11. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Legacy of Military Rule in Pakistan," *Survival* 31, no. 3 (May–June 1989): 255–268.

12. Chiragh Ali, *The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and Other Mohammedan States* (Bombay: Education Society, 1883); Sir Syed Ahmad Khān, *Maqālāt-i Sir Sayyid*, ed. Muhammad Ismail Panipati (Lahore: Majlis-i Taraqqi-yi Adab, 1962), 87–92, translated by Kamran Talattof in *Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought*, ed. Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (London: Macmillan, 2000).

13. There are two opposite views on whether or not Islam is compatible with liberal democracy. One view represented by the orientalist is that it is not. See, for instance, Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Judith Miller, *God Has Ninety-Nine Names* (New York: Touchstone, 1997); Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture* (London: Frank Cass, 1994); Adrian Karatnycky, "Muslim Countries and Democracy Gap," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (January 2002). For those who think Islam is compatible with democracy, see John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); Charles Kurzman, ed., *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Fareed Zakaria, "Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 1–20.

14. John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think* (New York: Gallup Press, 2008); John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); John L. Esposito *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

15. S. Akbar Zaidi, "Contested Identities and Muslim Qaum in North India: c. 1860–1900" (PhD diss., Churchill College, University of Cambridge, 2009), 250.

16. Riaz Mohammad Khan, *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15–16.

17. Moeed Yusuf, ed., *Pakistan's Counterterrorism Challenge* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014); Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); Khalid Ahmed, *Sleepwalking to Surrender: Dealing with Terrorism in Pakistan* (New Delhi: Penguin Books Limited, 2016); Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Alah, The Army and America's War on Terrorism* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004).

18. Marvin Weinbaum, "Civic Culture and Democracy in Pakistan" *Asian Survey* 36, no. 7 (July 1996): 639–654.

19. Ayaz Amir, "Fighting Someone Else's War" *Dawn*, August 17, 2007; Saeed Shah, "Pakistanis to Clinton: War on Terror Is Not Our War," *McClatchy Newspapers*, October 30, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24562369.html.

20. This figure has been compiled from the data provided to the author by the National Counter Terrorism Authority, a federal government agency under the Ministry of Interior, Islamabad, April 2016.

21. Ismail Khan, "Taliban Massacre 131 School Children: Principal among 141 Dead in Attack on Army Public School, Peshawar," *Dawn*, December 17, 2014.

22. Khalifa Abdul Hakim, *Islamic Ideology* (Lahore: Dr. Rashid Ahmad, 1998); Khaled Hroub, *Political Islam: Context Versus Ideology* (London: SOAS Middle East Issues, 2010).

23. Paul R. Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946–47: Means, Methods, and Purposes," *Journal of Genocide Research* 5, no. 1 (2003): 71–101.

24. For instance, see an article by Nafisa Hoodbhoy, "The 'Green Desert' of Tharparkar," *Express Tribune* (Islamabad), October 2, 2013.

25. The case of two police departments—Motorway Police and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police is instructive. With autonomy, they have become a role model for the rest of the country. "Motorway Police a Role Model Institution: PM," *Express Tribune*, December 31, 2014; Farhat Ullah, "Policing with Passion—KP Police Initiatives," *Pakistan Journal of Criminology* 7, no. 1 (January 2015).

26. Rashid Amjad, "The Challenges of a Resilient Economy" in *Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence,* ed. Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 193.

27. http://www.espa.ac.uk/files/espa/AO-ESPA-2016-Annex%201-Low-income-countries.pdf.

28. By remarkable consensus, all the political parties purged the 1973 Constitution of article 58(2b) that gave the president power to dissolve the national assemblies, first by thirteenth amendment, and then second time by eighteenth amendment.

29. Mian Raza Rabbani, *A Biography of Pakistani Federalism: Unity in Diversity* (Islamabad: Leo Books, 2014).

30. Maya Tudor, "Enduring Challenges to Democracy," in Ahmad and Rafiq, *Pakistan's Democratic Transition*, 39–52.

31. Mark Peceny, "The Social Construction of Democracy" (review essay), *International Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 95–102; Doh Chull Shin, "Review Article: On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research," *World Politics* 47 (October 1994): 135–170.

32. Salman Siddiqui, "Pakistan's Middle Class Continues to Grow at Rapid Pace," *Express Tribune*, May 2, 2017; Saeed Shah, "Pakistan's Middle Class Soars as Stability Returns," *Wall Street Journal*, February 1, 2017.

33. Michael Kugelman, ed., *Pakistan's Runaway Urbanization: What Can Be Done?* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2014), 1–20.

34. S. Akbar Zaidi, *Military, Civil Society and Democratization in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2011); Anita M. Weiss and S. Zulfiqar Gilani, *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

35. Asian Development Bank, *Overview of Civil Society Organization: Pakistan* (Manila: ADB, May 2009).

36. "In per capita terms, giving in Pakistan is higher than many industrialized countries." See "Welcome Address by Dr. S, Kiassim-Lakha at the Conference of Indigenous Philanthropy," delivered October 2000, Islamabad, http://www.akdn.org/speech/welcome-address-dr-s-kassim-lakha-conference-indigenous-philanthropy.

37. According the Federal Board of Revenue, tax to GDP ratio has increased from 8.7 percent in 2005–2006 to 10.5 percent in 2015–2016 (see http://www.pkrevenue.com/tag/tax-to-gdp-ratio/). It is only 50 percent of the tax capacity of the country that the International Monetary Fund estimates to at 22.3 percent. Shahbaz Rana, "Pakistan Faces Rs3.3 Trillion Revenue Black Hole, Says IMF," *Express Tribune,* January 14, 2016.

38. Pakistan occupies 147th position among 188 countries, while India is ranked at 131 and Bangladesh at 139. Hurmat Majid, "Pakistan Last Country to Fall in 'Medium Human Development' Group, Says UNDP," *Dawn* , March 23, 2017. Pakistan has continued to improve its Human Development Index (HDI) ranking. From 1990 to 2015, its improvement has been 32.6 percent (see http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PAK.pdf).

Chapter Two

Islam and the State

The basis for the character and identity of Pakistan and the foundational principles for state and nation building have proved to be a controversial question that continues to create chasms along religious, regional, and political lines in the country. In the decisive phase of Pakistan's formation, the political leaders, bureaucracy, and the emerging military failed to work out a coherent and consensual set of ideas for defining the new state—symbolizing polarization and factional politics from the early years. From the passing of the divisive Objectives Resolution in 1949 to the late adoption of a constitution in 1956, the country lost the essence of the ideals of its creation, which aimed to create a territorial nation state committed to empowerment, equality, and citizenship rights for all. Thus, from its onset Pakistan's identity and character became contested and continue to remain so even today.

Many distorted ideas are presented to explain Pakistan's creation and the vision of its founders, which are supported and perpetuated by numerous contending political and religious groups that interpret the Pakistan movement to justify their own brand of politics. In reality, the leaders that struggled to carve Pakistan out of the Muslim majority areas were westernized, English-educated, and modern Muslims. They were advocates of Muslim empowerment, revival of the community through modern education and science, Western ideas of progress, and democratic institutions. Present day Pakistan bears little resemblance to the one its founders had conceived and struggled for. Contrary to the founders' ideals of unity, solidarity, and freedom, the Pakistani state and society have become entangled in the divisive politics of Islam that has morphed into radical Islamism, extremism, and terrorism. In contemporary times, these present the gravest challenges to the security of the state and coherence of Pakistani society. The radical brand of Islam, which has advocates and allies in factions claiming to pursue their

Islamic dream through constitutional politics, is engaged in a deadly war with the Pakistani state that has had very high human and material costs. [1]

One may argue that the challenge of radical Islam is not unique to Pakistan, as it is experienced in varying degrees of intensity across many other Muslim states and regions. The rise of extremist and violent ideas in Muslim-dominated regions of the world, including Pakistan, has been a subject of intense debate in the global academy and think tanks, which has had strong bearings on perceptions of Muslim states and societies and the resulting policies toward them. [2] There is an emerging consensus that the rise of radical Islam presents a global challenge. For that reason, while defeating it may require a good degree of international cooperation, the solutions must come from the states where it has emerged, which necessitates that we explore why and how it gained strength. The use of modern means of communication allows the influence of radical groups to spill from one Muslim country to another. For religious and cultural reasons and on account of multiple failures of Muslim states, they find fertile ground among alienated, unemployable, and uneducated youth for creating terror networks. Radical Islam has established roots, in varying forms and intensities, in every Muslim society today and its violent ideas have also gripped the minds of young people from culturally isolated and marginalized sections of European and North American societies where significant numbers of Muslim migrants live. [3]

Investigating Islamic politics, more specifically its radical fringe, in the context of Pakistan poses many troubling questions. Why have the religious political parties performed so poorly in democratic contests against the traditional political forces while doing so much better in the streets? How aligned is the vision of an Islamic state among the competing political and religious parties? Have some or all of the religious parties given up on institutionalism as a path to political power? These fundamental questions must be answered in order to explain the changing relationship of Islam with the state and society in Pakistan. While the answers to these questions lead to more questions, our intention in this book is to focus on three essential variables—the state building process in the formative phase, the social structure of the dominant elites and their patronage politics, and governance failure, that is the inability or lack of will of the ruling groups to define a clear political path for political and social development.

With Jinnah, the charismatic and dominant captain of the Pakistan movement, gone within a year of Pakistan's creation, the ship of Pakistan entered turbulent waters and started losing its sense of direction. Power groups, factions, and every institution of the nascent state found itself embroiled in pursuit of narrow interests, leaving the larger question about the character of the state unattended, and even yielding ground to the religious right that had begun to stake claim in redefining Pakistan. This resulted in the vision of Pakistan becoming blurred with no individual leader or institution possessing

the power or strong inclination to give it direction. The constitutional questions such as federalism, popular representation, the role of religion, and distribution of power within the state organs took too much time to settle. While deciding the place and role for Islam, the contending political forces showed vagueness, indecision and a tendency of appeasement to the growing power of the Islamic clerics.[4] Outlining the character of the state grew complicated, controversial, and highly contested.

Pakistan's ideological dilemma was shaped by the conflicting urges of retaining the modernist legacy, as introduced by the imperial power, and atavism of the religious and conservative sections of society who wanted to turn the new state used religion and historical myths to recover the imaginary lost glory of Islam. One may even argue that the quest for Pakistan was polarized even before the country's birth, between Indian nationalist Muslims seeking to pursue collective interests within the framework of Indian democracy, on the one hand, and those struggling for an independent Pakistan, arguing that equality and political power were not possible within the Indian fold, on the other.[5]

There was another critical dimension of the divide among Muslims; some sections of the Deobandi clergy opposed the creation of Pakistan as it would not be an Islamic state and others within the same sect opposed it because the idea of Muslim nationalism in India was not acceptable to them.[6] Ironically, Islamic clerics of the same sect organized into the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and now stake a greater claim in shaping the Islamic identity of Pakistan.[7] Contrary to what their leading lights said or their group's aloofness from the independence movement, they interpret the creation of Pakistan as a state for the establishment of an Islamic order in which their interpretation of Islam should reign supreme.[8]

Chaotic political transitions and inability of the new ruling groups of the country to deliver on framing a new constitution or achieving any consensus on the ideological character of the state made the task of defining Pakistan harder and more complicated with every successive year. The fragmentation and squalling among the political forces provided an opportunity for the military to step in. Democracy and constitutionalism were thus crippled before they could be strong enough to even walk in the tribal and feudal social climate of the country.

Military's influence increased further by the beginning of the Cold War. Resources made available by the Western powers developed the Pakistan Army faster and much stronger than other institutions. Pakistan had a new institutional player, the military, on the political stage to reshape the state according to its vision of politics—a vision that was grounded for the most part in its beliefs of national power and progress. In its scheme of thought, the political class was no good at the task of state and nation building and could serve only as a subordinate political ally, and provide a political link

with the broader society in which politicians had social roots.[9] The rise of the military and its intervention further delayed a natural evolution of a national consensus on the constitutional framework of the state, opening all flanks of the state and society to attacks from Islamists, ethno-nationalists, and democratic forces that increasingly questioned the state building process by the statist elites—the military and bureaucracy.

THE CONTESTED MEANINGS OF PAKISTAN

For a long time, Pakistan has lived in a state of multiple contestations over its soul, as the issue of its destiny remains in the grey area between being a territorial nation state with pluralistic ethnic communities and an Islamic state forced into uniformity under Islam. The military, as indicated earlier, represents another dimension of this tri-polarity with its own view of Pakistan. Their rivalry and respective struggles are no longer peaceful as some of the Islamist factions have become radicalized. The clash between the Pakistani state and the Islamic radicals, once allies in the Afghan wars, has never been as sharp and as horrifyingly violent in Pakistan's history as witnessed during the past decade. However, the scope of violence and the groups involved in violence in Pakistan are much broader than just the radical Islamists. The tendency to resort to violence is a consequence of the unsettled question of the character of the Pakistani state—whether it ought to be democratic-secular, an Islamic state, or to be ruled by the military that has governed it for roughly half of its existence.

Democracy, military rule, and Islam as a political ideology present three contrasting views of the Pakistani state and nation. Theoretically, and also in terms of historical patterns of state and nation building, the three competing alternatives are fundamentally in conflict. At the center of Pakistan's political conflicts and crises for the last seventy years is a struggle among these forces over capturing control of the state and enforcing their ideas about shaping its ideological and institutional structure.

These forces and actors diverge greatly, both institutionally and ideologically, and have garnered separate constituencies of support in society regarding their view of Pakistan. However, they have not conducted their practical politics in competition and conflict or independent of one another. Rather, the dynamics of power have pushed their ideological differences into obliviousness and to pursue their respective interests, they have formed multiple opportunistic alliances. Quite often, the religious groups and parties and the military have entered into alliance to counter mainstream political parties that have popular support bases and have struggled to revive democracy under all four military dictators. The Islamic groups have however, not been the only political allies of the military.

The military establishment from the first military rule of General Moham- mad Ayub Khan (1958–1969) to the fourth military regime of Pervez Mu- sharraf (1999–2008), sought and found willing political allies from almost every kind of political party. Simultaneously, it also courted the support of influential political families of the country. Consequently, none of the mili- tary regimes established a pure military rule; instead, they created a hybrid of military and dominant political classes, with the latter working as subordi- nates to the military rulers. In doing so, the military establishment subverted the natural political process, fragmented the mainstream political parties, and furthered its domestic and foreign security agenda via religion and religious groups, particularly toward Afghanistan and India. The military rule and its uncanny alliances have produced obvious conflict, polarization, and frag- mentation in Pakistani politics and society. But more than that, these alli- ances have further confused the fundamental question of the character of the Pakistani state, which continues to remain contested.

The military has been able to rule the country and work out supportive political coalitions by adopting multiple policies of divide and rule and using its power to dole out state patronage. There are no doubts about the military's political dominance, at least in the past, and its rise as a powerful political machine can be attributed to a number of complex reasons.[10] Obviously, its structural coherence, institutionalized nature, and organizational role in the historical context of Pakistan have permitted it to interfere in politics without much resistance.[11] On the other hand, the weakness of the political system, the failure of the political leadership, and confrontational politics leading to political instability provided the rationale, opportunity, and to some degree public support for the military to intervene in politics. It is also important to note that the military commands greater acceptance in society compared to the other two competing alternatives—Islam and democracy. While Pakistan is going through its third democratic transition and has celebrated a peaceful transfer of power from one civilian government to another, worries are abounding about democracy's onward march. The first worry is the popular- ity of the military as most public opinion surveys suggest that eight in ten Pakistanis highly approve of the military's impact on the country.[12] This rating has been consistent for the last half-decade or so. The second and more worrisome reason is the youth's disenchantment with democracy; findings from a British Council Pakistan survey in 2013 among the youth—between the ages eighteen and twenty-nine—revealed that only 23 percent of young men and women think democracy has been good for Pakistan, even though 29 percent of them believe it is the best system. After the military, support for the Islamic alternative is about 33 percent, which is still higher than democracy.[13]

The other two forces, the democratic-political and the religious-Islamist have many divisions within them, often resulting in long periods of political

confrontation. Alliances between these two groups of parties and factions while in opposition or in governments at the federal or provincial levels have been common in the politics of Pakistan. Ideology apart, they have pursued a common agenda of toppling governments through agitation, such as the Pakistan National Alliance (1977), or have formed governing coalitions several times in Pakistan's history. The three-dimensional politics of dual-track alliances and confrontations, as opportunistic as they have been, have proved to be detrimental to evolving and consolidating a stable political framework of constitutional democracy in Pakistan. This failure has severally impacted the state and nation building process, which even today seems like work in progress, due to a fragile democracy and weak constitutional rule.

DECLINING POLITICAL HERITAGE

The democratic political heritage of Pakistan, meager as it was, has further declined with the many bouts of political confrontation among the political parties and the military. The silver lining, however, is that neither the elected oligarchies with their questionable democratic credentials nor the military regimes responsible for subverting constitutionalism, have been able to completely destroy everything that Pakistan inherited from the British with respect to colonial state building in the Indian Subcontinent. The political institutions, which have been based essentially on the British parliamentary form of government, have not found any other workable and consensual political substitute. All four military rulers either introduced an outright presidential system or changed the 1973 parliamentary constitution fundamentally to an executive presidency. Their political legacy has not survived, as the political parties after restoration of democracy have reverted back to parliamentary democracy twice by amending the Constitution with remarkable consensus.[14]

The irony is that while the civilian leaders were willing to purge the Constitution of provisions such as the eighth and sixteenth amendments that had corrupted the Constitution by changing its fundamental character from parliamentary to semi-presidential, they were averse to taking out Islamic provisions that had been inserted by the third military ruler, Zia ul Haq. Fearful of their own weaknesses and out of political expediency, they did not wish to annoy or alienate the Islamist constituency. Some political parties even struck alliances with the Islamists, such as the ruling Pakistan Muslim League—Nawaz, and have stayed right of center in ideological polarization. It is on account of Islamist factions that the political system of Pakistan has evolved into a hybrid with a heavy imprint of Islamic ideas, laws, and principles that have gradually moved the country away from its original secular orientation where religion was never understood to determine or shape the

central elements of the state and nation building. This has given rise to the debate, for the right reasons, whether or not the larger aspects of the state system that are rooted in colonial political modernity have survived the Islamic appellations. [15]

In terms of the constitutional framework, Pakistan's colonial political modernity has been subjected to two subversions, one from the military rulers, and the second from the Islamists who have exerted a far greater influence than their actual public support. However, some of the core foundational ideas of Pakistan's political heritage have endured such as the acceptance of parliamentary democracy among the political elites and urbanized sections of society. The choice of this system fits well with their political interest in ensuring rights, free expression, and individual empowerment. These are the universal aspirations of the relatively urbanized and more empowered sections of modern societies. In the context of Pakistan, the definition of these modernist political goals and their practical manifestation are greatly tampered by the local cultures, history, and personalized power plays of dynastic politics.

It is debatable whether the ideas and institutions of a democratic form of government have strong roots in the idea of the creation of Pakistan as a separate Muslim state. The protagonists of Pakistan then and now insist that the creation of Pakistan was a democratic act—a sort of right of self-determination to carve out a state in the Muslim majority areas. Others, however, insist that the Muslim League and its leaders rejected a democratic option within the Indian union on the pretext that they would be reduced to a permanent minority. That was not however the central issue in the struggle of the Muslim League; the objective was to win an independent state after the failure of protracted negotiations to produce a satisfactory solution for the Muslim leadership. A general sense of Muslim consensus and a popular sentiment for the new state in the political climate of the independence movement is no less democratic than other nationalist movements. In terms of democracy, the most important factors during that period appear to be mass mobilization, strong aspirations for a new state, a Muslim sense of identity, and a drive to win Pakistan through peaceful and negotiated legal and constitutional means.

The movement for the new country was one of the great achievements of Muslim modernity under colonial rule in the Subcontinent. The long and entrenched colonial rule, with a deep imprint of modern political forms and organization of the state, greatly contributed to an appreciation of democracy and its relevance to building the new state of Pakistan. Its founders, in the philosophical as well as social and political sense, were intellectual children of post-Renaissance European modernity. The difference was that they wanted to contextualize modernity to Islamic heritage and civilization to establish a new consensus on the relationship between nation-state based

political authority and the popular religious sphere at the societal level. Unlike the twentieth century Islamist ideologues and activists, Pakistan's founders saw harmony in the fundamentals of the modern Muslim state and religion; they strived for religion as a citizenship right to be protected by the state, while they wanted the state to remain neutral and to accommodate diverse and pluralistic religious communities that would constitute Pakistan.[16] However, the founders were a tiny minority in a diverse political crowd that did not have much interest in a well-defined ideological pursuit of this kind, let alone a clear secular path for the new state.

The ambiguity of the relationship of Islam with the state of Pakistan became embedded in the foundational idea of Pakistan, that is the two-nation theory. While the Indian nationalism was clearly understood as composite and essentially secular, Pakistani nationalism became to be increasingly defined as Islamic. The debate whether it was a state for securing the interests of the Muslims or for establishing an Islamic state has cast a heavy shadow over the subsequent political development of Pakistan. The neutrality of the state in religious matters that some of the founders had envisaged is politically a dead horse as multiple waves of Islamization and the rise of religious extremism have impacted state building. The counter forces of religion have become powerful, primarily by building street power and using intimidating and violent acts as opposed to gaining popular support, so much so that the political classes find it hard to even mention neutrality of the state in religious matters, let alone secularism. National and regional developments—conflicts and power struggles and the emergence of Islam as a political ideology competing with democracy—have changed the political landscape, at least for now, and put pressure on Pakistan's modernist heritage.

The current political leadership of the country from left to right lacks courage, wisdom and vision to redefine Pakistan in the image of its founder—Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah, the founding father of the nation, and popularly known as the *Quaid-e-Azam* (great leader) stands out as a charismatic and powerful leader of his time, and for many Pakistanis for all times to come, on account of his integrity, modern principles, and for translating the dream of Pakistan into reality. A careful reading of Jinnah's political life and politics suggests that he wanted a democratic, constitutional, and liberal Pakistan in the sense of equality, rights, and justice for everyone. There cannot be a more assured and forceful expression of his political creed than in the address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in August 1947: "You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan, you may belong to any caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the state."[17] The intent, desire, and manifest destiny of the country could not have been set with greater clarity than this statement. Pakistani liberals use this statement as a testament to their struggle for a secular, democratic, and

composite nation state of Pakistan. It makes a great political sense to use the founder of the nation to stake political claim firmly in the political battleground of Islam and democracy. As clear, precise, and prescient as the above statement appears to be, it is not the only statement he gave on this issue and at some occasions he made other statements which are inconsistent to the spirit of this statement. Given the personal character of Jinnah and his political ideas and the spirit of his political life, it will be great injustice to cast him as an advocate of an Islamic state, which he clearly was not. However, in the decisive phase of the independence movement, while addressing public rallies of great numbers, he appears to have used Islam and Islamic aspects of Muslim political identity for greater political effects. His frequent references to Islamic principles of the state, Muslim nationhood, and the demand for a separate state for the Muslims have provided plentiful material for the Islamist interpretation of the creation of the country.[18] The Islamists though respectful of Jinnah, do not use his thought and political practice as either a source of inspiration or to establish legitimacy of their agenda for Islamization. They neither rely on history nor have any interest in an objective reading of history to sell their point of view. Their source of inspiration and authenticity is Islam and the specific interpretation that serves their political ends.

Unfortunately, the post-independence heritage of Pakistan, including religious pluralism, is in great stress and faces an uncertain future. The reason for this uncertainty is the rise of militant Islamic factions and the growth of jihad (holy war) culture shaped by a selective reading of modern history and fanatical narratives of Muslim victimhood. These have been given a platform since Pakistani society at large has lost clarity. It has failed to pursue the modernist political path of the founders, creating a large space for the Islamists. The Islamists have over time come to present Islam as an alternative to the modernist political traditions—that is, parliamentary democracy, neutrality of state in the religious sphere, fundamental rights, pluralism, knowledge, and science and technology. The Pakistani society, as diverse as it is regionally and ethnically, is polarized on the issue of the relationship of Islam with politics and the state. While political modernity in the form of democracy, civil society activism, elections, and the political party system remains one of the cherished political dreams and ideals among the urban and liberal sectors of the society, this represents a minority view, as greater majorities within the urban environments as well as in the rural communities present a contrasting picture of social and political backwardness in attachment to archaic social structures and narrow ideas of religious particularism. One glimmer of hope is the rise in the growing number of the rural and urban middle classes and their political realignment with the forces of change, namely the media and civil society, which are providing space for alternative leadership. Ideally speaking, democratic philosophy, and genuine practice of

this system could have provided a unifying theme to the diverse peoples of Pakistan that speak different languages, belong to different cultural and ethnic streams, and greatly emphasize local identities. Democracy with rights, equality and true federalism embedded into it is still the hope, however, it is a long journey riddled with the debris of military rule and religious fanaticism.

Democracy died a premature death in the early stages of state formation within a few years of independence. The post-Jinnah rulers of Pakistan had little to offer on the universal template of rights, equality, justice, rule of law, and empowerment of citizens—the popular democratic aspirations of that time. Had they not deviated from the democratic and constitutional path they might have been better at handling the mindboggling diversity within the territorial confines of the new state. In the squabbles over power and ascendancy of the civil-military elites, Pakistan lost the democratic track treading on which would have produced an enduring consensus on its political ideology resting on its modernist heritage, that is a constitutional and democratic state. It is not surprising then that over the decades, Pakistan has been caught in the opposite pulls of praetorian rule punctuated by occasional democratic struggles resulting in a procedural democracy.[19]

STATE AND NATION BUILDING

It is important to take note of the three essential variables to understand the process of state and nation building in Pakistan. To begin with, the first variable is national security; the state building process in the first decade of independence got concerned with a deeper commitment to a conventional sense of national security—security and survival against India—than with building a constitutional-democratic state. Although both political pursuits are not necessarily in conflict, as no democratic country powered by democratic rule would sacrifice national security, but over-commitment to national security resulted in the structural imbalance between the military and the civilian sectors.[20] There are, however, competing interpretations of why national security was popularized and constitutionalism and democracy were reduced to secondary or subordinate goals by military rulers and their civilian collaborators.[21] We will explain some of these interpretations and analyze how and why the national security state replaced the democratic- constitutional idea of Pakistan held by the founders of the country.

The second variable is the social structure of the dominant political elite—the feudal or landowning class, that has been both a collaborator of the military regimes as well as at the center of electoral or democratic politics. For this class, accessing and retaining power has been primarily for patronage politics at the constituency level and for advancing private ends rather than being motivated by ideas of public interest. Their feudal, tribal, and

social lineage networks have greatly retarded the growth of a Weberian state characterized by impersonalization and neutrality, resulting in the subordination of state institutions to the political interests of the feudal oligarchy.[22] This is most visible at the critical administrative unit of a district, which is the hub for administration, development, and delivery of basic services to the population. The shadow cast by the political oligarchies has overtime created space for de-legitimization of political authority, opening all flanks of the state to ideological attacks from political and radical Islam.

Our understanding of Pakistani state and society, as socially and politically complex as they are, will not be complete without looking at the third variable, that is the political attitudes, beliefs and practices of ruling groups that have in many ways been authoritarian and self-centered. For the most part, the civilian elected and military-dominated governments have exercised power in excess of, over and above, the constitutional limits. Weak or non-existent institutional checks, anemic rule of law, and trashing of the constitution many times has resulted in unchecked power of the elected political executives. The military and political Islam, anti-democratic in political beliefs and ideologies, have very effectively created and exploited de-legitimization narratives centering on corruption, inefficiency, and dynastic family politics against the democratic elites.

The failure of the state and ruling political elites in providing services to the people at local levels has also created opportunities for the civil society and social movements to organize, often with the support of international donors. One of the few signs of optimism about Pakistan is that it has a large, diverse, and vibrant civil society including not only the modernist-rationalist stream but also Islamic civil society groups that are extensively engaged in providing missing services and relief (in times of national emergencies) at the local level. Ideological division within the civil society is reflective of the conflicting views on state and society, ideas of progress, and the role of religion. While both types of civil societies are pursuing politics of rights and undertaking development at the local level to fill the vacuum created by a weak and unresponsive state, their motivations and vision about society and politics are completely different. The two types of civil societies, roughly segregated into a liberal and moderate category and a religious category, with multiple sub-streams, have different dreams and ideas about the future of the individual, the society, and the country. The separate tracks of the two, interestingly, fall along the broad controversy and polarization over Pakistan's course as a democratic and secular state or an Islamic state. Sections of the mainstream political parties and religious groups have formal and informal association with either of the two. Which type of civil society, modernist-rational or conservative-religious, wins the hearts and minds of the general public will consequentially assist the larger struggle between the modernist state enterprise and political radical Islam in Pakistan.

Through these struggles Pakistan remains a "hard country" surviving and enduring crises.[23] The aim of this book is to understand what has gone wrong with Pakistan and assess whether or not Pakistan will succeed in pulling itself out of the present national security chaos, multiple polarizations, and religious militancy. In making this assessment, one of the central questions the book examines is whether the dream of a modernist and democratic Pakistan has been lost or will Pakistanis be able to recapture the dream and pursue it as a remedy to its present violent political and religious conflicts.

In observing Pakistan's contemporary intellectual, social, and political scenes closely one cannot ignore the disparaging and pessimistic view that dominates the social and political discourses and public debate in the print and electronic media in Pakistan.[24] The failure of Pakistan is also a popular theme of foreign scholarly commentary and the standard for most independent minds in the country.[25] While looking at the devastating crises and troubles that Pakistan has been through in the past and is presently confronting, it is hard to escape this impression. The tragedy of the public commentators is that they do not wish to engage seriously or meaningfully with the failure subject. They often express a lament at how things are bad but instead of looking at the root social causes and structural fault-lines, they go for scapegoating tactics. Their eyes and attention appear to be transfixed at external powers, particularly the United States, foreign conspiracies, and unidentified enemies of Islam and Pakistan. The conspiratorial mindset has produced a dangerous narrative of victimhood that has been placing responsibility for every wrong on the doorsteps of "foreign enemies" that are determined to tear the country down.[26] It is largely the result of a lack of critical retrospection, limited objective analysis, and absence of constructive self-critique that leads a common Pakistani and media persons to draw up an incoherent and incomplete picture, as their judgment becomes clouded by the conspiratorial world view.

Furthermore, another serious and disconcerting problem that contributes to the production of this failure narrative of Pakistan, that one finds disconcerting is the blacking out of every positive development or progress in any field. The national failures and successes in every case come together as a mixed bag; no society has ever reached the promised paradise or its destiny without false starts, breakdowns, disappointments, and failures. However, it is eventually the balance of successes versus failures that gives a nation pride, confidence, and hope on the way toward realizing its potential.

If we consider the balance of all things, past and present, worries about where Pakistan stands today become too serious and the future outlook appears to be cautiously optimistic. It is not just the opinion of a critical observer, but there is also a deep sense of anxiety at the popular level. The real issue is not the failure of the state in our view but weakness in areas that define its relationship with the civil society. It is weak in governing, establishing its

writ, providing timely justice and security, and establishing rule of law. This weakness is a primary character of the Pakistani state that creates a legitimacy vacuum that both the military in the past and now militant groups, with different narratives about Pakistan's future, have moved in to fill. Pakistan's continuing crisis of governability is an accumulated legacy of the many past decades. If the political elite doesn't address it through determined and sustained efforts, it will only widen the gulf between the state and society. Such a situation may expand the political space for extremist ideas and militant groups and may again provoke direct military intervention into politics.

THE RISE OF RADICAL ISLAM

Today, Pakistan confronts numerous challenges in every sphere of national life but no other problem threatens the very foundations of the state as much as the rise of radical Islam and the militancy emanating from it.[27] Islamic militancy has greater tenacity and wider social, cultural, and security implications on state and society than the many other crises the country has faced in the past. The biggest reason for this concern is radical Islam's rejection of normal politics—constitutional and democratic means—for achieving its political goals. The Islamic radicals, such as the Taliban, consider democracy, constitution, and parliamentary supremacy as Western ideas and incompatible to their understanding of Islam. Their alternative to a democratic state is the establishment of an Islamic state or emirate. There are a number of religious political parties and Islamic groups in Pakistan that share the ideal of an Islamic state with the Taliban and other radical groups. The difference between the radicals and the mainstream religious parties is mainly regarding the means for achieving this ideal. Radical Islam believes in violence and frankly sanctions indiscriminate mass murders, suicide bombing, and terrorism against the security forces and civilians to evict the state wherever it is weak to establish their Islamic fiefdoms.[28] They have had some success in the border regions of Pakistan where the presence of the state has traditionally been nominal.[29] The ultimate objective of radical Islam is to capture the state in Pakistan through militancy.[30] A parallel goal of the Islamists of all shades and opinions is to redefine the destiny of the Pakistani state by gradually transforming it into an Islamic state according to their one-sided, controversial, and dogmatic vision of Islam. The non-radical and political party-affiliated Islamists rely on the legislative process, as they did during the military regime of General Zia ul Haq, rather than resort to violence. But that doesn't make the regular Islamists peace-loving pacifists or make their philosophy rooted in the foundational ideas of democratic political order. Democracy for them is a pragmatic choice that can be turned into an effective

tool for empowerment and forwarding the objective of Islamic social transformation through the agency of the state.[31]

The mainstream Islamists and unconventional radicals may belong to different organizations, may be working on seemingly different agendas, and can even seem engaged in political and social competition but they share the same critical ideas that in many ways place them in the same ideological basket, if not in a single political form. They support jihad and armed Islamic struggles, which includes indiscriminate use of violence. They question territoriality of the state and its supremacy, and reject pluralism in the sense that their politics and religious rhetoric work against tolerance toward religious minorities, including minority sects within Islam. One additional thing common between them is their support for private armies for intervention in Afghanistan and Indian-administered parts of the Kashmir region. The major difference is that while the Islamic radicals seek confrontation with the state and have been engaged in a brutal war against Pakistan under the umbrella of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the mainstream Islamists have taken the electoral-democratic path. But that does not say much about their creed or actual political conduct; since the waging of war by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the religious party leaders, far from condemning Taliban violence, have offered justifications for their militancy against the Pakistani state as reactive against Pakistan's policy choices. These include Pakistan's participation in the war on terror, the US-led war in Afghanistan, and drone strikes in the tribal regions.[32] The mainstream Islamic factions have not actively engaged in violent conflict but have generated a social support base for the Taliban and Talibanization of Pakistani society through capturing a significant space in the media and through their social and political discourse, which appears to be supportive of the Islamic militants.[33]

The evolving conflict between the Islamic militants and the Pakistani state has acquired many dangerous dimensions that have internal religious connections and external linkages with the transnational Islamist groups. Internally, the radical Islamists are engaged in a two-pronged war, each section of them specializing in a different type of violence and pursuing a calculated strategy against a focused group across a wide range of targets. A number of organizations—Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Jash-e-Mohammad—are also involved in sectarian conflict with the Shia community.[34] The sectarian conflict is as much an internal conflict as it is regional. From Afghanistan and Pakistan to larger Middle East, we can witness a sectarian power struggle and rivalry involving Iran and Saudi Arabia through the many sect-based militant organizations and political fronts they support. The Islamic militants by targeting religious minorities within Islam and other religious communities have destabilized the extended Middle Eastern region with a grave impact on Pakistan because of its very serious sectarian, and other structural, fault lines. For the last three decades, we have been witness-

ing a regional security chaos, spilling into Pakistan's borders from Afghanistan and the Middle East. It has been happening in many forms ranging from armed groups to flow of money and weapons in every direction, consequently fomenting deep sectarian polarization.

The Islamic radicals, once an arm of the Pakistani state and Western coalition of countries led by the United States in their interventions in Afghanistan to defeat the Soviet Union, have now turned their guns on the Pakistani state.[35] They believe the state has deviated from the original agenda of the Islamic state, which was shaped during the Zia ul Haq years, and rather joined the United States and the West in a war on terror that has targeted the radicals and their allies in Afghanistan and in the border regions of Pakistan. The radicals have inflicted colossal damage on Pakistani state and society. For the country, this has been a costly and deadly war in which 4,907 security personnel and 12,128 civilians have lost their lives, while more than 40,000 have been injured.[36] The confrontation with the state continues with its lows and highs and the many efforts to end this war through political dialogue have failed to achieve peace. Many agreements in this respect have ended with fresh bouts of conflict.[37]

The effects of Islamic radicalism and militancy now run deeper in some parts of the society and regions in Pakistan compared to others in the form of radical and extremist ideas and sympathy for violent groups.[38] Sadly, Islamic radicalism has already harmed the country in fomenting a jihadist culture and producing one of the most threatening insurgencies in the border regions.[39] It poses a grave challenge to the legal and territorial writ of the state, and if not defeated, may eventually weaken the already fragile constitutional and democratic character of the Pakistani state, which, as it is, has faded considerably owing to the weak commitment of the ruling classes to the principles of constitutionalism. Horrifyingly, there has been a manifold increase in the strength of violent religious groups and their networks. The number of faith-based organizations preaching violence and directly participating in violence against the Pakistani state, religious minorities, and the neighboring states of Afghanistan and India, has increased significantly in the first decade of the new century.[40] Correspondingly the numbers of their secret and not so secret sympathizers, supporters, fundraisers, protectors, and apologists in the media and intellectual circles have also swelled.

Today. the violent Islamist groups and their virulent constituency have larger presence in Pakistan than at any other time in its history. Their intellectual wings and publications attack the founding principle of the country—political modernism that we define roughly as constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, and representative government.[41] By deconstructing the modernist vision, they are attempting to create a political and social space for the Islamist political alternative. In this pursuit they have focused on the more impressionable section of the population, that is the youth in modern educa-

tional institutions.[42] So it is not only the indoctrinated and deeply socialized impressionable young *talib* (student of a religious seminary or madrassa), but a much larger part of the youth and society that appears to be receptive to the message of radical Islam.

One may argue that Pakistan is not the only Muslim state facing issues such as the rise of political Islam, the emergence of radical Islamic groups, questioning of the modernist framework, and the relevance of the Western state model. Other Muslim states, in varying degrees, are confronting Islamic revivalist movements also and face a familiar question; how can a country be a Muslim state in the modern world shaped by Western political thought and cultural globalization?[43] This question reflects several currents of ideological and political tensions in Pakistan that are more than comparable to other Muslims states. The essential question of the relationship of Islam with the Pakistani state, though not new, has grown more complex and has taken a violent turn, which threatens the modernist political heritage of the country. Whether or not Pakistan is able to defend its modernist heritage will depend on how contemporary Pakistani elites and state institutions defuse or defeat the challenge of radical Islam. The modernist political heritage of Pakistan compared to many other Muslims states is still much richer, broader, and more institutionalized. This is reflected both in the institutional order of the Pakistani state as well as in the political aspirations and struggles of its citizens for democracy, rule of law, and constitutionalism.[44] These are modern ideas and modernizing political constructs that have proved to be catalysts for positive social and political change in many areas of the world. The fact however is that every element of this heritage exists in faded or perverted form and the democratic political order remains under tremendous stress. The only ray of hope is a broader political consensus among the elites on democracy, but that by itself may not be enough to prevent another military takeover or meet the challenge of radical Islam effectively. The essential framework of constitutionalism would require better governance, better climate of internal security, better economy, and a better law and justice regime than successive elected governments have proved willing or competent to provide. Too many failures, too often, in governance have created ideal conditions for radical Islamic ideas and organizations to flourish.

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Pakistan today faces multiple national security threats, chief among which is home- grown transnational terrorism, born as an unintended consequence of assisting the Afghan mujahedeen and the Taliban in their struggle for power. With a stateless Afghanistan for decades in the background and permissive Pakistani policies, the transnational jihadist networks have grown stronger

with many diverse non-state actors joining them from different sectors of Pakistani society and from across the regional countries—notably from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Arab world. The militant organizations along with religious parties, intentionally or unintentionally working as political fronts have further put the weakened Pakistani state and society under tremendous pressure. These polarizations, extremist and militant beliefs, and attitudes are shaking the very foundations of the country, gravely threatening social peace and political order.

Over the decades, Pakistan has developed serious fault lines—the political and military leaders have been evasive, expedient and largely self-centered, postponing difficult and politically costly decisions on setting the national direction right. There is a tendency to take symptoms for a cause in uncertain and chaotic conditions like the ones Pakistan is facing. The multiple crises that Pakistan endures on a daily basis from young suicide bombers exploding themselves in mosques and market places, claiming hundreds of innocent civilian lives, to squabbles among the political power groups are the effects of flawed politics and messed up priorities of the state. We argue in this book that frequent deviations from the foundational republican ideas for decades has left Pakistan in the rough sea of power struggles, generating multiple polarizations along political, religious and ethnic lines. The recurrent outbursts of ethnic, sectarian, and religious violence, and now the Taliban terrorism and insurgency, are simply the consequences of not resting and building Pakistan on the foundations of liberal democratic ideas that could gel a diverse society and its political elites together. Pakistan's political order is "work in progress" with regards to balancing civil-military relations and consolidating democratic transition through providing rule-based and effective governance. Pakistan is not at an irreversible mature democratic stage yet, nor are its crises of internal security and social order resolved. There are symptoms of fragility, weakness, and indetermination with regards to addressing structural security and political issues of the country.

However, Pakistan is a pivotal state with all the basic features of a middle power at the tri-junction of three strategic regions.[45] It is also one of the largest Muslim states with deep pan-Islamic feelings and nuclear capability. Therefore, success or failure and what type of statehood it strives for and becomes may have a great impact on the neighboring regions. More important, Pakistan's political order and security architecture can influence the security of other states due to its historical transactions with multiple regions around it and the ethnic, ideological, and religious groups within it that have relations with exogenous interests. There is sufficient evidence already of how the wars next door in Afghanistan have troubled Pakistan and how Pakistan's security concerns have troubled the Afghan state and social groups across the border. Therefore, it is quite legitimate to raise this question: What would Pakistan's continuing political and security crises mean for

security of the region and the world, and for Pakistan's own future? Unresolved conflicts within the country and with neighbors would weaken the state capacities by spreading its economic, political and security resources too thin. At the same time, piling up of its failures would create conditions for the growth and resilience of radical Islamic groups that have already taken up arms against the state and have inflicted too much damage on it.

In order to clear some intellectual fog, we would insist that Islam as a religion is not a problem as long as it remains in the personal and private domain; it is Islam's conversion to political ideology and its instrumentality for political ends that is contested, controversial and has generated many conflicts, both inter-communal and with the state. A new dimension of political Islam is the radical fringe, which has the jihadist interpretation and terrorism as its tools. At the root of this, is the idea of what authentic Islam is and who is an authentic Muslim. This is one of the oldest religious cleavages which a new brand of zealots are seeking to address using violent means to change the social, religious, and political order of Muslim society. Pakistan, which started as a moderate democratic state, has become an epicenter of Islamic radicalism, and the conditions of greater Middle East and Central Asia are no different.

Historically, Islam has produced a great civilization along with rich and plural cultural streams in different regions of the world, but today, violent groups have acquired greater control over Islam's meanings. They are employing religion as a political tool for accessing power and challenging the political order as well as religious pluralism of society. How did Pakistan get there? There is no single view of how and why radical Islam emerged as a threat to the security and stability of Pakistan. The radical Islamic storm has been in the making for a very long time, but the ruling elites and the military either ignored it for their own convenience, or used it for their purposes, or cynically tried to defuse it by adopting its platform. At the societal level, too, many events, policies, and conflicting ideas have created the militant mindset. A common explanation however, emanating from all the perspectives appears to be the notion of failure in many critical areas of national life.[46] The discourse on failure essentially compares Pakistan with similar states and societies within the South Asian region that share cultural and religious traditions, and a common independence timeline with Pakistan. Pakistan fares badly on many indicators, particularly on democracy, human development, minorities, governance, and internal security.[47] Given its potential and great endowment of resources, it should have done better in at least some of these areas. Its failures are symptom of a much bigger problem—its identity as a nation, society, and as a state. The fundamental challenge it has failed to resolve is in choosing its political direction or destiny is the question of whether it would be a democratic–secular state or an Islamic state in the image of the Islamists. This question remains unsettled. For as long as Paki-

stani elites continue to show ambivalence and a lack of resolve and consensus on a pluralistic, democratic, and constitutional state, they will continue facing the challenge of Islamism in many forms.

Moreover, only a course correction with development of a clear direction may not be enough; it would require overhauling of the political system to ensure the delivery of good governance, justice, development, and rule of law. The prevalent social and political conditions, along with the character of political leaders dominating the political scene give little confidence on whether any political or ideological reconfiguration of the system, which neutralizes the state from Islam, will take place. Over the decades, quite the opposite has happened; various regimes, political leaders, and parties have veered toward an Islamic orientation of the state. They have used Islam hoping to carve out a larger constituency for themselves or to appease the noisy Islamist constituency for expedient political reasons. By playing the Islamic card they have ended up losing more political territory to the Islamists. The mainstream political parties are now too weak in their courage and political will, even with greater numbers in the legislature, to reclaim power to define, or rather redefine, the Pakistani state according to any neutral if not decisively secular vision of the state. The blasphemy law is a case in point; no party or government has shown any real will to change it till today and it seems unlikely to happen in the near future despite the fact that the law has been grossly misapplied and continues to be misused.[48]

Pakistan's relationship with Islam has been both complex and troublesome from the very beginning, but more so since Pakistan's support and encouragement of the jihadist organizations during the wars of Afghanistan, especially in the 1980s, which has played a pivotal role in the pursuit of a national security policy. Pakistan applied the same template with similar groups in the Indian occupied part of the Kashmir. Official and semi-official encouragement and patronage of jihadist organizations created much wider and deeper alliances than anticipated among the different groups springing from the conservative religious right and the security establishment of Pakistan. In many forms and ways, proverbially, the chickens have come to roost. Some groups, disappointed over the change in Pakistan's policy toward India, splintered away and joined the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and others chose to attack the security forces and members of rival religious sects.[49] These violent extremist groups present a graver challenge of national security than perhaps India, with whom Pakistan has fought four wars.[50]

The demands for establishing an Islamic state and controversy over who is an authentic Muslim started within a few years after the establishment of the state.[51] The fundamentalist groups, parties, and leaders gained much louder voice and continued to press for transformation of the state according to their vision of Islam. They essentially used political means that varied from street agitation to violent outbursts and targeting of vulnerable religious

communities. Much of that has changed for the worse. What is new is the transformation of fundamentalist sections of society into violent radical groups and the use of terrorism to seek their ends—the establishment of Islamic state. The roots of radical Islam in a Muslim society like Pakistan have over time developed into violent movements. The radical threat that Pakistan faces can be summed up as follows: tolerance of religious intolerance, use of religion for political benefit, widespread sectarian attitudes and violence, weak rule of law and justice regimes, and decaying state institutions. Many failures of the Pakistani state over the decades—including the use of religious groups as proxies for wars in Afghanistan and the disputed region of Kashmir, along with three cycles of war and external interventions have further worsened Pakistan's crisis of national security. Inequality, poverty, limited opportunities for growth, and hopelessness are also some of the factors that have pushed a section of the youth toward Islamic radicalism.[52]

In facing a threat from radical Islam, Pakistan finds itself at the crossroads of history once again. This time, it has to choose a vision and a clear path for itself regarding the kind of state it wants to be. The choice is between the chaos and violence of Islamic radicalism and a pluralistic and constitutional democratic state with equal citizen rights for everyone that is integrated with the rapidly globalizing world community. This is the modernist idea that shaped the intellectual and cultural world of the founders of the country. The course Pakistan takes will determine its future stability, growth, and national security. Pakistan has lived from crisis to crisis and its current conditions portray a mixed picture between uncertain stability, fear, and hopelessness with its rulers running between brushfires of problems. What then makes Pakistan a "hard country" is the resilience of its society and the institutional robustness of the state in which the military remains the most coherent and powerful central element.[53] The military has many critics in Pakistan and its interventions in politics have soiled Pakistan's image a great deal but compared to other sectors of state—the political parties and leaders—the armed forces remain the most popular institution among the people even though this popularity varies from province to province and region to region. What has prevented Pakistan's collapse is the hardiness of its state and political institutions, which have a long history of development. Pakistan inherited relatively strong parliamentary democratic traditions alongside a competitive political party system, and has been through multiple electoral runs culminating in the formation of representative governments.

The country is going through the third democratic transition in its history, and has for the first time in 2013 witnessed a peaceful transfer of power from one political party to another. Even in the face of many troubles and debilitating political confrontations, Pakistan has retained a strong elite consensus on democracy, no matter how imperfect it might be. Pakistan is a freer society in terms of associational life, freedom of expression and political critique. The

bigger question however is consolidation of democracy, which will require creating necessary social and economic conditions for its stability. Some of the new social forces, including the emergence of a strong civil society, development of free media, and a new middle class kindle hope for democratic sustainability and further progress. There is another aspect of the Pakistani puzzle—relative development through agency of the state and growth of private, informal sectors.[54] This guarded optimism is further supported by Pakistan's economic growth that has over the past six decades averaged at 5.5 percent, which is not a poor performance by any standard, despite being below its potential.[55] For some of these reasons, Pakistan never even came remotely close to a collapse. The "failure" narrative of Pakistan has overshadowed the fact that the country has been able to retain, develop, and sustain some of its social and institutional energies. However, the core sentiment of the "failure" argument is not off the mark in suggesting that Pakistan has not performed according to its potential—given its huge young population, resilient society, and rich natural resource base.

There have been periods of political stability, good order, and economic growth. Several sectors of the Pakistani state and society at different periods in history have recorded greater success than other sectors. Even in periods of relative decline, not every institution or policy failed nor did every region and province of the country do as poorly as the rest. On the balance of things, Pakistan has been able to absorb many internal and external shocks—domestic insurgencies, three wars with India, and the dismemberment of the country in 1971 which has perhaps been the most devastating. Pakistan is finding it difficult to deal with the cumulative fallout of three long wars, that is the Soviet-Afghan war, Taliban-Northern Front war, and the US-led intervention and insurgency, all three of which have left some of the deepest imprints on society, social fabric, ideas, and institutions. Pakistan's choice of allies in the Afghan wars and policies of securing the Afghan strategic backyard from adverse influence of hostile powers, the imperative of "strategic depth," have created boomerang effects. Pakistan bears far greater responsibility for these effects than the "unreliability" of its partners or ambiguous extraneous forces aiming to destabilize and weaken it. If and when the latter does take place, extraneous forces find an opportunity through the cracks Pakistan has created within its society due to pursuing flawed foreign and domestic policies and in failing to rule effectively over all territories and people through rule of law and on the basis of representation.

Consequently, we have witnessed Pakistan's cultural and social environment weakening the traditional common bonds among the religious communities. The radicalized sectarian tendencies and violence have taken center stage, diminishing the influence of moderate and syncretistic Islamic tradition that drew much of its strength from multiple religious traditions, including Islamic beliefs and practices. The vast but silent majority of Pakistanis

continue to remain greatly attached to popular Islam of the old days in the rural regions and the people of Pakistan at large have rejected the religious political parties with manifestoes of Islamization and holy political promises in every electoral contest to date after their best showing in the 1970 elections. Nor is there any popular support for radical Islam in society except in small pockets among those who have similar motivations as the radical Islamists. Winning peoples' approval or support, however, does not constitute the means of radical politics. Popular politics is never the turf of the radicals of any breed or creed; they reject the system and rely on violence, terrorism, and militancy to change the system. Radical Islam has found some resonance with the religious political parties that have a much louder voice, have greater street power, and exercise far greater influence than their limited social support base can justify.

No discussion of Pakistan's internal state and national building crisis or security will be complete without some reference to its regional environment and its policy options during the second wave of the cold war in the 1980s. Pakistan's efforts to internally reform and recover itself, as a moderate Islamic state, are complicated owing also to the complexities of its geographical and cultural boundaries. Being on the front line of the global jihad in Afghanistan where it played a big role that included co-opting jihadist elements from every major part of the Muslim world and quietly allowing them to operate across its borders. Pakistan is a tragic victim of its own strategy toward Afghanistan as well as of its uncritically dangerous security liaison with the jihadist proxies. While Pakistan seems to have reversed some of those policies, the reversal is neither complete, nor is Pakistan in a position to bring all groups under its control that it once aligned with. A good number of these groups have turned their guns on the Pakistani state and society. Resolving this quagmire will take time. At present, Pakistan's security and stability have become entangled with what happens or might happen in the coming years in and around Afghanistan, as the foreign forces leave Afghanistan to fight its war or make peace with the insurgents.

There are other sources of worries for Pakistan as well. The fast evolving sectarian identities and conflict in the Middle East with transnational webs of cooperation among sectarian militias is another concern for Pakistan. Pakistan with its own troubled sectarian history may not be able to effectively immunize itself from the religious wars in the Middle East. The jihadists in Afghanistan or in the Middle East with a false or real sense of triumphalism and the narrative of injustice against an unjust world system, particularly the principal power in it, that is the United States, may have negative spillover effects. Pakistan was not alone in making what now appears to be a wrong choice of allies. The US war to liberate and rebuild Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 has activated and energized the very religious and social forces in the region it had aligned with in the Cold War. While the United States is distant

from the troubled region, Pakistan, an American ally, is right in the eye of the storm.

The next decade, like the previous one may not be an easy period for Pakistan unless it makes rational choices in terms of identity and direction of the state and seeks peace with its neighbors. Also, much will depend on how conflicts around it and within it get settled or continue to happen. Among the many urgent tasks for Pakistan, the most important is achieving internal peace and stability by consensus and power sharing among its complex collection of ethnicities, cultures, social groups, faiths and power factions—read political parties. This might be the starting point of state and nation building as it helps lay out a social and political master plan that successive generations can follow with their own will and autonomy to interpret and adapt according to the circumstances and needs of their own times. Lastly, unless, the ruling classes of Pakistan embrace true principles of pluralism and modernity, including neutrality of state among diverse religious communities, the country may continue to live from crisis to crisis and its growth and progress may remain impeded and blocked. The real challenge of Pakistan today is how to defeat militant Islam and harmonize Islam with modernity—modernity in holistic terms signifies constitutional, democratic politics, social pluralism, and peaceful accommodation of its complex ethnic, religious and sectarian identities. In other words, Pakistan requires major ideological rethinking on the relationship of religion with the state, and true interpretation of its history away from an Islamic state to a state created by Muslims to gain power and improve their economic conditions. Pakistan's future peace, stability, and even territorial integrity will largely depend on how effectively and how soon the ruling groups capture the true spirit of the Pakistan dream from its foundational years, and collect the courage to put Pakistan on a true modernist path. Pakistan's real strength is in the resilience of its society. According to Stephen Cohen, "the Pakistani state is enfeebled, but Pakistani society is as vigorous as ever, manifested in its provincial cultures and talented elite" but he says "there is a yawning gap between aspirations and actual performance."[56] A strong society with weak state cannot achieve progress and therefore, Pakistan's future would largely depend on how the state effectively exploits the strengths of society to improve itself or how the society can force a positive change in the direction and functioning of the state.

NOTES

1. Since 2001, direct and indirect cost of acts relating to terrorism is estimated to be US$106.98 billion. *Pakistan Economic Survey*, 2014–15 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, 2015), 279–280.

2. Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); John L. Esposito, The Islamic *Threat: Myth or Reality*? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle*

with Militant Islam (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2007); Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talat, eds., *Contemporary Debates in Islam* (London: Macmillan, 2002).

3. Roberto Tottoli, ed., *Routledge Handbook of Islam in the West* (New York: Routledge, 2015); Brian R. Farmer, *Radical Islam in the West: Ideology and Challenge* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011); Abigail R. Esman, *Radical State: How Jihad Is Winning over Democracy in the West* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010).

4. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics* (Karachi: Inter Service Press, 1972).

5. Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina: State Power, and the Quest forPakistan in Late Colonial North India* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1–25, 314–353; Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Madras: Orient Limited, 1988).

6. Maulana Syed Husain Ahmad Madni and Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Millat aur Watan* (Nation and country), a debate between the two compiled by Muhammad Akram Khan (Multan: Idara Rozenama Shams, 1930); Hafiz Syed Muhammad Mian, *Asiran-i-Malta* (Prisoners of Malta) (Karachi: Shamsi Publishing House, n.d.), 172–185; Babara D. Metcalf, *Husain Ahmad Madani: The Jihad for Islam and India's Freedom* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009); Rizwan Malik, "Muslim Nationalism in India: Ashraf Ali Thanawi, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and the Pakistan Movement" *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 18, no. 2 (1997): 76–82.

7. Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, *The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Pakistan, 1971–77* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000).

8. Farhat Haq, "Pakistan: A State for the Muslims or an Islamic State?" in *Religion and Politics in South Asia,* ed. Ali Riaz (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 119–145.

9. Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 65–87.

10. Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The oOigins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986); Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Pakistan: Crisis in Leadership* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1973); Stephan P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Ayesha Siddiqa. *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2007).

11. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 97–130.

12. Irfan Haider, "Army the Most Trustworthy Institution in Pakistan, Survey Reveals," *Dawn*, October 21, 2015.

13. The British Council, "Next Generation Voices," 2013, https://www.britishcouncil.pk/sites/default/files/next_generation_goes_to_the_ballot_box.pdf, iii.

14. Mian Raza Rabbani, *A Biography of Pakistani Federalism: Unity in Diversity* (Islamabad: Leo Books, 2014), 137–276.

15. See, for instance, Eric Stokes, "The First Century of British Colonial Rule in India: Social Revolution or Social Stagnation?" *Past & Present*, no. 58 (February, 1973): 136–160; K.N. Chaudhuri, *The Economic Development of India under the East India Company*, *1814–58* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); S.H. Rudolph, *Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967); J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948).

16. Merchant and Al Mujahid, *The Jinnah Anthology*, 115.

17. Ibid.

18. Jamiluddin Ahmad, "Pakistan as Quaid Visualized," in *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Founder of Pakistan,* ed. Ziauddin Ahmad (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1976), 94–102; Jamil-Ud-Din Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. 1 (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968).

19. See for instance, Stephen P. Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Brooking Institution, January 2011); Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005).

20. Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, 295–328.

21. Meghnad Desai and Aitzaz Ahsan, *Cross-Border Talks: Divided by Democracy* (New Delhi: 2005), 75–144.

22. Fritz Ringer, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 154–155.

23. See, for instance, Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience*, trans. Cynthia Schoch (Gurgaon: Random House India, 2015); Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Allen Lane, 2011); John R. Schmidt, "The Unraveling of Pakistan," *Survival* 51, no. 3, (2009): 29–54.

24. This assertion is based on close reading of columns and editorials of both English as well as Urdu press and watching and participating in the political talk shows by the author.

25. Babar Ayaz, *What's Wrong with Pakistan* (New Delhi: Hay House, 2013); Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive?* (London: Pelican Books, 1983); Ahmed Rashid, *Pakistan on the Brink* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).

26. "What Is the Wildest Conspiracy Theory Pertaining to Pakistan?" *Herald* (Karachi), June 19, 2015, http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153068; Robert Mackey, "A Grand Conspiracy Theory from Pakistan," *New York Times*, May 12, 2009, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/a-grand-conspiracy-theory-from-pakistan/.

27. Rushda Siddiqui, "The Islamic Dimension of Pakistan's Foreign Policy," in *Islam and International Security Challenges and Responses,* eds. Efraim Inbar and Hillel Frisch (New York: Routledge, 2008), 153–168.

28. Zahid Hussain, "Militancy: A Radicalized Worldview," *Dawn*, January 1, 2013, http://www.dawn.com/news/775504/militancy-a-radicalised-worldview; Zahid Hussain, "From *Jihad* to Terrorism," *Dawn*, February 12, 2014.

29. FATA is governed directly by the federal government through the governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. "Administrative System," FATA Portal, https://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iID=29&fid=2&pId=25&mId=13.

30. "Afghan, Pakistani Taliban Diverge on Goals," *Washington Times*, November 18, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/18/afghan-pakistani-taliban-diverge-on-goals/?page=all.

31. Syed Abul A'la Mawdudi, *The Islamic Law and Constitution* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1980); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

32. Author's interview with Islamic clerics and heads of three different Madrassas, Peshawar, March 25, 2016.

33. *Understanding the Militants' Media in Pakistan: Outreach and Impact* (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2010); Syed Irfan Ashraf, "The Radical Media," *Dawn*, June 4, 2012, http://www.dawn.com/news/840285/the-radical-media; Muhammad Amir Rana, "Militant's Media Front," *Dawn*, October 6, 2013. http://www.dawn.com/news/1047804.

34. Khaled Ahmed, *Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and Its link to the Middle East* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011).

35. Laila Bokhari, "Radicalization, Political Violence, and Militancy," in *The Future of Pakistan*, ed. Stephen P. Cohen, 82–90.

36. From January 2001 to April 2016, 17, 123 terror attacks have taken place in which 4,907 law enforcement agencies personal were killed and 11,810 have been injured. Among the civilians 12,128 have been killed and 30,383 have been injured. This data has been shared by the National Counter Terrorism Authority, Government of Pakistan, April, 2016.

37. Carin Zissis and Jayshree Bajoria, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-tribal-areas/p11973.

38. Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy? *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010): 79–118.

39. On spread of radicalism to bordering regions, see Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (2000): 115–126.

40. Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan*, trans. Saba Ansari (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2006).

41. Walid Phares, The Coming Revolution: Struggle for *Freedom in the Middle East* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2010), 131–164, 323–340; Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, *Political Islam in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), chs. 6–7;

"TNSM, Taliban Reject Darul Qaza: Democracy, Sharia Incompatible: Sufi," *Dawn*, May 4, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/news/847918/tnsm-taliban-reject-darul-qaza-democracy-sharia-incompatible-sufi.

42. Raheem ul Haque, *Youth Radicalization in Pakistan* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace), February 26, 2014, https://www.usip.org/publications/youth-radicalization-in-pakistan.

43. Ira M. Lapidus, "Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 40, no. 4 (1997): 444–460.

44. Lawyers' Movement was a premier event in struggle for the restoration of an independent judiciary, which has changed the dynamics of the country with a focus on rule of law. James Traub, "The Lawyers' Crusade," *New York Times*, \June 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/magazine/01PAKISTAN-t.html; Zahid Hussain, "Pakistan: Can the 'Black Coats' Restore Democracy?" *Sunday Times*, June 26, 2008.

45. Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and US Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996): 48–49.

46. Cohen, "Pakistan Arrival and Departure" in *The Future of Pakistan*, 1–69.

47. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2015,* http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PAK.pdf.

48. "Christian Couple Beaten to Death for 'Desecrating Quran': Police," *Dawn*, November 5, 2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1142386/christian-couple-beaten-to-death-for-desecrating-quran-police.

49. C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan' War Within," *Survival* 51, no. 6 (December 2009–January 2010): 161–818.

50. Nirupama Subramanian, "Internal Threat More Immediate Than External: Kayani," *Hindu*, July 5, 2009, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-international/internal-threat-more-immediate-than-external-kayani/article219920.ece.

51. Ali Usman Qasmi, *The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan* (London and New York: Anthem Press, 2014), 93–119.

52. Alan B Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–144.

53. Anatol Lieven uses this expression quite aptly to characterize Pakistan. See his *Pakistan: A Hard Country*.

54. Shabbar Zaidi, *Pakistan Is Not a Failed State* (Karachi: Zam Zam, 2014).

55. Rashid Amjad and Shahid Javed Burki, eds., *Pakistan: Moving the Economy Forward* (Lahore: Lahore School of Economics, 2013).

56. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution), January, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/brookings-future-pakistan/p24135, 1.

Chapter Three

Modernism and Imagining of Pakistan

Pakistan's creation rests on a broader Muslim consensus but its roots lie in the multiple layers and streams of Muslim modernism, generated by the reforms of British colonialism and the many social movements in the Sub-continent. There are two vital elements of this consensus; first is that the Muslims must create their own state or states in provinces where they were in majority, that is the eastern and northwestern periphery of India. Second, they had a rough notion of a future state of Pakistan that rested on a political-ly plural, democratic, and modernist socio-political philosophy. The Muslim leaders striving for the creation of an independent state of Pakistan did not see any tension between economic and political modernity, territorial nation-alism, and the Islamic religion. Rather, they visualized empowering them-selves and recovering some of their lost heritage through modernist enter-prises, which included nationalism, sovereignty, responsible government, rule of law, and more important, modern education.[1] Far from being concrete plans or manifestos of state and nation building, these were rough ideas in the minds of the Muslim League leaders once they became disillusioned with the efforts to obtain adequate autonomy and representation within the Indian union. They became possessed with the urgent task of winning an indepen-dent country as opposed to planning what kind of state it would be, and strived toward a broad notion of a state comprising of the Muslim majority areas.

Naturally, the challenge of achieving an independent Pakistan was fore-most and critical thinking over what concrete institutional format the future state would take was pushed to the margins. The temperament of the time was shaped by the emergencies, crises, and uncertainties that surrounded the period before the creation of the country and immediately after its establish-ment. There was a great leadership factor at play as well. Jinnah himself was

occupied with the idea of an independent Pakistan and was not able to pay full attention to defining the nature of the state. Rather, to gain popular support he said many things to many different audiences while mobilizing support for the new state. His speeches and statements made obvious references to a state for Muslims and the Islamic principles under which the new state will be run, which included Muslim nationalism or the two-nation theory, freedom and equality—essentially a democratic rule. Once he was gone, the meanings and intent of Pakistan became subjected to different interpretations with a big question at the center of debate; was Pakistan to be a state for the Muslims or a theocratic state as in the minds of Islamic clerics?

Pakistan was a political project of the rationalist-modernist Muslims under the British rule who wanted to live in and march with the modern world, while retaining the identity of their community, culture, and Islamic civilization as essential reference points. [2] How the two could blend was left for the political process to settle but owing to the chaotic political process in the aftermath of the creation of the country, the ideals of Pakistan and the political reality that ensued started to drift apart. After Jinnah's death, not a single surviving leader of the movement or any from the latter generations has ever been able to create a consensus on the relationship of Islam with the state. Those left on the scene, along with the feudal political class that had jumped on the Pakistan bandwagon, failed to save the integral contours of Pakistan's essential vision; that was to make Pakistan a democratic constitutional state. Those responsible for setting Pakistan's political course got consumed by internal power struggles, the making of dangerous compromises vis-à-vis the role of religion, and the interventions of the fledging security forces under the umbrella of alliances with the Western world. With the unending no-hands-barred power struggle, the Pakistani ship became rudderless, losing its essential institutional balance resulting in the ascendancy of an unelected political executive and assumption of greater powers by Governor Generals Ghulam Mohammad and Sikandar Mirza and later by the army chief, General Mohammad Ayub Khan (1958).[3] Ayub buried the constitution and democracy in a deep ditch, giving his own vision for Pakistan, which can be summed up as 'development first, democracy later."[4]

Since then, Pakistan's quest for finding a common political vision has remained challenging as it has required choosing the right mix of elements from colonial modernity, centuries old Islamic law, and the diverse culture of the constituent regions of Pakistan. More than a century of British colonial rule in the Indian Subcontinent has left deep imprints on every aspect of society including social structure, political ideas, and the modern infrastructure of the Pakistani state. Imperial modernity, albeit weak, has competed with the rise of Islam as a political ideology and the multiple secular ethnic identities from the regions constituting Pakistan for political space, recognition, and self-assertion. While this is not unusual for diverse and pluralistic

societies, it requires a clear vision, consensus, energy, and political will to build a common future. One of the many complex reasons for why Pakistan has lived from crisis to crisis for most of its troubled history is that its ruling elites and dominant power groups have been engrossed in power struggles and were resultantly distracted from determining a common vision or a shared destiny to pursue. Rather, the ruling groups focused their politics on expedient and immediate gains. Laws, the constitution, and the future shape of Pakistan became subservient to personal and institutional interests. A big problem has been that Pakistan did not have a clear template on the nature and character of the state. Instead, they only had ideas and concepts, including those of Jinnah, which did not find any significant institutional expression and were never molded into a clear plan for political development of the country. This is evident from the fact that it took the successors of Jinnah nine years and several governments to frame the Constitution in 1956. The constitution came too late and was unable to take firm root since the political climate had grown acidic and become ridden with multiple confrontations and hostilities. Without real ownership and a good political legacy, the constitution itself and the political class were too weak to prevent the military takeover, which raised further questions about the Pakistani state. In recent decades, the Islamist political groups have attempted to arrogate to themselves the power to explain and interpret the intent of Pakistan as an Islamic state. Perhaps, this re-definition of nation and statehood is not restricted to Pakistan, as other Islamic states with different cultures, histories, and geographies are also facing similar challenges of reconciling modernity with religion and local cultural traditions.

Pakistan's engagement with political Islam is unique and very different from other Muslim states due to its search for Islamic identity as a new state. To understand this better, one has to take into account Pakistan's particular history of creation, culture, and political endowment. One of the positive features of Pakistan's political heritage is that it has a strong tradition of intellectual pluralism and a social atmosphere of free debate—which is considerably more today than in past decades. Therefore, all ideological perspectives and discourses on modernism, democracy, Islam, and socialism have competed for political space. This tradition has survived and flourished despite the long years of four military rules, and the not so democratic civilian interludes. Along with the dialogue and conversation on different political paths for Pakistan, we have seen clear political movements shaped by various religious ideas and political ideologies. As mentioned earlier, three major contestants for political space have been military rule, Islam, and constitutional democracy.

Historically, the Islamist groups have pursued an institutional and peaceful path to power, an option they argue they have not given up even today. But other groups which may be out of the fold or have loose alliances with

the religious parties that have rejected constitutionalism and democracy, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and many of its affiliates, have not taken this path.[5] Two of the central questions that we will be probing in the course of this book are how and why a section of the Islamists, the Taliban and sectarian Islamic associations, have abandoned the constitutional path to power and have turned violent against both rival sects and the Pakistani state. In our view, the civilian and military rulers of Pakistan and the conservative social forces of society, often aligning with the military and sympathizing with militant outfits, must accept responsibility for drifting toward this clash. It was an overriding concern with national security in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that effectuated an alliance between the military-dominated Pakistani state and the conservative religious factions. The Pakistani state played a rather pivotal role in orchestrating the Afghan mujahedeen resistance, which can be considered the first global jihad, encouraged and supported by key Muslim and Western countries to defeat Soviet communism. In the strategic tangle of the Cold War, Pakistan's security establishment did not pay adequate attention to the blowback of its involvement on the Pakistani and Afghan society, or on other regional societies where religious mobilization was on the rise. Those who understood historical currents of the region and past conflicts could not impress the Western allies enough to be able to guide them on how the forces of radical Islam could expand and redefine their agenda of holy wars beyond Afghanistan.[6]

Pakistan's Afghan policy proved to be myopic; it was fixated on immediate strategic gain and failed to assess the long-term consequences of Pakistan's stance on the Afghan issue. The tyrannical cycles of conflict in Afghanistan and the sustained support to Islamist groups, which aimed to restrict the state according to their ideas of Islam, did not spare Pakistan. What we have witnessed since then, over a period of more than three decades, is a triad of intertwined troubles—radicalization of religion, sharpening of narrow sectarian identities, and declining institutional capacity of the state. The ruling elites failed to apprehend the seriousness of these issues. While neglecting germination of dangerous ideas and movements at home, they fomented a conspiratorial outlook at the popular level that labels even the most supportive countries in the West as "enemies." Pakistan has been on this self-destructive path for decades as it has taken the Pakistani security establishment too much time to re-examine the alliance with the religious right and to reconsider the utility of proxy factions for enhancing national security. There is now an open acknowledgement that the internal enemy of radical Islam threatens the state and society more than conventional external adversaries and poses an even graver threat to national security.[7] With the regional and global security environment changing to the detriment of Pakistan, the security establishment of Pakistan has apparently refigured the hierarchy of security challenges and the strategy to confront them. But this change has come

too late, after the monster of militancy has struck at the roots of the Pakistani society.[8]

The question why Pakistan was created in the Muslim majority areas of the British Indian Empire has never evoked a single answer beyond the well-beaten two-nation theory, which posited that Muslims and Hindus were two nations each equally entitled to having a separate state. This seems too simplistic an idea to properly explain and understand the social, political, and historical process that shaped the idea of Pakistan.[9] We argue that the creation of Pakistan was the result of Muslim modernism and its reformist spirit in all aspects of community life which cultivated self-imagining among Muslims as a distinctive social, cultural, and political category in India. It was the gradual rooting of this consciousness that led to the formation of a Muslim identity and political aspirations.

MUSLIM MODERNISM

The history of the idea of Pakistan is therefore the history of Muslim reformism in undivided India, which went through different phases over a period of time. Each phase was spread over several decades and symbolized clashing ethos and conflicting visions regarding the best route to empowering Muslims in the vastly changed political landscape compared to the old Mughal Empire. The Muslims faced stark choices under the British rule with a dominant and self-asserting Hindu majority on the rise in all fields of economic, social, and political activity. The Muslim reformers, beginning with literature, science, and religious thought, shaped several identical cultural movements with a similar objective; that is, the revival of the power and influence of the Muslim community and how best to strive for achieving rights and the rightful place for Muslims in the politically evolved British Indian Empire.[10]

British colonialism was one of the most transforming events in the history of the Subcontinent, and equally so for the Muslims in the region. Not only did the British rule introduce new ideas such as nationalism, constitutionalism, and representative institutions, it also changed the institutional order under which power was exercised. In doing so, it created a very dense network of state institutions, laws, and procedures that formed the foundations of a new economy of the Raj, which rested on commerce, industry, and massive infrastructure comprising railways, telegraph, irrigation canals, and gradual development of industry. The new institutions included modern bureaucracy selected on competitive basis, professionally trained military that went through training academies, a judicial system and codified laws, and a system of modern educational institutions. This provided a solid framework to consolidate colonial power and bring a vast and diverse India under imperial rule. The British template of the imperial state as well laid the founda-

tions for the development of a possible nation state or states in the Subcontinent. Even though the British Raj was foreign and extractive in all respects of state building and modernizing of the economy and society, vast numbers of local communities embraced the new political order for their own good. Progressive and forward-looking urban sections of the society viewed British reforms and political and social reordering as a welcome change from the unstable and conflictive conditions in the waning period of the Mughal rule. The new education system, new professions, and economic opportunities in agriculture, industry, and business offered new avenues of progress and self-empowerment for many of the communities that were not held back by tradition or national and religious prejudice against the Raj.

The Muslim communities, as diverse and pluralistic as they remain even today, were naturally not unified in their response to the new British order. A good number of them saw British colonialism as a humiliating subjugation to foreign rule. Amid a state of confusion and despondency for decades they were slow to the idea of adapting to the British rule. It took them a while and a lot of persuasion from the enlightened modernist Muslim reformers to learn English, the new language of success and to enroll in modern colleges and universities, thereby enabling them to enter the new professions in bureaucracy, law, judiciary, engineering, and medicine. Success in this respect was partial, spotty and confined to urban areas or more developed regions of the Subcontinent. Geographically remote traditional Islamic societies took more time to grasp the importance of modern education; they remained fixated with their conventional trades and professions, mainly menial jobs and agriculture.

An overwhelming majority of Muslims perceived the new social and political order as a threat to their culture, identity, and even religion and civilization. Securing the Islamic heritage was considered the first duty of Muslims, and this objective took priority over any thought of material progress.[11] Those adhering to this view can be characterized as conservative Muslims whose idea of salvation was recovering the lost glory of Muslim civilization by returning to the fundamentals of Islam. Seeking refuge in religion was a natural response for those sections of Muslims that were inclined toward religion and felt insecure in the vastly changed India. But that was only one section of society and Muslim populations were never unified in their response to the changing politics and society under the British rule. They made choices according to their circumstances and the dominant social trends in the respective zones and areas where they lived.

A large portion of the Islamic clergy or ulema interpreted the cause for the decline of Muslim power as the deviation from the true path of Islam by both rulers and the laity. They visualized a new future for the Muslims through the prism of religion by restoring its purity via proper learning and dissemination of Islamic knowledge through the traditional learning modes,

mainly the madrassas (traditional Islamic schools). [12] The move to save Islam was primarily defensive aiming to protect Islam from the onslaught of what the clergy thought was the debasing influence of British imperialism. This was not a consensual view of Muslims, nor was it a dominant line of thinking among ordinary Muslims. The impact of this view, if any, was limited to a narrow band of reformist Muslims and their following, and it very seldom impressed a common Muslim who was worldly, pragmatic, and mainly interested in improving his material conditions. The issues of soul and spirit, though important in their own right, remained within the realm of traditional Islam practiced at the popular level. On a theological level, the views of reformist Muslims that became to be known as Deobandis in the later part of the nineteenth century were contested and rejected by the popular version of Islamic clerics who had much broader religious following. The Deobandi political worldview and resistance to modern education and non-cooperation with the British got drowned in their unpopular version of Islamic theology. This category of ulema are now deeply involved in politics and their thought and students, the Taliban, are associated with radicalism and political violence in Pakistan, even though they avoided participation in the affairs of the state under the British colonial rule. They preferred "religious renewal and moral purification," [13] which one of its several groups, the Tablighi Jamaat, which literally translates to preaching party, continues.

By all evidence, the liberal modernist Muslims of late nineteenth century contested the traditionalist and conservative vision of the ulema regarding the Muslim empowerment, identity, and rebuilding influence of the Islamic community in India. These modernists believed that the advent of British imperialism had fundamentally changed the power relationships and the means of individual and collective empowerment in the Subcontinent. Even though this group cannot be considered secularist in the modern sense of the word, it viewed the new political order with an open mind and believed that the past history of Muslims had little relevance in shaping the present or the future of Muslims. This group focused on the idea of progress mainly in secular terms and advocated education as the best means to achieve progress. In their assessment of the Indian social and political landscape under the British, they regarded modern education as the right alternative to the traditional Muslim mind-set and its value system, which they believed held Muslims back and had little hope for improving conditions. Muslim liberal reformists, such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–1898) mainly defined the ethos of this group. The Muslim liberals spent a greater part of their life at what seemed like two opposite ends: on the one end, seeking conciliation with the British and, on the other end, awakening the Muslim community to the need of accepting new ideas in their own interest. They insisted that the future of the Muslims and their ability to move forward was possible only through acquiring scien-

tific knowledge and accepting "Western culture"[14] in terms of modern learning, reasoning, rationality, and embracing progress as an ideal.

For the Muslim liberals, time was an important variable, as they saw that a majority of the Hindu community and other religious and social groups had advanced in business and modern professions through the agency of modern education brought by the British Empire. By the time they began social mobilization of the Muslim community, other communities had already made tremendous progress and were better prepared to take advantage of opportunities that the new institutions offered in the modern, evolving political economy of India. Impressed by the Western educational institutions and their role in economic and social progress in Europe, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and his colleagues launched the movement for persuading Muslims to enter modern educational institutions.

With a focus on modern education for the Muslims, the Muslim modernists established the Aligarh Muslim University with a missionary zeal to prepare the Muslim youth to enter the sphere of modern Western learning without which they could never progress. The central mission of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was to help Muslims revive their lost status and power through education, which he believed would produce a new generation of modern and enlightened leaders who would combine the pursuit of religious and secular goals.[15] Fazalur Rahman, one of the outstanding scholars of Muslim modernism, sums up Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's conception of the future Muslim of India as follows: "The Quran on one hand, modern science on the other, and on his head the crown of 'there is no God but Allah.'"[16] This statement epitomizes the essence of Muslim modernism—science, reason, material and human progress, rooted in an Islamic civilizational context. The Muslim modernists did not see any theological or philosophical conflict between Western-inspired modernity and an eclectic conception of Islam and Islamic civilization that every generation of Muslims could interpret according to the objective conditions of their own time.[17] Aligarh became the guidepost of Muslim modernity in the Subcontinent to help Muslims emerge out of the darkness of religious obscurantism and to shun fantasies and old myths of Muslim power and past glory. Modern education was the only path to such an ideal and to retain their due place in the new world of India. This has been and will remain the central principle of Muslim modernity in Pakistan and in other places where struggles over the soul of the community and the state are ongoing. A host of other Muslim organizations thereafter imitated the Aligarh model and founded modern schools and colleges that began to produce graduates on the pattern of Western academia. Even today, Aligarh, though left deep inside India, remains a great reference point for modernism in Pakistan.

That said, the deep imprint that Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's Aligarh movement left on the Muslims is subject to different interpretations. Raj Mohan

Gandhi, for instance, thinks the Mohammadan Anglo College that the Muslim reformer founded "would eventually symbolize neither the modernity that had become Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's goal while in England nor the religious reforms that he espoused after his return, but Muslim solidarity and conservatism. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's vision was, at best, partially fulfilled."[18] The government servants, leaders, and intellectuals that Aligarh produced promoted Muslim solidarity around the idea of a separate Muslim state, and some of them came to occupy high positions in Pakistan. However, they were not traditionalist in any sense or as conservative in religious beliefs as the dominant sections of the Muslim community. With a focus on education, they pursued empowerment, identity, and some eventually embraced the idea of Muslim separatism. Echoing the same theme, David Lelyveld argues that Aligarh students were different from others in the sense that they generated debates, discussion, and intellectual tradition. They promoted strong ethos of solidarity for fellow Muslims. This set of ideas and beliefs distinguished Aligarh from other institutions at that time, and eventually played a vital role in cultivating feelings of Muslim nationalism among the Muslims of the Subcontinent.[19]

The cultural impact of Western education on the Muslim mind in the Subcontinent was very profound. The newly Western educated professional middle class developed a deep interest in self-empowerment by opening up to Western liberal and social values and began to question Muslim traditionalism and its backward-looking institutions. This, consequently, transformed their worldview, image of self, and formed within them an accommodationist and integrative attitude vis-à-vis the British Raj. Pragmatism began to replace emotionalism among Muslim individuals and groups that embraced modern education, and were consequently able to find opportunity and means in different parts of British India. However, that was the beginning of change, not a social revolution among the Muslims, and it continues to be the ideal, which is yet to be realized even after seven decades of the creation of Pakistan.

Another great thinker and leading light of Muslim modernism was Syed Ameer Ali, a man of great intellect and foresight. Like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, he questioned and challenged the basic ideas of Islamic orthodoxy which had, for a long time, been resistant to reformation and rethinking regarding Muslim social and political ideas, and institutions. Amir Ali stridently argued that the principles of modern Western polity, such as democracy and its central philosophies have been part of the Islamic conception of politics and society from the early days of Islam.[20] Muslims, in his view, could recover the lost heritage of Islam by reconstructing their societies according to these modern principles. This is a view that Muslim modernist thinkers throughout the extended Middle East, Iran and the constituent regions that now comprise Pakistan, have espoused.[21] Although there are vari-

ations in themes, emphases, and issues facing their societies, a unifying theme among most Modernist Muslims thinkers is the need to reinterpret Islam through *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) in contemporary Islamic societies and to break away from traditional schools of thought.[22]

Questioning orthodoxy within Islam has never been an easy task for anyone, but for progress and making Muslim civilization relevant to the modern age, the Muslim reformists cannot escape this obligation. In fact questioning orthodoxy is as old as the orthodoxy in Islamic tradition itself— from the *Mutazilah* (rationalist interpreters) to present-day Muslim rationalism.[23] It was with this deep sense of commitment to the Muslim community that reformists in the Subcontinent began their work against the challenges posed by the orthodox clergy who sought societal revival through Islamic fundamentalism. Awakening illiterate Muslim masses that were under the local influence of the clergy, the caste system, and tribal chiefs posed another set of problems. However, persistent in efforts and greatly committed to their cause, the modernist Muslims took the central stage in shaping new Muslim attitudes toward progress and modernity. They understood the challenges of the modern times better than the conservative Muslims, and used prudence and practicality to shape their vision for building a modern Muslim community in the competitive social and political environment of India under British rule.

For almost a century, Muslim modernists, coming from diverse ideological and political standpoints, were mainly concerned with the awakening of fellow believers who were living in the past and were unable to overcome the challenges they faced in the modern world. With the great ideas of modernity in mind, they focused their struggle on social mobilization and institution building that would offer the Muslims an opportunity to empower themselves and allow them to enter modern professions from state bureaucracy to law, education, medicine, and business. These were, and continue to remain, the tools of personal success and revival of communities. Since the path-breaking ideas and efforts of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, a modernist-rationalist stream of Islamic thinking in India and Pakistan developed which continues to remain a robust counter-interpretation to the orthodox view of Islam. There is a long list of rationalist Muslim scholars, chief among which have been Chiragh Ali, Shibli Numani, Altaf Husain Hali, Abul Kalam Azad, and Muhammad Iqbal, who have greatly contributed to the reconstruction of religious thought by offering fresh and original interpretations to overcome the challenges of the modern world.[24] The rationalist-modernist methodology is reflected in the works of Ghulam Ahmad Pervez and Khalifa Abdul Hakeem who founded research institutes, published widely, and engaged in an alternative religious discourse to counter the forces of traditional Islam in Pakistan during the Ayub era.[25] Their intellectual tradition has survived the rise

of political Islam and resurgence of traditional Islam but their influence has remained within a narrow band of urban literate sections of society.

There are roughly four common strands of thought that define the thinking of the Muslim-rationalist scholars. First, they believe that Islam is universal, that is beyond time and space, for all times to come. Second, they believe there is the necessity of openness to *ijtihad* emanating from the universalism of Islam. Third, they posit that the *ulema* do not have a monopoly over theology and its interpretation. Finally, they theorize that there is no conflict between reason, science, modernity, and the eternal principles of Islam. These principles necessitate continuous rethinking and accommodation of Islamic principles to face challenges of the modern world, which are continuously being shaped and reshaped by science and technology. In a way they have attempted to take religion out of the traditional institutions established over the centuries by the ulema and placed it in the modern institutions, that is. the academic and research institutes of higher learning.

THE POLITICS OF MUSLIM MODERNITY

Colonialism and its social and political template for India, in a positive way, developed a sense of competition between the social and political leaders and their communities. The success and power of one, primarily of the majority, largely influenced the behavior of the minorities, which were in substantial numbers. The Muslim reformers lost no time, and expended every effort, in identifying why the Muslims were backward and explaining how and why the Hindu majority and other minorities were making great progress. In their judgment, pragmatism, education, and the motivation for material progress were the driving forces of change and they advised their community to follow the example of the communities that were doing well. The Muslim religious, conservative, or modern political revival was thus the mirror image of similar movements within the Hindu community.[26]

The early phase of Muslim modernism had composite social, cultural, and political content. In the case of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and few others in the Subcontinent, bringing Islam closer to modern science by showing that there was no conflict between the two was an equally important task. According to Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, there was no contradiction between God's word—the scripture and God's creation—the universe. Rather he thought that the study of the universe and its scientific principles were a religious obligation for Muslims.[27] The purpose was to reinterpret and redefine Islam and its principles in the light of a new world emerging under the influence of scientific revolution, technology, and the industrial revolution. The broader struggle with which the Muslim modernists in this region were occupied was the question of Muslim empowerment, which was not possible in their judgment

without pulling Muslims out of the dark ditch of the orthodox Muslim position. While empowering Muslims, the modernists also sowed the seeds of a separate political consciousness among the Muslims.

Muslims with modern education, which represented a very narrow band of the vast number of Muslims, formed a sufficient critical mass. They generated self-awareness and became a catalyst for the subsequent struggle for a communal identity and political rights. A separate identity as a religious community regardless of the ethnic, linguistic, and regional differences in political outlook and interests, created a legitimate ground for staking claims for appropriate representation in the flourishing state institutions under the British. The complex intersecting of modernizing trends, political aspirations, and separate identity among Muslims contributed to the creation of a cultural and social base that sought communal representation with constitutional guarantees, and failing that, an independent state or states for the Muslim regional majorities. Such a thought, though vague, was the culmination of a long process of loss of power, self-questioning, foreign rule, and the rising power of the self-assured and aggressive Hindu majority. The idea of separate nationhood among Muslims evolved into a definite shape over almost a century, and it was only during the last decade of the British Raj that the idea emerged as a political ideal after the passing of the famous Pakistan Resolution on March 23, 1940 in Lahore.[28]

The Pakistan Resolution needs to be understood in the light of the sociology of the Muslim community and the character of the religious, cultural, and social forces that formed it over many centuries with a definitive influence of imperial modernization. The Resolution was a culmination of the struggle for Muslim identity and representation in the future constitutional structure of independent India. At that time, it was still a bargaining chip to resolve the outstanding issue of representation and autonomy within the Indian state framework. It represented the new phase of Muslim politics in India, shaped mainly by the political developments from the implementation of the 1935 Government of India Act, the 1937 elections, and the Congress governments in several provinces. Even at this stage the Resolution, which did not even mention the word Pakistan, was the beginning of "territorialization of incipient Muslim nationalism."[29] Many Muslim League leaders, such as Sir Sikander Hayat, at the time of the deliberations on drafting the resolution had advocated a confederation, and even Jinnah accepted the same proposition in saying yes to the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, roughly six years after the passing of the Resolution.[30] There had actually been a clash for almost two decades between two contrasting visions about the future of British India; On the one hand, was centralism propagated by the Congress, and on the other was the federalism with greater autonomy for the Muslim majority areas supported by the Muslim League. These visions also reflected a contested political fact of dual nationalism—Indian and Muslim; Muslims

cumulatively numbering 90,000,000 in undivided India, in many ways measured themselves very differently from the strict yardstick of majority and minority. Their optimism and struggle rested on a hard geopolitical fact—being in majority on the peripheries of present-day India presented them with an option of separation. But still cautious and conscious of their Indian history, heritage, civilizational bonds, and common cultural strands, the separation appeared to be a matter of last resort and not the first preference. Pushed by politics, narrow choices, communal violence, and a rising emotional cry for an independent state, Jinnah accepted the "moth-eaten" Pakistan and became the "reluctant founder" of the new state.[31]

FROM COMMUNITIES TO NATION

The idea of Pakistan is embedded in Muslim nationalism. This was an idea and movement that went through many transformations over time from communal, separate representation to autonomy, and finally the demand for a separate state. The movement however, was never a unified one and it did not capture the ethnic and regional diversity of the Muslim populations, which were spread out in the vast landmass of the Subcontinent. The voice for Pakistan just became the loudest voice, since its leaders were more charismatic and carried far greater credibility, among the many other voices emanating from the Muslim communities. Even before Pakistan appeared to be politically visible over the horizon, Muslim communities were divided across many ethnic, linguistic, and regional groupings. Muslim nationalism, the force at the superstructure of Indian politics, overshadowed alternative visions, views, and schemes for protecting Muslim interests, including the voice of Indian nationalists from the Muslim elites. A common faith, and now a common political ideal, however, placed a temporary cover over the ethnic and political diversity within the Muslim communities. Regional, ethnic, and linguistic identities have been organic to the geography, history, and culture of the Subcontinent. These identities have remained largely unchanged even under the powerful influences of several religious streams both native and foreign to the land. The essential character of the communities made up of various castes, tribes, and ethnicities thus remained the same. However, vital aspects of their relationships to one another, response to foreign invasions, struggle for survival, and quest for power and recognition were distinctly shaped by broader regional developments, such as influence of new religions, foreign conquest, and empire building. The native culture and social formations interacted with colonial modernity in many creative ways in which neither replaced the other. The interactive civilizational process greatly influenced the thought process, political awakening, and competing reform movements. With a new political order unfolding, different com-

munities began to think of their political rights and questions of equality and justice.

The communities, native to the Indus region embraced the Muslims that came into the Subcontinent because of their reformist social program which promised egalitarianism and hope for the lower strata of Hindu society. [32] Thus, an important driver of conversions to Islam was the aversion of the masses to the degenerated and oppressive social order. [33] Over time, Islam, a new religion in an ancient land, imbibed aspects of the Indian civilization. While Islam did retain its original purpose, philosophy and spirituality, and promoted the sense of a separate community, its observance and rituals became colored by the powerful local tribal and Hindu cultural traditions. Therefore, there has been and continues to be some Indianness about Islam in the Subcontinent as practiced by the peasantry and rural populations. This Indianness is not just the influence of Hindu rituals on what is now known as popular Islam, but also extends to subtler domains, such as the exploration of common humanistic and spiritual threads, which produced syncretism and allowed the religious movements of Hinduism and Indian Islam to discover and celebrate common spiritual bonds. The objective of this syncretism was to create harmony between the two religious communities—Hindu and Muslim. Beyond faith, they shared everything; languages, cultures, customs, history, foreign rulers and a common geographical space. [34] Sir Syed Ahmed Khan makes a very important point about the Muslim communities or "nations": "Whatever their reality, nature has changed the blood, identity and essence of Muslim nations that have settled in India and became similar to Indian nations. The Muslim blood, flesh and skin too are the products of India." [35]

But as religious communities, they remained distant in their worldviews and self-imagination. It is debatable whether it was imperial modernity that generated rival quests for power and self-differentiation, or the Muslims' search for a spiritual center that marked their communal outlook. It may be that neither was responsible and multiple other factors contributed to a sense of separate community among Muslims.

Muslim self-imagination transcended the Indian boundaries, extended to distant Muslim lands, and included admiration of Islamic heroes, all the while relishing in their achievements, and feeling pride via historical Islamic conquests and feats. An Indian Muslim, under the Muslim rule, developed a dual personality or a two-track identity. He was an Indian but also a Muslim whose allegiance was with the religious center in the Arabian Peninsula and with the great heroes from Afghanistan, Central Asia, Persia and beyond. Stemming from this, is the fact that, to date, Muslims in Subcontinent continue to identify more closely with extra-territorial Muslim ethos, causes, problems, and struggles than perhaps any other Muslim community anywhere in the world. [36]

The sociological reason for this is that a typical Muslim in the Subcontinent became emotionally attached to the Muslim conquerors, religious figures, and cultural symbols because they positively transformed his identity and social status by highlighting common themes of equality of all believers and a sense of belonging in a greater religious community. Pakistan celebrates foreign Muslim conquers from Arabia, Afghanistan, and Central Asia; it builds monuments in their veneration and even names modern arsenal after them, such as the naming of Pakistan's nuclear capability missiles after the great warriors Shahabuddin Ghouri and Mahmud Ghaznavi.[37] This symbolizes glorification of Muslim invaders that are regarded by Pakistanis as heroes. As Muslims, they consider every invader of India as their liberator and in the quest for national identity they embrace everything Islamic, and from Islamic history, as a means of separating themselves from the Indian civilization.

This Islamic sentimentality and subjective feeling of being a part of an Islamic global community, while living in the territorial limits of India, sowed the seeds of Pan-Islamic feelings among the Indian Muslims that continue to persist as a very strong emotional stream among the Pakistanis. Islam brought about a social revolution among lower caste Hindu converts in terms of pulling down, at least theoretically, the wall of social stratification that rested on a rigid hierarchical social code. It was natural for these new converts to idealize the non-territorial Muslim community and draw some sentimental energy out of this feeling for the reconstruction of both their individual and social identities. This resulted in their dual identification with indigenous local communities and the global Islamic one. That dual identity has remained as strong in Pakistan as it ever was in the mind of Muslims of the Subcontinent before the independence of the country.

In Mughal and colonial India, two competing conceptions of Muslim community prevailed—the Indian and Islamic. While the first understood and explained the Muslim community essentially in Indian territorial terms, the latter adopted an Islamic, universalistic definition, linked with Islamic streams of thoughts, ideas, movements, and philosophies from distant lands. The pre-colonial Muslim reformers in the waning decades of the Mughal rule, such as Shah Waliullah and Syed Ahmad Shaheed, wanted to purge Islam of Indian cultural influences, and restore its original purity.[38] Later, the Deoband school followed the same path in the nineteenth century. The Islamic reformists represented a minority view, and tended to overlook the fact that Muslims in India were rooted in the local cultures and pluralistic Indian civilization that gave them space, status, and opportunity to not only grow but also to rule over India. The great Mughal emperor Jalal ud-din Muhammad Akbar (1542–1605) espoused syncretism, inclusivity, and pluralism. He territorialized Islamic faith in the cultural sense by avoiding a scriptural reading of Islam.[39] However, the Muslim rulers, clergy, and the laymen have

never been divorced from mainstream Islamic ideas, theological controversies, power shifts, and religious movements in the Muslim dominated parts of the medieval and modern world. The Muslim modernists in colonial India adopted a territorial conception of the Muslim community, and were more concerned with the issues of empowerment and representation in the politically changing Indian landscape than the problems of Muslims elsewhere.

The roots of the conception and the idealization of a separate homeland for Muslims lie in the social evolution of Muslims as a distinguished religious community with a different social order, beliefs, and political interests. It is therefore important to understand the critical forces that shaped the community formation process. The question of representation in colonial institutions stimulated Muslim interest in seeking representation on a communal basis.[40] This gradually shaped a communal identity or subjective nationalism of Muslims. As indicated above, colonial modernity was the driving forces in many respects and helped create a greater momentum for differentiation. One of the most important reasons, perhaps understated, was economic inequality among various communities, which was one of the outcomes of British modernization and the colonial policy of selectivism, which rewarded the cooperative sections of the Indian society and ignored those that were not willing to be part of the British colonial enterprise.

The Muslim intelligentsia became increasingly concerned with a single political question; how could Muslims in the Subcontinent revive and empower themselves under the new political order. Individually some of the progressive and forward-looking Muslim families had embraced Western education and institutions, but as a community they continued to live more in the past than in the present. While the progressive modernist section of the Muslim community wanted fellow Muslims to obtain Western education, value new social and political ideas, and enter the new economy, the conservative religious sections insisted on religious purity and returning to the fundamentals of Islam. The modernist Muslims interpreted the backwardness of the Muslim community as a consequence of discriminatory British policies, and also apportioned some of the blame on the Muslim social resistance to new ideas and institutions stemming from the Raj.

COMPETING STREAMS OF MUSLIM MODERNITY

In many ways the two streams of Muslim reformers, the progressives and the conservatives, were involved in dual parallel modernizations of two essentially opposite realms of religion and temporal life. They did however have some common ground; a few modernists defended Islam as a modern religion, and claimed that its ethos was in agreement with modern Western ideas and institutions, such as democracy, equality, and human rights.[41] The mod-

ernists also argued that with the acceptance of these drivers of empowerment and social change, faith in Islam would not be compromised. They demonstrated an eclectic view of Islam that could be flexible and accommodative in the modern world without any loss of its core ideas. They did not see any conflict with Islam in reconstructing Muslims lives and society according to modern principles of economy and politics.

The purpose of modernist Muslims in highlighting and preaching Western education, institutions, and values of scientific knowledge was to empower Muslims and make them competitive to help them rise as a community alongside the majority Hindu groups. Their approach to modernism rested on pragmatism, as it was believed to be instrumental in achieving social and political ends. They argued that only modern science and Western education could open up the vistas of success for any community. They had deep conviction in modernity as a tool for progress for the Muslims and believed that there was no other practical option. Being conscious of the strong hold of religious beliefs on Muslims they presented modernity as compatible with the Islamic beliefs and philosophy.

Religious revivalism, which is generally interpreted as obscurantist and in the modern discourses as fundamentalist, was yet another stream of modernity and was essentially reformist as it aimed to re-interpret Islam in the Indian social and political context of the later part of the nineteenth century. The eighteenth-century teachings of Shah Waliullah (d. 1762) revived Muslim spiritual and intellectual tradition at a time when Muslim power in the Subcontinent was in decline. [42] His attempts to revive the true spirit of Islam and root it in the classical Islamic learnings found some expression in the founding of the Darul Uloom (Islamic seminary) at Deoband at the time when the modernists were encouraging Muslims to enter the English designed educational system in India. [43] However, the central drive behind the Deoband movement was to save Islam and the Islamic civilization in India from the threats of Christianity and Westernization. Other revivalists who were neither conservatives nor westernized modernists endeavored for finding common ideas and ideals between Islam and the modern world. They founded Nadwatul Ulema (Organization of Islamic scholars) in 1894 to counter the challenge of Western education. [44] They were different in approach from the Deoband school in the respect of emphasizing the utility of modern sciences, focusing on vocational training, and contributing to the political project of Muslim empowerment.

Although Aligarh, Deoband, and Nadwah founded different movements, articulated different approaches, and presented different options on how to safeguard secular and religious interests of the Muslims in colonial India, all contributed to "the substantial religious self-consciousness of the period; all reflected and encouraged the growing sense that Muslims resident in British India were tied together in a separate community; and all fostered the use of

Urdu among educated Muslims."[45] Muslim revivalist movements in all forms and of all secular and religious pursuits had a reinforcing and overlapping impact on the Muslim sense of identity and redefinition as a political community. It was that latent sense that began to grow into political demands for adequate share in power and representation in the emerging state institutions under the British rule.

The Muslims' self-assertion as a distinguished political community on the grounds of religion began as a struggle for legal and constitutional rights within the Indian fold.[46] However, fundamental disagreements emerged between the dominant Muslim factions represented by the Muslim League and the Indian Congress Party on how and through what mechanisms the realization of these rights must be realized. The Muslims wanted constitutional safeguards and assured representation in the elected assemblies—primarily aiming to get an adequate share in power and representation on communal lines. The Muslim consensus was on writing a social contract between the two major religious communities, that is the Hindus and Muslims, on effective, enduring, and inviolable constitutional protection for the representation and power of the Muslim community. The acceptance of the Muslim demand for separate electorates had two parallel political effects; political accommodation, along with the creation of a separate political sphere for the Muslims. This sort of Muslim exceptionalism ran counter to the secular idea of the Indian nation that the Congress had used to create unity among diverse ethnic and religious groups of the Subcontinent.[47] Failure in reaching a common understanding on the future political order of an independent India and the constitutional position of the Muslim majority areas, and the rest of the Muslim populations scattered around India, further deepened the sense of separate nationhood among them.

The Muslim demography, geography, and history in the Subcontinent have some unique characteristics and are very different from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Middle East in many respects. Population concentrations of Muslims existed on the eastern and northwestern fringes of the Subcontinent, while the political battle for the safeguarding of Muslim communal interests and later Muslim separatism started in the heartland of India. At the culmination of the struggle, Muslim social and political modernists from Muslim minority areas succeeded in winning the state of Pakistan that encompassed the geographical areas of Muslim concentration, that is the Muslim Bengal and historic regions of the Indus in the West, to create Pakistan.

While focusing on Islamic identity, the Muslim modernists popularized the idea of a nation, state, constitution, parliament, and democracy, which they believed would energize the Muslims. These notions best define the modernist political project, which they undertook in the Subcontinent. While developing an idea of a separate Muslim state or Pakistan the founders of

Pakistan greatly benefited from religious revivalism and modernism as well as from the colonial heritage, that is the legacy of political movements for independence, political parties, elections, constitution, representation in the assemblies, bureaucracy and military, and above all an institutional infrastructure of the state, something that many Muslim states at that time lacked.

How the modernist vision of Pakistan got lost in the mess of power struggles, among factions of the Muslim League, on the one hand, and the civilian and military leaders on the other, is another story. But more debasing has been the attempt by these leaders to present themselves as political 'heirs' of the founders while following political agendas and strategies that run contrary to their vision of the rule of law, supremacy of the constitution, and representative form of government. The religious and conservative sections of Pakistani society have tried to paint Jinnah as sympathetic to Islamism; confusing his struggle for the creation of a state in the Muslim majority areas as being premised on the concept of an Islamic state instead of Muslim nationalism. Jinnah's idea of the state was based on common citizenship and neutrality of the state in religious matters, and he envisioned the state to be inclusive of other religions and minorities, as any other pluralistic territorial state would be.[48]

Prominent historians and others that have written on some of the founders of Pakistan including Jinnah and on the events leading to the partition of the Subcontinent have never disputed the fact that Jinnah and most of his colleagues in the Muslim League had been modernist Muslims devoted to the freedom of India. For decades, they had worked with the Congress, and after they found the Congress leaders to be unreasonably hostile to legitimate Muslim political aspirations, they demanded a separate state—Pakistan.[49]

Up until the end of the Cabinet Mission (1946), Muslim leaders such as Jinnah tried to work within the constitutional framework of the Indian union whilst ensuring that adequate safeguards existed for Muslims through three basic principles, that is autonomy of provinces, representation of Muslims in the legislature proportionate to their demographic strength, and a share in power.[50] From this point of view, the major concern wasn't that Islam was in danger in India but it was the economic and political interests of the Muslims as a nation, that were at risk. The Muslim League was thus concerned with the majoritarianism of the Hindu majority, evidenced from the Congress rule in 1930s, and aimed to negotiate a reasonable deal for the Muslims within the Indian fold first. Failure to provide these safeguards resulted in negotiating a grand deal—an independent Pakistan in Muslim majority areas on the fringes of mainland India.

ELITE MODERNISM AND ISLAM

It was natural for the new state of Pakistan to form a narrative regarding what separated the constituent regions of Pakistan from India. This also explains why a stress on the two-nation theory has continued with vigor, in order to perpetuate the, imagined or real differences, between the two countries. The project of becoming a nation had to progress beyond the struggles and controversies of pre-Pakistan days; but it did not and got lost within the first decade of Pakistan's creation into the bouts of power struggles, rapid successions, disarray of the Muslim League, and the military takeover. The two-nation theory was no longer relevant; rather it became a sign of weakness unable to define what kind of state Pakistan wanted to be—democratic constitutional, secular-liberal, or Islamic. Moreover, ethno-linguistic nationalism and demands for autonomy and cultural recognition, equally modernistic in terms of rights and representation, joined the old streams of thought about imagining Pakistan. Naturally, various political, ethnic, and ideological groups began to interpret the idea, the struggle and the motives for Pakistan's establishment to explain the direction and destiny it should pursue in the contemporary world, very differently. Furthermore, the constituencies supportive of political Islam, aligned directly and indirectly with Islamic radicalism, have captured a much larger space in defining the ideal of Pakistan. The Islamists reject, oppose, and often agitate against even the mentioning of ideas such as secularism and liberalism, which are the founding principles of the modern democratic world.[51] The popular or mainstream leaders of Pakistan have never cared for articulating a liberal-secular vision of Pakistan. They have been too timid and politically expedient, primarily concerned with completing their tenures instead of de-emphasizing the role of religion in politics and affairs of the state. Unfortunately, they have aligned with the religious parties, supported and encouraged them with their own opportunistic religious tilts and appeasements.[52]

Pakistan's dominant elites have never hesitated to play the Islamic card or to court the Islamists, even those groups that have been associated with the sectarian extremism and violence.[53] The role Islamic identity played in the formation of the Muslim community, Islamic nationalism, and the demand for Pakistan as an independent state is another reason for the mass confusion both at the elite and public level. Jinnah in the years leading to the partition, and his Muslim League used Islam "as a marker of national difference" to support the two-nation theory and motivate Muslim masses to rally behind the idea of Pakistan. This message was read and understood very differently by different Muslim constituencies. The necessity of religious symbolism in articulating the idea of separate nation, in many ways, worked counter to idealizing the "liberal, secular" nation state.[54] In the cultural climate of the Muslim communities with low levels of political and intellectual develop-

ment, and while facing the challenge of creating a new country out of India, the leaders of the Pakistan movement were constrained in fashioning their political message in liberal-secular terms as openly and explicitly as the All Indian Congress. Owing to political necessity the All India Muslim League which was waging a struggle for Muslim nationalism, and finally a state in the Muslim majority areas, tried to strike a balance between Islamic ethos and principles and the values and modern notions of nationalism and communal rights through vaguely weaving both into the two-nation theory. It popularized the idea of a Muslim nation against a Hindu (Indian) nation, which later opened wide the doors for interpretation of the rationale for Pakistan. Islamic scholars like Abul A'la Mawdudi conceptualized the future state of Pakistan as an Islamic ideological state that would be very different from the Western conception of state with respect to the ethos of nationalism and governing principles. Mawdudi and other scholars and political activists in his intellectual footsteps have insisted that Islam is the basis of Pakistani nationalism, and therefore, its political order must embrace the idea of 'sovereignty of God' as opposed to the 'sovereignty of the people.'"[55]

Since the birth of the country, the Islamists have questioned Jinnah's idea of a liberal, secular state. Even the mainstream politicians with liberal credentials have dragged Islam into Pakistani politics for their own legitimacy, which has kept the issue of Pakistan's identity controversial. For decades autocratic rule and the perversion of constitutions undermined the liberal constitutionalist vision of Jinnah. The biggest blow came from the state-sponsored Islamization program under General Zia ul Haq, and his alliance with the Islamists and jihadists, which perpetuated a twisted interpretation of the ideology and political struggle of the founders of the country. The power nexus between religious parties and the then military regime set Pakistan on a different path, leading to the rise of extremism, sectarianism, and transnational jihadist movements. The Afghan mujahedeen's war in Afghanistan along with the dedicated Western support to the military regime and the Afghan resistance provided a perfect regional strategic environment for radical Islam to flourish. While Pakistan has survived many of the ideological and political traumas inflected by the third military regime, it has left society wounded, divided, and politically disoriented.

Despite this, three central factors have helped Pakistan survive and represent the potential to get Pakistan back on the rails of modernity and progress. It includes the robustness of Pakistani state infrastructure, the modernist orientation of the Pakistani political elite, and the electoral failures of Islamist parties. There is robustness in the Pakistani state infrastructure in terms of institutions, military, bureaucracy, and political order. The political order despite four military interventions and political disfigurations has always come back to its original default position—parliamentary democracy. Though surviving from crisis to crisis has weakened the state, in a compara-

tive sense, it remains one of the most robust states in the region. Moreover, the dominant political elite of Pakistan exhibit varying degrees of modernist orientation. Their ethos, political values, and interests are deeply embedded in the idea of democracy and a representative system despite all its flaws and defects. They have often struggled for restoration of democracy, some have even paid a heavy price for it and their learning curve has been satisfactory. Most important, although oligarchic and dynastic as they are, they have prevented the religious parties from succeeding at electoral politics. That said, the political elite also have many failings and their failures have generated crises of the state and society. Their corruption, bad governance, and personalized politics have created opportunities for military interventions into politics and the rise of radical Islam. Lastly, every national election in Pakistan has proved beyond doubt that the people of Pakistan do not want a theocratic Islamic state as in the image of the Islamists since the Islamist parties have done resoundingly poor in the elections. Thus, the constitution of Pakistan, the doctrine of repugnancy—which posits that no law against Islam can be enacted, and the sovereignty of the constitution and parliament—remain the hallmark of political modernity.

Revival of Pakistan from the present chaos of extremism, militancy, and radicalism is linked to the above-mentioned ideas and institutions, which have partly become eclipsed due to decades of military dictatorships aligned with the religious and right wing political groups. It was primarily the loss of the modernist vision that produced the many failures, conflicts, and distortions that Pakistan confronts today. A careful reading of the life and works of the founders of Pakistan, such as Jinnah's, would reveal that they were modernist-rationalist to the core and wanted Pakistan to be built on democratic and constitutionalist principles within the cultural and civilizational context of Islam. Two of Jinnah's statements about his vision for the future state of Pakistan clearly stand out. He unequivocally stated, "Pakistan is not to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission."[56] On the question of neutrality of the state of Pakistan in religious matters, Jinnah's address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947 clearly defined the character of the Pakistani state in the following words "you may belong to any caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the state."[57] In a way, he indirectly declared that the two-nation theory was no more relevant, valid, or needed. There cannot be a clearer statement about the vision of Pakistan than what Jinnah told the Assembly that would be tasked to frame the future constitution of the state.

The ideology of Jinnah and his vision for Pakistan is a much debated question on which a unanimous answer does not exist anymore. We share the view of those who believe that Jinnah was essentially a secular Muslim, not that he rejected religion as something irrelevant on a personal level, but wanted the state of Pakistan to be neutral and safeguard interests of the

diverse religious communities of Pakistan. This is one of the old renaissance ideas that have transformed relations between societies and states in the modern world.

Secularism may appear to be a controversial idea among common Pakistanis beyond those who may have a nuanced understanding of the origin and significance of this philosophy.[58] But Pakistan's civilian demagogues, military dictators, and political parties have caused damage to Pakistan's modernist ideals. Four military generals sitting under Jinnah's portrait have suspended and abrogated constitutions and sent elected governments packing. Moreover, they have relied on those social forces, such as the religious right and Islamists to gain support, further unsettling the issue of neutrality of the state in religious matters. The dynastic politicians from different political parties have never lost the opportunity of aligning themselves with new rulers and their political opportunism has trumped democratic principles. Thus, military rulers have used every faction, party, or group that was willing to do their bidding and be on their side to act as a constituent element of the political façade they created to hide authoritarianism.

For reasons of political expediency, the successive generations of ruling classes of Pakistan, both military as well as civilian have wavered on the subject of the positioning of Islam and constitutionalism in politics and the state of Pakistan. They might have been able to benefit from the political legacy of Jinnah on both issues but that has unfortunately become controversial as religious groups use his thoughts and beliefs as much as democratic elements to legitimize their claims. At least three ideas of Jinnah's political struggle, representative government, constitutionalism, and civil rights, are universally held in high esteem and have survived in Pakistan. These are universally accepted ideas that have shaped democratic movements throughout the world, and have been accepted across cultural and national boundaries. The issue in Pakistan is that the ruling classes are uncomfortable with a liberal democratic framework that goes beyond procedural democracy. As Pakistan tries to rebuild itself as a democratic state in the wake of the fourth democratic transition, it has the benefit of its political experience and institutions. The big question is whether the ruling elites of Pakistan will learn from history and place public interest before their narrow private interests—a dilemma that all developing democracies face. Finally, Pakistan will have to reorient itself away from the undercurrents of extremism and radicalism through pluralism, equality of all citizens regardless of faith and neutrality of the state in religious matters.[59] That said, we have yet to see strong leaders committed to this vision who possess the will and public support to move the country decisively away from the confused and contradictory paths it has taken to in the past.

NOTES

1. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, *Maqalat-i- Sir Syed Ahmed Khan* (Essays of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (Lahore: Majlis-i-Taraqi-i-Urdu, 1991), 35–40. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and his associates were the first to realize the importance of Western education, English language and the study of modern sciences. They established modern educational institutions, scientific societies and stressed the need for educating Muslim girls. They modeled the Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College, later developed into Aligarh University on the British Cambridge University. See Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 37.

2. Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014).

3. M. Rafique Afzal, *Pakistan: History and Politics, 1947–1971* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).

4. Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1998).

5. Anoushiravan Ehtashami, "Islam, Muslim Polities and Democracy," in *Religion, Democracy and Democratization,* ed. John Anderson (New York: Routledge, 2016), 94–97; Alia Brahimi, "The Taliban's Evolving Ideology," Working Paper 02/2010, London School of Economics, July 2010, 5; Tahir Khan, "Un-Islamic System: Taliban Call for Poll Boycott," *Express Tribune*, April 9, 2013.

6. Sajjad Hyder, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Reflections of an Ambassador* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987).

7. "Pakistan Army Sees 'Internal Threat' as the Greatest Security Risk," *Dawn*, January 2, 2013.

8. See Seth G. Jones and C Christine Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 4, 17, 31.

9. On debates how the idea of a separate nationhood emerged, see Khursheed Kamal Aziz, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books,1987).

10. Fazlur Rahman defines modernism as integration of Western thoughts and practices with Islam. See his "Muslim Modernism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* (1958), 91.

11. Maulana Syed Husain Ahmad Madni, *Naqsh-i-Hayat* (Life History) (Karachi: Baitul Tauheed, 1953).

12. Under the British colonialism, the Muslim religious scholars feared threat to Islamic religion, way of life and civilization under the British. To protect religion and Muslims, they founded Darul-Uloom (Islamic seminary) at Deoband. *Darul Uloom Deoband ki sad sala zindgi* (Hundred years of the life of Darul Uloom Deoband) (Deoband: Darul Uloom Deoband, 1965), 14.

13. Barbara Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1989), 11.

14. Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 31–56.

15. David Lelyveld argues that: "From the outset, the rationale for Aligarh was bound up with an analysis of the relationship between the Muslims and the nature of political power in British India." See David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 317

16. Rahman, "Muslim Modernism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent," 83–84.

17. Reza Aslan, *No God but God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam* (London: Arrow Books, 2011), 230–232.

18. Rajmohan Gandhi, *Understanding the Muslim Mind* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1986), 35.

19. Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation,* 319.

20. Syed Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam: A History of Evolution of Ideas of Islam with the Life of the Prophet* (London: Methuen, 1965), 268–289.

21. For instance, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); Forough Jahanbakhsh, *Islam,*

Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran, 1953–2000: From Bazargan to Soroush (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

22. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, edited and annotated by M Saeed Sheikh, 6th ed. (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 2006); Shaukat Ali, *Contemporary Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Publishers United, 1986).

23. Mansoor Moaddel, *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse* (Chicago University Press, 2005); Mohammad Abed al-Jabri, *The Formation of Arab Reason: Text, Tradition and the Construction of Modernity in the Arab World* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

24. Aziz Ahmad and G. E. Von Grunebaum, *Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan 1857–1968* (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2004).

25. Ali Usman Qasmi, "God's Kingdom on Earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947–1969," *Modern Asian Studies* 44, no. 6 (November 2010): 1238–1247.

26. Norman G. Barrier, "The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab, 1894–1908," *Journal of Asian Studies* 26, no. 3 (1967): 363–379.

27. M.U. Abbasi, "Sir Syed Ahmed Khan," in *The Muslim Luminaries: Leaders of Religious, Intellectual and Political Revival in South Asia* (Islamabad: National Hijra Council, 1988), 66–67; Muhammad Ali Musofer, "Sir Syed's Legacy," *Dawn*, May 22, 2015.

28. For the text of the Resolution and speeches, see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents, 1906–1947* (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970), 340–341.

29. Sharif al Mujahid, "The Day and Its Significance," *Dawn*, March 23, 2015.

30. M. Rafique Afzal, *A History of the All-India Muslim League, 1906–1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 629–637.

31. Aslan, *No God but God*, 263.

32. M.N. Roy, *Historical Role of Islam* (Lahore: Sind Sagar Academy, 1974), 95–96.

33. MN Roy, "India and Islam," *Nation* (Islamabad), February 15, 2010.

34. On this perspective, see Imtiaz Ahmad, *Ritual and Religion among Muslims in India* (Delhi: Manohar, 1981) and his, *Modernization and Social Change among Muslims in India* (Delhi: Manohar, 1983).

35. Maulana Muhammad Ismail Panipati, *Maqalaat-e-Sir Siyyad* (Essays of Sir Siyyad) (Lahore: Majlis-e-Taraqe-i-Adab, 1963), vol. 12, 21.

36. John Sidel, *Pan-Islamism, the Caliphate, and New Islamic Movements*, LSE, London, 3 November 2011; Jacob Landau, "Turkey Opts Out, while India's Muslims Get Involved," in *The Politics of Pan-Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Azmi Ozcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877–1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1997).

37. C.E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids 994–1040* (Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 1963); Tanvir Anjum, "The Emergence of Muslim Rule in India: Some Historical Disconnects and Missing Links," *Islamic Studies* 46, no. 2 (Summer 2007); Andre Wink, *Al-Hind-Making of the Indo-Islamic World*, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

38. Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, *Islamic Renaissance in South Asia, 1707–1867*: *The Role of Shah Wali Allah and His Successors* (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, 2002).

39. Eric Maroney, *Religious Syncretism* (London: SCM Press, 2006), 150–164.

40. Farzana Shaikh. *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860–1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 119–193.

41. Amir Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*.

42. Bashir Ahmad Dar, "Wali Allah: His Life and Times," in *Shah Waliullah*, *1703–1762: His Religious and Political Thought,* ed. M. Ikram Chaghatai (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2005), 19–49.

43. Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1989), 87–137.

44. Jamal Malik, "Making of a Council: The Nadwatul Ulema," *Islamic Culture* 68, no. 1 (1994): 1–40.

45. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India*, 315

46. Sir Syed was the first prominent Muslim who raised voice for political and constitutional safeguards for Indian Muslims. He laid foundation of the demand for separate electorates and opposed the idea of majority representation in British India. For Sir Syed's views on the same, see Christine Dobbin, *Basic Documents of Modern India and Pakistan, 1835–1947* (London: Von Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), 41

47. On historical evolution of Muslim exceptionalism, see Masood Ashraf Raja, *Constructing Pakistan: Foundational Texts and the Rise of Muslim National Identity, 1857–1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010).

48. Akbar S. Ahmed, "Jinnah's 'Gettysburg Address,'" in *The Jinnah Anthology*, ed. Liaquat H. Merchant and Sharif Al Mujahid (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 84–85.

49. Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 155–183; Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2009), 332–393.

50. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 51–81.

51. Suhail Kakakhel, "Religious Leaders Criticize PM for Calling Pakistan 'Liberal,'" *Dawn*, November 13, 2015.

52. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 170.

53. Zarar Khuhro, "Bloody Instructions," *Dawn*, August 25, 2014.

54. Masood Ashraf Raja, *Constructing Pakistan,* 136–137.

55. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 87–99.

56. Merchant and Mujahid, "From Broadcast to the people of USA, February, 1948," in Merchant and Al Mujahid, *The Jinnah Anthology*, 110.

57. Ibid., 115.

58. Tarik Jan, ed., *Pakistan between Secularism and Islam: Ideology, Issues and Conflict* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1998).

59. Not in one but in several speeches, Jinnah made a forceful argument for democratic principles, rule of law, rights of the minorities, rejection of theocracy. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah,* 7th ed. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968).

Chapter Four

Erosion of Modernist Tradition

The question of modernity under Western colonialism is contested, controversial and provokes a heated debate among native intellectuals and nationalist circles. A good number of post-colonial thinkers and political activists look at the entire imperial enterprise with suspicion and associate it with the design of imperial hegemony and domination. They argue that colonialism disrupted the natural development of local cultures, political institutions, and social values. [1] Moreover, there is a bigger issue of losing sovereignty to a foreign power and a sense of humiliation for being subjected to such a rule, which has dominated most of the nationalist and post-independence narratives from left to center of the political spectrum.

Our argument in this book is that colonial modernity greatly influenced the social and political life of the regions comprising modern-day Pakistan, leaving deep imprint on the concepts and institutions of state and nation building. While British colonialism in the Subcontinent, like other colonial advents, raises complex questions and the concerns expressed regarding their colonial enterprise are not without reason or substance, our concern is not with the declared motives of the British. We are also not concerned with the analysis of economic, social, and historical forces that shaped the imperial quest in Britain or other European countries in the eighteenth century. Instead, we look at British colonialism with the purpose of understanding its contribution to the modernist tradition of Pakistan. Undoubtedly, some of the positive gains of the long imperial rule have been ideas of state and nation building, modern political outlook and establishment of institutions such as democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. It is necessary to consider Pakistan's colonial political heritage to assess why Pakistan's democratic dream remains strong despite many setbacks and a loss of direction in the formative years after its independence.

There is a general agreement about the colonial powers transplanting new values, culture, and authority structures in non-Western societies that facilitated and prolonged their rule and made the colonial enterprise easy and effective. To realize its imperial objectives and economic interests, Britain created one of the biggest empires in India, introducing extensive administrative changes and ensuring that social and political modernizations ran parallel to the process of state building in Europe, albeit operating in a different social and historical setting. Even though the reforms and changes they brought about in India had imperial motivations, they have left a deep impact on almost every area of national life. The introduction of modern laws, the court system, bureaucracy, a professional army, and most important, an industrial economy to support and sustain the colonial venture have survived well beyond the end of British rule. These transformations have, in fact, provided the bedrock on which nation states of South Asia rest today.

Whether we characterize the colonial intervention in the social and political life of the Subcontinent as disruptive or transformative, one has to acknowledge that there were hardly any spheres of local society that were not affected negatively or positively by colonial policies and its system of governance. Whether these changes should be considered westernization or modernization is however, an important question—the answer to which cannot be definitively provided in black and white. Perhaps it was both, as the British design of economic and political change was rooted in their own historical experience and was deeply influenced by Western industrial culture and liberal social and political ideas. But its consequences, intended or unintended, produced multiple streams of modernity in education, industry, science, and political life. Benign intentions have never motivated colonization of weaker regions of the world, and for this reason, one should not entertain any illusions about colonization for the sake of 'civilizing' the "uncivilized." Contrary to its declared purposes and pretensions, colonialism was more about extraction, control, and power but at the same time it also sowed the seeds of social and political change, which in some areas was even radical.

The British cultural and political influence through its disruptive effects on local cultures brought about a kind of modernity. Modernity itself is a debatable concept, and the realm and desirability of modernity are both attacked and defended by many commentators. Since we are concerned with the state of Pakistan, we will focus on how pursuing colonial interests and objectives in a region as vast as the sub-continent, laid the foundation for the modern infrastructure of the Pakistani state. Furthermore, the issue of social and political engineering to create collaborative and supportive classes that now form the post-colonial ruling oligarchy in Pakistan is also an important issue.

Therefore, in this context we take a rather broad view of modernity that is a controversial as well as a complex subject, and does not easily lend itself to a consensual view but to an array of opinions and discourses. Modernity can be encapsulated as the capacity of man to live in the ethos of his age, which entails a process of change on the basis of rational and utilitarian principles in retaining relevant and expedient features of pre-colonial and colonial times, while rejecting the outdated and redundant features. Fundamentally, it is a historical process of constant change, re-evaluation of all forms of social life and a movement, forward in ideas, institutions, productive process, science, technology, and social relations. The idea of modernity is not confined to secular objects alone and it encompasses religious thought, reformation, and reinterpretation of religions to stay relevant to time.[2] The values and institutions birthed by the modern world we live in now, began to reach distant parts of the non-Western world as a consequence of imperial outreach, and continue to influence every part of the world rapidly through present day globalization.

This global spread has been the subject of debate and discussion on account of the social and material forces that contoured it and the effect it had on societies, benign or malignant, particularly on Muslim societies where multiple conflicting narratives of injustice have leveled serious charges against colonial policies. These narratives about the past and enunciation of Islamic ideology for reconstruction of polity and society in the Islamic world have seriously questioned the imperial brand of political modernity, especially its secular streak as a European social construct employed to rob Muslim societies of their religious identity.

It is hard to settle all these intellectual and philosophical controversies about modernity but it is important to assess and evaluate the depth here of the impact of British imperialism on Pakistan. It would be also important to note that modernity, induced by indigenous development or imposed by foreign rulers, can succeed in totally replacing old social structures, political systems and social relations. Rather, it introduces hybridism, a mixing of old and new, that over a period of time changes shades according to the utilitarian interest and rational calculation of relevance to the context of society. Pakistan, like all other post-colonial Muslim societies, presents that hybridism with varying shades of tradition, old social structures, modern sociopolitical forms, and religion. It is a complex mix and often contains conflicting ideas and centrifugal social forces that pull Muslim societies in different directions.

POLITICAL HERITAGE

We may disagree on how politically developed the Muslim majority areas were compared to other regions of India at the time of independence. While the latter were definitely more industrialized compared to the former, elements and social forces that contributed to political development were present everywhere. The political mobilization during the independence movement reinforced a common national identity; produced charismatic nationalist leaders, political parties, elections, and established assemblies as a focal point of representation, and thus left a deep historical imprint on political development in the regions comprising Pakistan. These were the building blocks of modern political life and slowly became woven into a broader philosophical framework of political modernity. These formed the foundations for a representative government shaped by law, constitutional structures and powers, and government.

The founding fathers of Pakistan embraced these ideas and institutions as universal in their application. They did not regard local traditions, cultural variations, and civilizational differences as insurmountable barriers to constructing new politics and institutions. They rightly thought that human dignity, responsible government, and progress of societies could only be possible through a government based on consent of the governed and under the rule of law. The question of which law Pakistan has to be governed under, modern civic law or Islamic law, remains a serious and unresolved issue. While ulema and religious parties continue to press for Islamization of laws, the mainstream parties have settled on the doctrine of repugnancy—meaning no law will be passed by the parliament that is in conflict with Islamic principles. As in the case of other religious traditions, the rule of law in Pakistan is rooted in Islamic civilization and social tradition.[3] Therefore the history and geography of modern political ideas, with a focus on bringing the political authority under law and social responsibility, have not created dissonance among modernist Muslim thinkers and activists in India and Pakistan.

As we will discuss below, some sectors of the Pakistani society have increasingly questioned the mutation of traditional social structures under the dense shadow of the colonial past. The religious and conservative forces in society, as discussed in chapter two, have an alternative political project of Islamization: to enforce an Islamic identity and to present Islam as a political ideology first and foremost. Interestingly, the institutionalists among the Islamists use the idiom and political channels of modernism, such as political parties, elections, and parliament to reform the state and society, and accept the supremacy of the constitution. It is actually radical Islam, its ideologues and their militant fronts, which have rejected the constitutional framework and institutions of the post-colonial state by propagating fuzzy ideas about the re-establishment of a caliphate in the image of early Islam.

Although, Pakistani society in general is not interested in the Islamist political project and has rejected the Islamist parties in electoral contests, radical-extremist ideas and groups have gained some strength during the past couple of decades.[4] But radical Islam's violent politics and the threat of Talibanization are not the only reasons why modern political institutions, ideas, and political practices are being challenged in Pakistan today. Furthermore, Pakistan is not the only country where the emergence of Islamism as an ideology poses a political challenge. This phenomenon can be seen across most Islamic states with varying degrees of power and influence. Historically, and compared to other Muslim regions, Pakistan has had a larger and more extensive endowment of modernity, and for that reason is a better candidate to strengthen liberal institutions and making the transition to democracy. But Pakistan continues to struggle for a workable democracy, while the legitimacy and effectiveness of its modernist political traditions and institutions have grinded down.

The following sections examine why Pakistan has not lived up to the liberal vision and promise of its founders, and how long decades of misrule, civilian and military authoritarianism and the mafia-like organized corruption within the ruling political groups and state institutions have undermined the democratic faith of ordinary citizens. It is really in despair and hopelessness that Pakistan has looked toward the military, an organized and effective institution, to take over power to gain temporary relief and certainly not as an enduring or stable solution. The paradox of Pakistan is that while some sections of society have celebrated the humiliating end of elected governments by distributing sweets and dancing in the streets to welcome rulers in uniform, others have resisted them by launching democratic movements. Military rulers have selectively coopted sections of the political elites that have been willing to work as their political front. By bringing the same discredited and corrupt politicians into the fold, the military rulers failed to bring about any "revolution" and were only successful at restoring some order and economic growth. It is this double disappointment over a long time that seems to have generated an extremist constituency and the rise of militancy and radical ideas. These retrogressive developments have eroded the liberal endowment, which at the time of Pakistan's independence was meager to begin with.

Besides weaknesses and failures of post-independence leaders and institutions, some scholars have rightly argued that Pakistan's move toward an authoritarian social and political character is partly due to the uneven effects of colonial modernity. According to Christophe Jaffrelot, the existing institutional imbalance is a colonial legacy rooted in the political heritage of Punjab and other regions that constitute Pakistan. This explains why they have often submitted to authoritarianism more than other parts of the British Indian Empire.[5] In answering the question of why British rule created different

patterns of political development in South Asia, Ayesha Jalal argues that India and Pakistan inherited different elements of the same colonial legacy. While India was bequeathed with the central apparatus of the Empire, Pakistan had to build a new state on its periphery constituting regions that were formerly ruled from Delhi.[6] The imperatives of setting up a new central state pushed forward the agenda of centralization, which gradually produced authoritarian political culture.

FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

The real reason for the decline of the modernist inheritance of Pakistan is failure of constitutionalism, rule of law, and democracy. These were some of the great benefits that both Pakistan and India received as colonial subjects. If we take political modernization as a separate discourse, as some of the political scientists have,[7] these concepts and political institutions built on them form the core of political modernization. As a historical phenomenon, political modernization of the Subcontinent is more than one and half century old and started with the founding of political parties, emergence of new social movements, revival and reconstruction of social and religious identities, and reforms in the latter half of the nineteenth century.[8]

Pakistan began its political journey in 1947 with a more than adequate inheritance of political modernism, which was in varying depth and hold in different areas comprising the new country. This is the case even today because of regional disparities in economic development and modernization processes.

The drift toward authoritarianism and personalized rule started well before the new state could find a stable balance among institutions or a political tradition of representative government could be established. Some scholars accuse Jinnah of setting a wrong political precedent by concentrating power in his hands. Others have viewed his assuming the powers and responsibilities of governor-general as a continuation of the vice-regal tradition that has raised many questions about his legacy.[9] On the other hand, Ian Talbot, a noted historian, argues that strengthening central authority in the new state of Pakistan during the chaotic conditions of early years was a political necessity, and that "Jinnah never exceeded the limits of his authority as Governor General."[10]

The political leaders and parties of Pakistan owned the ideas and institutions that shaped the political heritage of the Subcontinent under the British rule, but have failed to live fully up to their promise. The entire Subcontinent has varied layers and bands of authoritarianism mixed with shades of democratic development. Compared to India, the quality and performance of democracy and democratic institutions has been weaker and inconsistent in

Pakistan. India's success lies greatly in subordinating the military to civilian rule, while Pakistan's failure in this endeavor remains pretty pronounced. That is not to say that India has resolved all its social contradictions through democracy, but that it has been able to achieve stability and certainty in its political affairs, while Pakistan continues to be troubled by constant political crises.

There are many theories that explain Pakistan's political failure on the path of democracy, such as praetorian tradition, authoritarian political culture, agrarian-feudalistic social structure, and imbalances between the state institutions and underdeveloped civil society.[11] In our view, the new state of Pakistan lost its visionary leader, Jinnah, at a critical stage during its formative years. While Pakistan was still left with post-partition emotions, great hope and spirit, it had no coherent political leadership to carry forward the dream of a liberal democratic Pakistani state. The Muslim League became fragmented along many axes, ranging from personal rivalries to regional pulls and could not entrench its shallow roots in the new soil of Pakistan. For a decade preceding the creation of Pakistan, the League captured the popular imagination of the Muslims, not by its own organizational qualities but by the power of the dream and inspiration from the dreamer of a new sovereign Muslim country, Jinnah. Jinnah was the center, substance, and the driving force behind the League. Historians of the independence movement in South Asia have continued to debate whether it was the party-based movement or the great leader Jinnah that popularized the idea of Pakistan and finally won the case for it. It is however, a compelling fact that the Muslim League's stance vis-à-vis Pakistan was shaped entirely by Jinnah.[12]

Sadly, Jinnah did not live long enough to define and guide the state and nation-building process of the new state. He did, however, leave a great vision, formative ideas, and a rough outline about the future shape of Pakistan. As we have discussed above, Jinnah had a republican political vision and was an ardent proponent of a welfare state based on constitutionalism, and rule of law with a federal parliamentary character. Most significantly, he believed in the neutrality of the state among religious communities and asserted that the religion was not to be "the business of the state."[13] Building the state and national institutions according to these very modern principles of government required leaders that genuinely represented peoples' aspirations, considered their demands, and remained committed to the original ideals of Pakistan. Even if Pakistan's own example is not enough, the experience of many other countries has suggested that state and nation-building processes require careful thought, skills, sacrifices, and deep commitment because it is all about translating ideas and visions into practical political shape. However, doing all that requires balancing conflicting interests of leaders, factions, and regions within the larger vision of the state. In Pakistan's case, both the vision about the future of Pakistan and the enterprise of

inclusive politics ran into rough waters within a few years of creation and all that Jinnah stood for became controversial.

Jinnah had effectively used Islamic ethos to bring political consensus among Muslims for a separate homeland. Consequently, he addressed different constituencies with different political orientations and interests and wrote speeches and made statements keeping in mind the different interests of different audiences, and often conflated the ideas of an Islamic welfare state, two-nation theory, and Muslim nationalism. Consequently, he ended up creating too many strands of thoughts and ideas that have been open to debate and discussion. The consequence of this has been that modern secularists, traditionalists, and Islamists all quote Jinnah's statements to support their respective, and often conflicting, visions of Pakistan.

Jinnah's successors were poor compared to Jinnah in demonstrating the kind of charisma and leadership qualities needed at that time. There was no other leader in his party who could claim similar consensus, popularity, or mass support. With Jinnah as a central figure and consensus-builder, the Muslim League was reduced to a crowd of individuals with varying qualities and commitments. The only individual that stood a little taller than others was Liaqat Ali Khan. He was a migrant from India who had the trust and confidence of Jinnah and had gained enough political experience in the struggle for Pakistan to give some coherence to the League and effectively run the affairs of the state. Despite this, he faced daunting challenges in every area of state and nation building, from dealing with the chaos of the partition to putting energy into the fragile state structure.

Liaqat Ali Khan was a central figure of great national repute and his honesty, integrity, sacrifices, and love for the new country have been widely known and admired. However, in the political landscape of the new state, he was unable to generate the same level of acceptance and unquestioned followership as Jinnah had. There is, actually, no comparison in stature and popularity of the two. Khan's real problem was that he lacked a constituency of his own in the way that other factional leaders of the Muslim League and other influential leaders had built up on account of their standing in their constituencies. Did lack of a solid, regional, and national support base adversely affect Khan's decisions, such as the moving of the controversial Objective Resolution? The answer, his competing political contemporaries have given, is a yes. He is accused of delaying elections and unfairly allowing immigrants from the old United Provinces to settle in Karachi to create his own support base.[14]

The challenge of transitioning from a mass movement to a political entity with appropriate institutions, rules, procedures, and a consensual system of governance was a big challenge. In the formative state, Jinnah's successors could not settle three of the fundamental issues: a constitution reflecting national consensus, balancing of aspirations for regional autonomy with the

requirements of an effective central state, and most important, the place of Islam in the framework of modern nation state. These issues continue to haunt Pakistan even after seven decades of establishment.

CHOOSING A POLITICAL PATH

The question regarding the most appropriate political path to state and nation building or choosing a national destiny is complex in pluralistic societies such as Pakistan. Every constituent region, party, and faction had views, ideas, and embedded interests to shape the narratives of vision and politics for constructing the new state of Pakistan. Islamic self-image was just one of them, which began to capture much larger space among the competing ideas. Therefore, determining what kind of state Pakistan ought to become was a contested issue from the very beginning. Building a consensus was as complex as it could be as the competing groups did not agree much on what direction to give the new state.

The issue could have been settled through democratic politics of rights and general agreement on a constitution that gave ethnic and regional groups a stake in the political system, but sadly, the political factions got more embroiled in persistent bouts of power struggle rather than building a consensus on a constitution. Framing a constitution in the early years of public enthusiasm and relative innocence of political leaders proved to be an elusive quest. A constitution might have firmed up the foundation for the construction of the state and espoused nationalism among pluralistic ethnic communities that constituted Pakistan. It was the contentious issue of Islam and the state, on the one hand, and the power of the center and the federating units, on the other hand, that further complicated the quest for consensus. Moreover, as the political leaders lost their legitimacy in the politics of intrigue, infighting and power politics, the bureaucracy and military began to capture much of the political ground. They projected themselves as the 'guardians' of the state, with their own set of ideas about the constitution and the vision of the state of Pakistan.

The two-nation theory, which posits that Hindus and Muslims are two separate nations, was built on Islamic identity and had served its historical purpose in both promoting Muslim nationalism and winning the territorial state in areas of Muslim concentration. While the theory, rather a skillful political construction, was effective in demonstrating to the Muslims that they were a nation and required a separate homeland, it failed to serve as the basis for effective post-independence political consonance by itself. Pakistan was a perplexingly diverse state, which required the guaranteed protection of individual and regional rights which was only possible under constitutional politics.

If we demystify the ideas or ideology behind Pakistan, it becomes obvious that it was a struggle for safeguarding the rights of the Muslim community, which consisted of diverse ethnic and regional constituents. But soon after independence, the 'ideology' of Pakistan started to be defined largely in the religious idiom.[15] The questions of rights and interests of the constituent regions were central to politics and clashes on political interests, visions, and group pursuits were natural as expectations were as diverse as the regions themselves. That said, these could have been pulled together and integrated under a political system based on a social contract, i.e. the constitution, which provides the mechanisms for mediating clashing interests, resolving disputes, and defining the rules of the political game. Pakistani leaders and political factions, driven by individualistic interests more than collectivist thinking, failed to negotiate the constitution (in other words a social contract) required to build the state they had founded.

By the time they reached some understanding on the constitution, though imperfect, and roughly after a decade of the creation of Pakistan, it was too late and too little in terms of resolving the central issues. The manufactured consensus rested on dissolving historical provincial boundaries of four provinces in West Pakistan and sabotaging the majority principle to keep the more populous East Pakistan at parity with West Pakistan.[16] In the meantime, factional power bouts, politics of intrigue, and elite conflicts disoriented state institutions.[17] The political elite associated with the politically shallow Muslim League lost legitimacy as they became engrossed in settling personal political scores and conspiring with the condescending powerful bureaucrats to oust one another, rather than working within the constitution and going back to the electorates for fresh mandates.[18]

In contrast to consociational politics in India, driven and consolidated by Jawaharlal Nehru and other stalwarts of the Congress party, the Pakistani political landscape presented a sad specter of political fragmentation during the fateful first decade of its birth. The vision of Jinnah and the ideals he and the dreamers of Pakistan had pursued were lost in the power politics that was shaped by the opportunistic attitude of feudal and the oligarchic and bureaucratic elites of Pakistan. Pakistan, in a way, began to fall down well before it could even stand firmly on its feet and walk in the liberal democratic direction.

One of the grave setbacks to the liberal democratic vision of Pakistan was the adoption of the Objectives Resolution six months after the death of Jinnah. Sadly, none other than the first Prime Minister of the country, Liaqat Ali Khan, a close and trusted lieutenant of Jinnah, moved the Resolution in the Constituent Assembly. No other aspect of the three constitutions of Pakistan has provoked as much controversy and comment as the Objectives Resolution.[19] The liberal sections of the Pakistani society argue that this signified a surrender of the founding principles of Pakistan to the religious political

parties that were demanding the establishment of an Islamic state once Pakistan became independent. In public debates, primarily in the political arena, the religious political parties in the opposition became frantically active in putting pressure on the Muslim League leadership to accommodate their demands for an Islamic state.

The religious groups bitterly opposed what they saw as the secular tendency and westernization agenda of the Muslim League, which they feared would be the path of the new country if they remained silent. The Jamaat-e-Islami in particular launched a campaign for Islamization of the state by reminding the Muslim League that in demanding a separate state, they had been making appeals to Islam.[20] Liaqat Ali Khan faltered at the most defining and critical juncture of constitution writing for the new state. He capitulated to the pressure of the religious groups, perhaps thinking that by pushing the Objective Resolution, he would calm their tempers. Rather, it proved to be the beginning of their rise, and set the precedent of the Pakistani state, where while in power even the most secular of the secularists have kept appeasing the religious constituency. It was on the advice of Maulana Shabir Ahmed Usmani, a religious scholar of Deoband school of thought that Khan presented the Resolution.[21] Behind the scene, Maulana Mawdudi played a significant role in developing the text of Resolution that presents the destiny of Pakistan, as Islamic.[22] It was a major departure from the idea of a secular Pakistan; and it is obvious that Jinnah would have opposed it.[23]

The Muslim League leaders, including Liaqat Ali Khan having used Islamic slogans during the Pakistan movement, even though more for political mobilization than any real intent, were not willing to confront the religious parties. From the outset, the religious parties built tremendous pressure by holding conferences, issuing statements, and threatening to host rallies and marches to get Islamic demands accepted. It is interesting that the Muslim League leaders, who were generally secular modernists continued to use Islam to pursue their political goals. There are a few explanations of their apparent contradiction.

First, they faced multiple pressures from conflictive and diverse constituencies that included religious parties clamoring for an Islamic order, provincial groups demanding autonomy, and many voices seeking solutions on issues of settlement of refugees, poverty, and order. The Muslim League leaders thought that Islam could be an effective tool of achieving unity and solidarity in a very diverse society. Having used Islamic symbolism successfully in the freedom movement, the party fell back on Islam for nation building. It failed to explore alternative ideas and ideologies or consensual political ground of nationhood and unity.

Second, some historians have rightly argued that since a dominant section of the ruling party were migrants from India and had no social roots in the

political soil of the new state, they resorted to Islam to establish their legitimacy.[24]

Third, the Muslim League leaders also became concerned about the rise of communism and the factions with communist leanings that existed in Pakistan. Their counter-communism narrative was primarily Islamic. They took the threat more seriously after they discovered the Rawalpindi Conspiracy—a communist plot to overthrow the government.[25] Moreover, a study of the early constitutional debates in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan suggests that the Muslim League leaders were not averse to giving an Islamic character to the constitution, and this was influenced primarily by the Islamic clerics.[26]

At a glance the Resolution appears to be harmless; an attempt at reconciling Islam with modern political forms and reflective of political accommodation of the religious parties. The Resolution is not exclusively related to Islam but addresses all issues of modern democracy, fundamental rights, and representative government along with the preeminence of Islam.[27] However, the limit of Islam on the sovereignty of the parliament, that is it cannot enact any law that would be in conflict with Islam is a persisting issue which has given rise to the doctrine of repugnancy, meaning any law made by the parliament can be declared unconstitutional if it violates any Islamic principle. The other side of the coin of repugnancy, as understood and perpetuated by the religious right is that the parliament is under obligation to change existing laws and make them conform to Islamic principles.

The Objective Resolution made concessions both to the liberal and religious constituency and was conceived by its authors to merely serve as a statement of intent and essentially be a non-operational part of the constitution. For this reason, it was set in the preamble of the constitution, and nothing contained in its provisions was supposed to be obligatory, i.e. the state did not have to legislate according to Islamic law. The Hindu members of the Constituent Assembly drew a different conclusion than the meaning the apologists for the Resolution were selling.[28] They made a strong point that if sovereignty belonged to God then it did not belong to the people, so Pakistan could not be a democratic state based on equal citizenship rights. They believed that the Resolution was against Jinnah's vision of Pakistan; "were this resolution to come before this House within the lifetime of Quaid-e-Azam, it would not have come in its present shape," lamented Bhupendra Kumar Dutta.[29]

The Islamic content of the Resolution set off an alarm bell for the Hindu minority regarding the future prospects of a secular Pakistan in which the state would be neutral in religious matters. Prem Hari Barna reminded the Muslim majority that "our state of Pakistan consists of diverse peoples professing various religions and having different social customs and cultures. We may not proceed with the work of framing the constitution in such a way

as may cause apprehension and distrust."[30] Another minority member, Bhupendra Kumar Dutta eloquently explained the difference between faith and reason, and argued that politics and matters of the state belong to the sphere of reason. He feared that the private sphere of religion was being incorporated in the public sphere of state and politics, which he argued would give rise to 'absolutism' and the provisions of the Objective Resolution "will remain liable to variations, liberal or rigid, from time to time by different authorities and specialists."[31] This is exactly what happened under General Zia ul Haq when he shifted the Objectives Resolution from the non-operative part of the 1973 Constitution to the operative part through Presidential Order No. 14, in 1985.[32] The Islamists, for decades, have rested their demand for the Islamic state on grounds of the Objective Resolution.[33]

All three constitutions reflected this consensus; that whatever the leadership of the League gave to the religious constituency by one hand, took from it by the other by making the Objectives Resolution non-operative. This however, changed with the Islamization of the state.

Seemingly, what was supposed to be an innocent concession by the parliament, proved to be a very potent legal and political arsenal in the hands of religious political parties in redefining the character of the Pakistani state. The Jamaat-e-Islami declared the passing of the Resolution as a major victory, after which it launched a publicity campaign to educate the people about the content, spirit, and goals of the Resolution.[34] This was a strategy to pressurize the government to implement the Resolution the way the Jamaat-e-Islami interpreted its spirit. The ulema of all Islamic shades and opinions were equally encouraged by the Resolution to assert themselves on the political scene and the Resolution became a powerful constitutional tool in their hands to launch an Islamization movement. They justified their demands then, as they do today in the present-day Pakistan, with reference to the Objective Resolution.[35]

The Muslim League factions in Punjab in the 1950s brought religious parties and Islam into their power struggles and vied to win support of groups that had demonstrated street-power in the anti-Ahmadiya protests of 1953. Courting of such factions, which were previously opposed to the creation of Pakistan like Majlis-e-Ahrar, provided them legitimacy, recognition, and encouraged them to fan sectarian hatred.[36] This marked the beginning of the rise of Islamist political influences over the future direction of Pakistan as these groups eventually started to dominate the political discourse more than any other political force in the country.

While the League might have thought of striking a balance, a bargain, and an acceptable middle ground to assuage the fears of the religious factions to ward off confrontation, the religious parties took it as first installment of their larger political agenda. From the very beginning religious groups' interpretation of the Objectives Resolution differed from that of the League with the

former regarding it as more than just a symbolic political gesture. They had persistently demanded its primacy in transforming the legal system of the country according to Islam and called for the implementation of *Sharia,* the Islamic law, after having the ideal of the sovereignty of God recognized in this Resolution. That was the beginning of the slow march toward an Islamic Pakistan, contrary to the foundational idea of it being a Muslim majority state with citizenship rights for all. The founder of the country, Jinnah must have turned in the grave; if alive, he would have opposed the Resolution tooth and nail. The path Pakistan was choosing alarmed both the secularist sections of the society and the minorities, particularly the Hindus who had considerable numbers in East Pakistan and parts of Sindh and Balochistan.

Irrespective of the intentions of the writers of the Resolution, the Resolution shifted the discourse of the Pakistani state from liberal democracy to Islamization. Jinnah himself had been very clear regarding liberal principles of polity, but he had little time to give a detailed sketch of future institutions beyond his landmark speech to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947. His speech idealized the conception of citizenship by referring to the British history and presented the idea that in "course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state," which still resonates in the minds of Pakistani liberal sections.[37] Ideas such as citizenship, religion as private matter of the individual, and the state not having any business with religion are core ideas of political modernity that liberal intellectuals throughout the Muslim world endear and espouse.

While Jinnah had been able to use his charisma and central place in the political arena to set the direction in his brief time in Pakistan, his successors were neither as strong-willed as he was, nor did they possess the same degree of commitment to liberal institutions as he did. They could not withstand the pressure of religious groups and began to bend before their demands. Admittedly, Jinnah brought Islam and Islamic imagery into the struggle for Pakistan, but his August 11, 1947 speech before the Constituent Assembly can be interpreted as an indirect declaration that the two-nation theory was no longer valid in post-independent Pakistan. Thinking of the plight of the vast numbers of Muslims left behind in India, "Mr. Jinnah took the earliest opportunity to bid goodbye to his two-nation theory in his speech on 11 September, 1947."[38] The argument that Jinnah wanted a liberal and democratic Pakistan can be proved with reference to Jinnah's life, social beliefs, political struggle for freedom of India, and his general political and legal philosophy, which was rooted in the British intellectual and constitutional tradition.[39] According to Justice Munir, Jinnah never used the words 'ideology of Pakistan' nor did any of his political successors; until 1962 when an obscure member of the Jamaat-e-Islami while commenting on a bill pertaining to the establishment

of political parties in the Assembly said no party that opposed the "ideology of Pakistan" would be allowed to function. The expression rather surprised the legislature, and on a question from the floor about the nature of the ideology of Pakistan he explained that it was Islam.[40]

The civilian political leaders and military rulers in the following decades used Islam both as a political card in the hopes of weakening the religious constituency or making expedient political gains by appearing close to the religious ethos. In either case, they played on the wicket of religion, on which they could not fare as well as the religious parties, which were able score much better as conditions favored them much more. Ayub Khan, a modernist general in the tradition of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Jinnah, thought that he could free Islam from the stranglehold of the ulema and end their monopoly on religion. He wanted Islam to be re-interpreted in the cotemporary context, and for that task, he employed noted modernist Islamic scholars such as Fazalur Rehman and Pervez Ahmad.[41] Ayub attempted to present a "modernist vision of Islam as against traditionalist interpretation."[42] By doing so, he brought Islam to the central stage of Pakistani politics that ended up generating more debate and controversy over what Islam was than regarding its appropriate relationship with the state. As the intersecting history of Islam and politics in Pakistan suggests, every attempt to bring Islam into the public sphere has always added to the political space available to the religious parties. Furthermore, the continued discourse on Islamic politics and the state has not only given a central stage to the agenda of the religious political parties, but has also pushed pragmatic political issues of consolidation, strengthening of democracy, constitutionalism, and rule of law to a secondary position.

Since religion and socio-political issues concerning Islam evoke strong emotions in Pakistan no political leader, irrespective of his popularity or personal religiosity, has shown any willingness to confront religious parties. Rather, they have tried to compete with religious political parties by adopting a part of their agenda, if not substantively than only symbolically in a vain attempt to "assert monopoly over the public expression of Islam."[43] The symbolic use of religion by modern parties, time and again, has catapulted Islamic political discourse at the center of politics. The cause of the religious parties is thus furthered by the competitive bid for Islam among the mainstream political parties. Vali Reza Nasr explains this dilemma quite brilliantly: "Islam could not, however, be manipulated for political ends without the intercession and ultimately the interference of the Islamic parties, and herein lay the dilemma of waving the Islamic banner for political ends. Factors which also made Islam appealing to the politicians limited the ability of the same politicians to manage successfully the role of Islam in politics."[44] The end result of the competition for religious authenticity is that the real issues of governance, justice, rule of law, and economic progress of society have

taken a back seat while emotive issues have shaped the political mind of Pakistanis and their outlook toward the rest of the world.

Narratives of real and imagined grievances also feed the religious and conspiratorial outlook that has contributed to the rise of extremism in Pakistan. The catchphrase of claiming that Islam and Muslims are in danger has become popular in Pakistan and has been perpetuated via half-truths and twisting of historical facts by some highly opinionated people from the popular media in the country. The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, drone attacks in Pakistan, events in the Palestinian territories, and the hegemony of the United States are often cited as evidence of this assault against Islam and Muslims. In the absence of a truly democratic, responsible, and responsive government with the spine and credibility to stand up and speak the truth, the balance in the war of ideas in Pakistan at the moment appears to have swirled in favor of the clash theorists that seek an Islamic alternative and provoke a sentiment of resistance.

THE POWER SHIFT

As we have been arguing, the issue goes back to the formative years of Pakistan when political parties and representative governments lost control and power in the state structure in a bid for political survival. They were replaced or turned into junior partners right from the beginning by the arrogant civilian bureaucrats that had been trained in the British colonial ethos, etiquette, and administrative tradition. The bureaucrats began to wrest power from the same fragmented political groups that had brought them onto the political stage as a vehicle of supremacy during their constant internal intrigues and power plays. They soon manipulated the political groups and placed themselves in top positions of power and decision-making contributing to a downhill slip for democracy and constitutional rule in Pakistan.

Thus the bureaucratic elites using their formal positions in the top echelons of administration effectively captured the state with the primacy of the office of the Governor General. While this office was supposed to be nominal in the English tradition of the Queen in parliament, its occupants in Pakistan assumed the powers of the chief executives of the state. This vice-regal political tradition has survived in Pakistan's political history with military dictators assuming the role of presidents through rigged referendums. In the first decade two bureaucrats, first Ghulam Mohammad and then Sikander Mirza, occupied this executive position, and while perched there manipulated every institution to keep political groups and parties subordinated. Factionalized and leaderless, the politicians put up some resistance through the Constituent Assembly by clipping the power of the Governor General Ghulam Mohammad in 1954, who struck back by dissolving the Constituent Assem-

bly which had also functioned as a legislature.[45] This sad tradition has also survived in Pakistan with military dictators and presidents dissolving the National Assembly and provincial legislatures four times resulting in the dissolution of elected governments.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan also played a major role in the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly that truly "murdered" the fragile democracy, further tilting power in favor of the bureaucratic elites.[46] Legal vexation apart, the Court undermined the power of the parliament putting its conventional sovereignty into question. Pakistan, after about seventy years of independence, is still struggling to recover from the constitutional chaos that this decision created with its lengthy dark shadow covering subsequent similar incidents.

THE RISE OF THE SECURITY STATE

Pakistan's internal political processes have not been independent of the regional and global security environment. Pakistan's quick shift from a cluttered democracy to an 'orderly' military authoritarianism in the first decade has a lot to do with Pakistan's entanglement in US-sponsored military alliances during the first wave of the Cold War. Pakistan's participation in the Southeast Treaty Organization (1954) and Baghdad Pact later renamed as Central Treaty Organization (1955), was mainly brokered by the powerful and pro-West figures in the bureaucratic-military establishment, which further contributed to the imbalance of power between the statist and political elites. Ayesha Jalal rightly argues that the imperatives of political economy of defense greatly interfered with the political arrangements between the center and the provinces.[47] The Pakistan military had strong British colonial traditions, large recruitment areas, and some excellent institutional infrastructure, but it was poorly equipped and lacked resources to counterbalance the Indian threat. The central motivation in dragging Pakistan into the Western camp was both, the function of elite orientations, as well as the need for security assistance to build strong national defense. This produced negative political consequences for the state-society relations and for the federation. The concern of the central elites of Pakistan, devoid of true political support and legitimacy, that the subnational elites and groups would undermine their efforts to build the Pakistani state according to their vision has produced the political psychology of 'fearful state." This psychology views pluralism as a sign of weakness rather than being rich civilizational heritage and a foundation of social strength.[48]

The weakening of democratic political forces in Pakistan corresponded to the rise of the armed forces as modern, cohesive, and the most powerful institution in the country. The development of the military as an institution

occurred at a very critical juncture in the formative phase of state building in Pakistan.[49] The military began to emerge as an important actor in politics during chaotic and unstable political conditions.[50] Also, there is another factor that tilted the balance of institutional power in favor of the armed forces; the politicization of the army under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, who first got himself elected as a president through referendum, and then later through an electoral college that comprised of members of local councils in 1964.[51]

From Ayub Khan to the fourth military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, all the generals have spoken from the same script on the reasons for taking over, which are premised on the prevalent deterioration in economic and political conditions of the country, and the promise to pull the country out of chaos and make it the "promised" land.[52] On capturing power, they have used the exclusive pulpit and the controlled media to target elected politicians in almost the same language; they cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of governing the country and they are corrupt to the core, inefficient, power hungry, and without any understanding of modern statecraft.[53] In a transitional stage of democratic development, when the fundamental question of supremacy of the civilian elites over the military was yet to be established and in social conditions of underdeveloped democratic culture and institutions, questioning the political conduct of politicians and political parties provided more ammunition to the military to advance its political claims.

The politicians had opportunities, though few and limited, but they failed to reach a consensus on fundamental political values or work toward cultivating a culture of trust and political tolerance. While in power, they misused their authority against opponents, often behaving in tyrannical fashion. Quite a few of them filled up their pockets, created conditions of political confrontation, and polarized society. Such kind of political behavior gave credence to the allegations of the military that the civilian politicians were responsible for economic decline, political chaos, and social fragmentation.[54] The military projected itself as the savior, and the "guardian" of the state, claiming that it was intervening only to put the country back on the rails and push Pakistan toward economic progress and better governance.[55]

The power shift toward the military was never entirely due to the institutional or structural factors relating to the power of the armed forces.[56] The social and cultural attitudes of the people in Pakistan, mainly from the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province), have contributed to the passive and sometimes enthusiastic support for the military to take over. There is a kind of idealization of the soldier in the warring tribal culture of Pakistan that has also contributed to making military regimes more acceptable.[57]

Political fragmentation, strong perceptions of corruption of elected governments, and failure to handle structural social and economic problems

of the country are some other reasons that explain why the Pakistani masses have looked at the military leadership as better equipped institutionally, and more trustworthy than those from whom they captured power.[58] But the military rulers have never tested their popularity in an open, competitive, and free environment. Rather, all of them have chosen to subvert the constitution by forcing into it amendments that have amounted to changing its fundamental character.[59] They took the route of referendums to declare themselves elected by running alone and manipulating results prepared by the Election Commission. Interestingly, each of the military rulers secured more than 95 percent of the votes in referenda.[60] Musharraf had his referendum on May 1, 2002 and it was claimed that 71 percent of the people of Pakistan voted in it and 97.5 percent elected Musharraf as a president for five year term, authorizing him to complete his agenda of "reforms, reconstruction of institutions of state for the establishment of genuine and sustainable democracy, including the entrenchment of the local government systems, to ensure continued good governance for the welfare of the people, and to combat extremism and terrorism."[61] Both the turnout and outcome were obviously manipulated and the entire referendum exercise undermined the credibility of the Election Commission.[62] This sent a strong message to the political parties that the General would rig any rule, violate any democratic principle, and intimidate and buy off anyone that opposed him. His legal and political maneuvering in the subsequent months and years further proved this point.

Another significant aspect of the praetorian tradition in Pakistan is that the military rulers have sought collaboration of the judiciary to get legal and constitutional cover for their intervention in politics. Starting with the first dismissal of the constituent assembly in 1954 by the Governor General to the last dissolution of the assemblies in October 1999, the superior judiciary has validated military takeover on the ground of the "doctrine of necessity."[63] In a nutshell it means that a successful military coup was a legitimate means of acquiring power. It needs to be clarified that General Musharraf and General Zia purged the apex court of independent-minded judges to make sure that they got the legal endorsement for their interventions. They devised the strategy of the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), which for legal matters substituted for the 1973 Constitution, which was held in abeyance. Both generals required the judiciary to take the fresh oath of office under the PCO. When Musharraf issued the PCO on the last day of December 1999, six of the nine justices refused to take a fresh oath of office and were removed from office.[64] Two-thirds of the new Supreme Court thus comprised of judges that had been handpicked by the Chief Executive, the designation that General Musharraf chose for himself. The verdict for the case against Musharraf was thus not unexpected; the court justified the military coup and granted it three years to conduct the elections and restore the assemblies.[65]

Furthermore, an even more significant factor has been the existence of a set of collaborators from political parties that have supported praetorian rule and thus given it legitimacy. None of the military regimes in Pakistan's military-dominant politics have been pure military regimes as all of them have co-opted politicians from the party they deposed off and the opposition parties. At best, the generals created hybrid regimes by having electoral elite on their side, and at worst, they distorted the democratic development of Pakistan. This has been an old colonial practice established by the British in the Subcontinent wherein feudal personage and families functioned as inter-mediaries between the Raj and the masses. The elite civil service (ICS, CSP, and now DMG) was another component of the vice-regal system and an ally of military governments in the past. Both the feudal oligarchy and the elite civil service have been partners of the military regimes and have received much of their power and influence as rewards for their collaboration. Most of the political figures from the land-owning class, with few exceptions, were keen to strike a new partnership with the Musharraf regime by becoming turncoats. Shifting political loyalties, splintering of political parties, and join-ing military-dominated governments have been a part of Pakistan's feudal political culture. The landowning aristocracy could not leave the opportunity of associating itself with power, as they knew that if one faction or prominent individual did not do so a rival group or politician would take the opportu-nity. These shifts however are not confined to the landowning elites. Others from urban and industrial backgrounds have done the same, justifying their actions on the grounds of political pragmatism.

The civil bureaucracy, with its subordinate position, had no choice but to become an ally and a partner to the military takeovers. The business and industrial class, which has been a product of the economic protectionist policies and patronage of the state, has also generally supported the military on the grounds that they bring about the requisite political stability needed for furthering their class interests. One finds an ideological congruence be-tween the two on the leadership role of the elites in structuring institutions, establishing an appropriate system of governance, and devising economic policies for growth and development. From Ayub to the fourth military re-gime, there has been a very clear and directed effort of the elite consociation to create a broader ruling class or establishment consisting of the military, civil bureaucracy, intelligence agencies, business houses, tribal chiefs, and landowning classes. Ayub Khan's success in building a coherent and inclu-sive elite network that included the above sections of the state and society rested on the idea that development, not democracy, was the key to good society. Nation and state building theories of that time were also supportive of the role of the militaries in post-colonial states.[66]

In the case of Pakistan, the social base of the military has been stronger in some regions, such as the more populous Punjab than others, but generally

the common Pakistani has time and again welcomed the "man on the horse-back." But the military has never ruled through popular legitimacy, instead it has aligned with a section of the political elite. This partnership has been dictated by political opportunism, and not by any ideology, though reform-ism, restructuring and good governance have been used as the rationale. Once the hold of the generals on power loosened, the political sections aligned with them have moved in other political directions, and alliances built by the military have not survived after the departure of the military prince.

While the rise of the military as a political force is one of the primary factors in disorienting Pakistan's nation-building priorities, the poor perfor-mance of elected governments and the political crises generated by the feudal oligarchy have opened a window of opportunity for military rulers. Riding on the high horse of power, they have presented themselves as "saviors" of the nation. More than "saviors," they were survivalists and pursued a politics of fragmentation, constitutional subversion, and misuse of civil and political institutions for power objectives. They left the country worse off every time and in a deeper crisis. With each military intervention, Pakistan fell several notches away from constitutional democracy, and the military along with its political allies constantly tried to substitute "guided" democracy in its stead. Consequently, it is clear that the generals though they knew which parts of democracy should be retained in the interest of the country and which needed to be destroyed since they were irrelevant in Pakistan's context. Surely, the founders of the country must have turned in their graves in anguish at this political engineering by the military.

Successive political leaders have tried to restore democracy on its consti-tutional rails by re-amending the constitution, re-building fragmented politi-cal parties, and seeking re-alignment among the political elites. Political reconstruction after the end of fourth military regime has not been easy but the political elites from the two rival mainstream political parties, the Paki-stan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN) along with the smaller allied parties have concerted complementary action and pressure to stabilize democracy. This elite compacting has served a great purpose by promoting a consociational system, which means democracy must be defended together. While it has involved compromises on systematic corruption, tolerance of poor governance, and making of many corrupt bar-gains among the major parties, the objective of this system has been to consolidate democracy by allowing the rival political party to complete its mandated tenure. This compromise is part of the landmark agreement be-tween late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif known as the Charter of De-mocracy. Despite many deviations and departures, the two parties have main-tained the spirit of the agreement through constitutional reforms, devolution

of power to the provinces, and avoiding pursuing cases of corruption that have lingered on from the previous decades of political confrontation. [67]

Some of the achievements of political compacting are already visible. First, the PPP government completed its political tenure even in the face of difficult economic, political and security challenges. It rode through the storm of the lawyers' movement in 2008–2009 that marched in the streets to get the Supreme Court judges ousted by General Pervez Musharraf in 2007 restored back to their benches. [68] Moreover, the first ever peaceful constitutional transition of power from one elected government to another took place; this was Pakistan's tenth general election. Additionally, competing and conflicting political parties are able to hold power in different provinces of Pakistan. A new political party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf, has emerged at the national level and has formed the government in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, a region troubled by terrorism, lawlessness, and ungovernability for a long time. Overall, Pakistan's tradition of political pluralism has survived, and so has the freedom of expression, debate, and discussion.

Having said this, the institutional capacity of the state continues to remain weak which requires major structural reforms to make it effective enough to deal with the serious issues of fighting extremism, radicalism, terrorist networks, corruption, and political violence. The elite compacting has also had another negative fallout, which has been the hesitation to initiate reforms restructuring institutions wasting public monies to assure better governance. The general consensus is that governance remains poor, with a few positive gains. The military has attempted to fill governance gaps and address the absence of political will and prolonged political procrastination on major issues such as terrorism and radical groups. The military, concerned with internal national security filled this gap by taking the lead in launching Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in North Waziristan in 2014. The Pakistan Muslim League—Nawaz government had previously preferred negotiations with the Taliban over military action and had been engaged in indirect talks with them. But after multiple attacks on major cities and military linked targets, the military has taken the frontline role. The military has also launched the Karachi Operation to bust criminal gangs involved in extortion, target killing, sectarianism, and extremism. [69] Many of the functions the military has assumed, from the establishment of the military courts to policing Karachi, fall within the normal jurisdiction of the civilian institutions. But the ability and efficacy of the civilian institutions in Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Karachi, and other parts of the country has remained questionable and has led to the gradual transfer of power to the military. In fact, the national parliament has surrendered its authority on all these issues willfully to the military because the civilian governments have

been unable or unwilling to take action due to a lack of leadership, vision, capacity, or political expediency.

Since the fourth democratic transition in 2008, the civilian political institutions and political leaders have reached a new understanding with the powerful military institutions. This has meant, allowing the military to have a dominant role in vital national security issues and critical foreign policy decisions including relations with India, Afghanistan, and the United States. Its informal domain of power also includes the custody and development of Pakistan's nuclear program and formulation of the nuclear strategy and doctrinal issues. This has been the well-known division of power over the decades. The new dimension is the military's greater role in determining the direction of the internal security policy, policing of Karachi, and launching of anti-terror campaigns in coordination with the police in every part of the country. Something that perturbs the political class, without recognizing its own failures and weakness, is that the military discreetly appears to be pushing the institutions of accountability, such as the National Accountability Bureau, and the Federal Investigation Agency to probe and effectively prosecute politicians, bureaucrats, and even military personnel that might be involved in corruption. The military has been involved in an array of activities ranging from counter-insurgency to the development of infrastructure in Balochistan, to the policing and counter-terror operations. Such an extensive role of the military reflects the weakened position of the civilian political institutions, and demonstrates the power of the military even when it has not taken direct control of the state. [70]

NOTES

1. On different views, see Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, eds., *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993); Juan R.I. Cole and Deniz Kandiyoti, "Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia: Introduction," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia, 34, no. 2 (May 2002): 189–203.

2. Michael Allen Cillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 255–294.

3. Francis Fukuyama, "Transitions to the Rule of Law," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 1 (January 2010): 38.

4. Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2007).

5. Christophe Jaffrelot, *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 61–62.

6. Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*: *A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1995), 1–25.

7. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics* 17, no. 3 (1965): 386–430; and his *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968).

8. See Chetan Bhatt, *Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths* (New York and Oxford: Berg, 2001), 69–71.

9. Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 233–258; Allen McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996).

10. Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1999), 128.

11. Aqil Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).

12. Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 35–81.

13. Merchant and Al Mujahid, *The Jinnah Anthology*, 115.

14. Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, *A Nation That Lost Its Soul* (Lahore: Jang, 1995), 178.

15. Ayesha Jalal, "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27 (1995): 73–89.

16. The four provinces that now constitute Pakistan were merged into West Pakistan in 1954 as one unit for parity with East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. The parity compromised East Pakistan's numerical superiority as the two wings of the country were given equal representation in the national legislature.

17. Ilhan Niaz, *The Culture of Power and Governance in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010).

18. M. Asghar Khan, *We've Learnt Nothing from History: Pakistan, Politics and Military Power* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 7–30.

19. See the text of Resolution and comments in *Islamic Studies* 48, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 89–118.

20. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 117–125.

21. Afzal Iqbal, *Islamization of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books 1986), 41.

22. Seyyed Vali Raz Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution*, 124.

23. Justice Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980), 29.

24. Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), 84.

25. Hasan Zaheer, *The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, 1951: The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998).

26. In shaping the text of the Objective Resolution, Maulana Mawdudi and Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani played a key role. Both had been insisting on establishing an Islamic state in the new country. See Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), 137–154.

27. Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan introduced the Objective Resolution on March 7, 1949. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates* 5, no. 1 (March 7, 1949): 1–7.

28. For the defense of the Resolution, see speech by Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates* 5, no. 3 (March 9, 1949): 39–43.

29. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates* 5, no. 2 (March 8, 1949): 14.

30. Ibid., 8.

31. Ibid., 13–15.

32. *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (Karachi: Ideal, 2010), 30.

33. See Jamaat-e-Islami publication, *Tarjuman ul-Quran* 23, no. 4 (March 1950): 175; Syed Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Rasail-wa-Masail* (Issues and problems), vol. 2 (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967), 451–457.

34. Syed Abul A'la Mawdudi, "Matalba-i-Nizam-i-Isami" (Demand for an Islamic system), *Tarjuman ul-Quran* 32, no. 1 (1959): 12–18.

35. Justice Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1198), 72–73.

36. The political tussle was between the Nawab of Mamdot, the chief minister of the Punjab and Mumtaz Daultana who was backed by Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan. While Mamdot secured the support of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Daultana enlisted the Ahrar on his side. As a bargain, when Daultana took over as the new chief minister, he ignored what the Ahrar had done against the Ahmadiya community. Syed Nur Ahmad, *From Martial Law to Martial Law: Politics in Punjab, 1919–1958*, edited by Craig Baxter (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), 339–371.

37. *Jinnah: Speeches and Statements, 1947–1948* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 29.

38. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore: Brothers Publishers, 1961), 321. Jinnah said goodbye to the Two Nation Theory on August 11, 1947.

39. Khan, *The Nation That Lost Its Soul*, 218–223.

40. Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia*, 25–26.

41. Dr. Fazal ur Rehman founded and headed the Islamic Research Institute with the tasks of reinterpretation of Islam. Pervez Ahmad wrote Islam treatises in the rationalist tradition of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. Both of them were the target of propaganda and political campaign of the traditionalist ulema.

42. Muhammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan* (Lahore: Progressive, 1989), 166.

43. Sheikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* 90.

44. Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution*, 117.

45. Allen McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 134–154; M. Rafique Afzal, *Pakistan: History and Politics, 1947–1971* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 135–39.

46. Paula R. Newberg, *Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

47. Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991), 267–289.

48. Talbot, *Pakistan History*, 7

49. The question of balance between the military and civilian institutions in the formative years; see Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*.

50. Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1998), 111–156.

51. M. Rafique Afzal, *Pakistan History and Politics, 1947–1971* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

52. See first speech of Pervez Musharraf, *Dawn*, October 13, 1999.

53. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 48–68.

54. Aftab Ahmad, "Historical Antecedents of Corruption in Pakistan," in *The Political Economy of Corruption*, ed. Arvind K. Jain (London: Routledge, 2001); Malik Ayub Sumbal, "Political Elites, Accountability and Corruption in Pakistan," *International Policy Digest*, February 29, 2016, http://intpolicydigest.org/2016/02/29/political-elites-accountability-and-corruption-in-pakistan/.

55. *Dawn*, October 18, 1999.

56. For an economic and institutional interest argument, see Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007).

57. Meghnad Desai and Aitzaz Ahsan, *Divided by Democracy* (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2005), 99–111.

58. Faisal Bari and Adeel Faheem, "Institutional Underdevelopment/Underperformance and Reliance on Private Trust Networks: Pakistan through the Asia Barometer Survey," paper presented in the second LUMS Social Sciences Conference, June 6–7, 2006.

59. General Zia ul Haq introduced Article 58(2b) that gave the president and provincial governors' power to dissolve the national and provincial assemblies respectively. Civilian government of Nawaz Sharif took away this power of the president through the thirteenth amendment, which all the political parties supported after the 1997 elections. General Pervez Musharraf got Article 58(2b) restored through the seventeenth amendment. See, for instance, "Unrealistic & Absurd" (Editorial), *Dawn*, June 20, 2006.

60. See Charles H. Kennedy, "A User's Guide to Guided Democracy; Musharraf and the Pakistani Military Governance," in Charles H. Kennedy and Cynthia Botteron, *Pakistan: 2005* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 120–130.

61. Ibid., 130.

62. This author visited three polling stations in Islamabad on the referendum day. There were some people voting but stuffing of the ballot boxes took place in rural districts. The government officials responsible for the conduct of the referendum were told to produce favor-

able results, and this did with stuffing the ballot boxes. Author's interviews with political activists in Islamabad, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Rajanpur districts in July 2002.

63. It started in the Malulvi Tamizuddin Khan' case. See *Federation of Pakistan and Others vs. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan*, *Pakistan Legal Decision,* 1955, 240–378; *Miss Asma Jilani vs. Government of the Punjab*, *Pakistan Legal Decisions*, 1972, 139–270.

64. See *Dawn*, January 1, 2000.

65. *Zafar Ali Shah vs. Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan,* PLD 2000, SC, 869.

66. See, for instance, the works of G. Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World* (New York: Charles Scibner, 1974); D. Learner and R.D. Robinson, "Sword and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics* 13, no. 1 (October 1960): 19–44; H. Daalder, *The Role of the Military in the Emerging Countries* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962).

67. See "Text of the Charter of Democracy," *Dawn*, May 16, 2006.

68. Shoaib A. Ghiaz, "Miscarriage of Chief Justice, Media and the Struggle for Judicial Independence," *Law & Social Inquiry* 35, no. 4 (July 20, 2008): 985–2010; "The Pakistani Lawyers' Movement and the Popular Currency of Judicial Power," *Harvard Law Review* 123, no. 7 (May 2010): 1705–1726.

69. Hafeez Tunio, "After Two Weeks: Sindh Extends Powers with a Caveat," *Express Tribune*, December 17, 2015.

70. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The State of Civil-Military Relations," *Express Tribune*, March 23, 2015.

Chapter Five

The State in Decline

Pakistan has had patchy progress toward building effective state-society relations, and an effective state with periods of good progress between many failures, decline, and crises. Over the course of its political development many problems have accumulated such as poverty, inequality and the rise of extremism and terrorism. These are serious challenges that have taken a life of their own, and have adversely affected the governing capacity of the state and the national development process.

Roughly four decades back, Pakistan was structurally in a much better shape, and was well-positioned to take the next steps of its evolution via the translation of its founding ethos into a social contract delineating the relationship between the state and citizens, and between the federation and the constituent provinces and regions. As we know, social contracts are about rights and obligations, and in the context of post-colonial states, the compacts encompassed transitioning from an alien foreign character to a natural national one with the objective of realizing the aspirations of the citizens, and correspondingly gave a broader legitimate base to the state.

Owing to the painful partition process and rationale for a separate country, the Pakistani state was intended to have a democratic and responsive political system. These had in fact been some of the embedded aspirations for the independence movement and were envisioned as necessary requirements for integrating ethnically diverse people and regions into a new nation. While during the creation of Pakistan Muslim nationalism had briefly overpowered feelings and affiliations of ethnicity, a strong subscript of ethnic nationalism had existed throughout. Only a constitutional regime guaranteeing rights, justice, representation, and equal opportunities for growth to all would have adequately addressed popular expectations about regional/ethnic freedom. Unfortunately, the ruling groups of the new state of Pakistan lost the vision,

that is the democratic track, and even some basic ideas of governance in individual, institutional, and regional power struggles. The post-independence politics of Pakistan was never able to represent the ideas, the vision, and aspirations that had defined the independence movement and nationalism in South Asia.

The missteps and setbacks of the formative phase gravely affected not only the institutional balance between the military and civilians but also among the constituent regions—which has been an enduring dilemma and challenge for Pakistan. In subsequent decades, Pakistan has confronted more traumatizing political setbacks via repeated military takeovers, internal insurgencies, and during the past fifteen years, rise of radical Islam and terrorism. Pakistan's progress in different fields of national life has, at best, been patchy. Overall, as explained in the following sections, Pakistan has experienced political turmoil and disorder more than stability that has damaged the legitimacy and governing capacity of the state to a great extent.

The link between the moral and legal degeneration of political authority in Pakistan and the rise of militant Islam remains unexplored, and attempts to explain it have been at best simple and journalistic. In our view, the rise of ethnic and religious militancy in Pakistan is a consequence of the deterioration and decay of state capacities, both administrative and political. The ruling classes of Pakistan have been able to weave a clever narrative that shifts the causes of radical Islam away from their own serious political failings to internal characteristics of the Islamist militant groups, such as the role of Islamic educational institutions, intolerant religious culture, and sectarian mind-set manipulated by external forces. While these characteristics of radical Islam are not off the mark, and its steady rise and violent expression has been aided by multiple national, regional, and international factors, major failings of the Pakistani state have been the major reason for the rise of radical Islam. The Pakistani state has had failings both in terms of the constitution of its ruling groups as well as its choice regarding security policies. Both civilian and military leaders, often collaborating with each other, have made strategic choices, primarily in relation to Afghanistan and India, which have produced disastrous internal consequences with regard to religious extremism and militancy.

Starting with being on the frontline of jihad in Afghanistan against the former Soviet Union, to supporting similar groups in the Indian-administered part of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region, the ruling groups of Pakistan have bolstered the radical constituency. Pakistan's Afghan policy, from the anti-Soviet war to supporting the Taliban in their rise and conquest of the country before they were evicted from power by the international coalition forces, has proven to be shorted-sighted.

The rise of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan has influenced the rise of similar internal movements such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which

Pakistan has been directly combating, since launching a major military operation, named "Black Thunder," in April 2009 to retake several districts in the Swat region that the regional chapter of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan had occupied.[1] Pakistan's alignment with Islamist groups to protect and advance national security interests has been a big contributory factor to the rise of jihadist militant Islam. To pursue its ambitious regional security policy Pakistan's choice of non-state actors as allies has contributed to weaken its security rather than strengthening it.

Pakistan presents a glaring example of a fragile state struggling to reverse its downward spiral by re-examining some of its major domestic and regional policies. There is an apparent desire on the part of the security establishment and the civilian government to chart a new course to revive and rebuild a "new Pakistan."[2] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who floated a Sharia Bill in the parliament in 1998, when his party had two-third majority, has now shown a new inclination in his current term to make Pakistan a "liberal country."[3] Even though he is neither consistent nor ideologically committed to the liberal Pakistan project, he has taken a lot flank from the religious parties for even making a muted reference to liberal Pakistan.[4] The challenges Pakistan confronts are mainly domestic, and have been born out of decades of wrong policies, misplaced priorities, and manipulation of state institutions for material greed and power. These challenges include political violence, weak governance, systematic corruption of ruling groups, and weakened institutions. On account of weak democratic structures, these problems have grown complex over the past few decades and continue to pose a threat to social order. Internal security, terrorism, and insurgencies have consumed a considerable amount of Pakistan's political and social energies and inflicted large-scale costs in terms of real resources and lost opportunities for social development and economic growth.[5] The rise of Islamic militancy is just one of the threats that have arisen as a result of misplaced national priorities, political disorder, and rapaciousness of the ruling oligarchies. The willful weakening of governing institutions and procedures by ruling groups in order to expropriate public resources for private ends is another reason for the state's decline. It is not surprising to see that today this nuclear-powered state is stressed and finds it hard to perform vital tasks such as internal security, governance, and development.

The decline of state institutions has continued unabated both under the civilian and military rulers without any consistent effort to check it. Erratic and half-hearted measures of reform in many areas of national life have given birth to very few sustainable effects in protecting citizens and maintaining order in society. Failure to deliver justice on an equitable basis or creating economic opportunities for the growing population, which has a heavy youth bulge, has created conditions for the rise of extremist groups.

For almost two decades, under both civilian as well military regimes, we have seen continued erosion of the power of the state in Pakistan across all primary functional areas. Thousands of ghost schools, absentee instructors in public colleges and universities, filthy government hospitals with inadequate numbers of qualified doctors and widespread corruption in government departments have been visible signs of the Pakistani state's heavy tilt toward decline.[6] The country has witnessed frequent outbursts of instability due to a regular pattern of political confrontation among the major political parties controlled and run by dynastic political oligarchs. The political behavior of the dynastic elites, and their disrespect for legal and constitutional norms has further contributed to Pakistan's multiple crises.[7]

A silver lining however, is that the decline of the state has not been uniform across all places, regions, and provinces. The same also applies to the central governing institutions, among which the military has remained the most robust, effective and has sustained public's trust and respect. Among the regions and provinces, Punjab has managed itself far better than others.[8] There are signs of resilience and some rays of hope in the form of conscientious teachers, government doctors, and government employees in different layers of bureaucracy holding on to principles of fairness, neutrality, and good work ethic. But their numbers have been on the decline and so has the writ and credibility of the state.[9] The rise of a free media, civil society, and democracy-oriented social movements, as we will discuss in the last chapter, offer some hope for reviving Pakistan. However, in order to control the threat of radical Islam, the Pakistani political class, the powerful security establishment and the fledging civil society will have to take bold steps in addressing structural problems confronting the Pakistani state. Religious motivated violence may further disorient the state; the control of which will require public resources being devoted from security toward social development, to secure the state and society as opposed to just fighting the symptoms.

Historically, there has been an imbalance between expenditure on security and development, which has contributed to creating another enduring imbalance in military-civilian powers and has prevented the political system to develop and mature along democratic lines. This imbalance impacts state-society relations and relations between the federation and the provinces who view national priorities very differently. The constituent regions and diverse centers of power of the country require reaching a common ground on developmental issues and security. Continuing with old policies may produce even graver consequences than before, especially in the troubling climate of regional jihad and militancy, which has several connecting points from Syria to Afghanistan. Any regional conflict that affects Pakistan's internal stability and political order may have consequences far beyond the region because of its size and the eagerness of its jihadist constituencies to join regional conflicts on all sides.

SYMPTOMS OF DECLINE

The decline or development of the Pakistani state cannot be analyzed independent of the social and political forces that influence it. These are both, institutional, that is they come from within the state structure and from the informal sectors of the society. The state is an abstraction for political, legal, social, and constitutional institutions, which form the character of society and are not just reflective of its ruling classes but are also shaped by their quality. There is also a reverse influence of the state on society as modern nation states have come to play a big role, albeit declining in the age of multinational corporations, in the progress of the society and economic development. Much of the positive influence of the state on society—its progress, values, and quality—is largely the function of the ideas and personal qualities of leadership that the ruling elites provide. Moreover, an equally important factor is the institutional capacity of the state. Therefore, the discussion about state decline is in fact a study of the failures of the ruling elites, the political institutions they rule, and their inability to deliver social and political goods to society. Ultimately, it is also the weakness of the Pakistani society, if not a failure, in not being able to cultivate a responsible and responsive elite class that can work toward its interests, pleasures, and collective self-actualization.

The 2015 report on "fragile states" ranks Pakistan thirteenth in the "high-alert" category among 171 states in the world, only five notches below Afghanistan—another conflict-ridden society that lost its state during several cycles of war.[10] This is three positions above the 2010 ranking, and hence, a slight improvement. The debate about the decline of state capacities in Pakistan is not without substance given the alarming trends seen since 2007, such as increased political violence, emergence of militant groups and influential social actors exercising state-like authority parallel to the state. Therefore, the subject of state decline requires full and comprehensive analysis. That said, the analysis needs to be nuanced with respect to each issue, field of activity, function, and sector and must be assessed candidly but with rigor and discrete scrutiny.[11] Also, one needs to bring into focus any progress or improvement, revival, real attempts at reforms, and claims of progress that incumbent government often makes.

There is considerable evidence to support the view that Pakistan's writ was considerably weakened, and in some places Pakistan even lost sovereign control, between 2007 and 2014. Several factions of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan took over territories in Swat and Federally Administered Territory Areas (FATA). The latter has been a weak spot in governance since colonial times, but the state of Swat was one of the best governed until it was absorbed into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in 1974. Furthermore, several of the religious and ethnic parties in Sindh and Karachi organized and main-

tained wings for territorial domination, extortion, and eliminating rival indi-
viduals and groups. Karachi, the hub of commerce and economic life of
Pakistan has witnessed more targeting killings than any other city or region
of the country. Punjab and Balochistan have been in the grip of sectarian
strife for almost a decade, with the former experiencing greater violence than
the latter. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has remained on the frontline in the
war on terror, experiencing the heaviest casualties of civilian and security
forces. The spread and intensity of the national internal security threat has
spread across Pakistan with no region or city left as a safe or secure place,
which has raised serious legitimate questions about the decline of the state of
Pakistan. While doing so, we will examine the nexus between weakening of
the Pakistani state and the rise of radical Islam, and assess the gravity of the
threat it poses to the long-term stability and security of Pakistan. We will also
examine some questions about the measures the Pakistani state is taking to
correct its path, and if so, what has been its progress in reviving itself.

At first glance, the issue of low human development stands out starkly
among all other failures. This is perhaps the most critical failure because it
feeds into causes that produce extremism and militancy. The Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI), compiled by the United Nations Development Pro-
gram, for 2015 puts Pakistan in the "low human-development category"
placing it at the 147th position out of 188 countries and territories. Pakistan's
HDI is lower than India and Bangladesh, two comparable regional countries
born out of the same constituent region and with a similar socio-political
context. Although one can see steady improvement of several economic indi-
cators from 2013 to 2016, the HDI is yet to make a big breakthrough that can
enable it to get out of the "low" ranking.[12] Pakistan's national literacy rate is
58 percent but it is even lower for the conflict-infested border regions, where
is it is lower than 30 percent and far lower for the women. Pakistan currently
spends only 2.68 percent of the GDP on education, which is the lowest in the
South Asian region, but still higher than previous years.[13] The low quality of
education in the public-sector schools, colleges, and universities is another
significant aspect of this issue. These are the critical tiers of education where
real intellectual development of Pakistani youth has to take place. Most of
the prominent public educational institutions have been captured by relig-
ious, ethnic, sectarian, and mainstream political parties. It is there, and far
less in the religious schools or madrassas, where different varieties of extre-
mist thoughts are being implanted in the younger generation.[14] Of course, the
madrassas are a natural habitat for religious indoctrination, which takes a
very strong sectarian color, and where students and teachers get aligned with
political Islam and religious parties, they are certainly not the sole source of
violent extremism. The indoctrination of extremist ideas is also taking place
in the modern educational institutions; radical violent students groups of all
ideological shades—ethnic, sectarian, and Islamist—have been sponsored by

their principal political outfits and have crowded out liberal and freethinking from the public colleges and universities. [15]

The poverty of social development has produced another unmanageable problem—the population explosion. If Pakistan's population growth continues to be poorly managed, it may prove to be even more disastrous in creating social and political chaos than is generally understood. This is a very serious social and economic issue but it hardly attracts any public attention and has not obtained political ownership. The country's ruling classes, generation after generation, have constantly ignored the growing imbalance between population growth and natural resources. They have avoided addressing the issue meaningfully due to its religious sensitivity, and also out of usual political apathy. Pakistan's population has grown roughly five times in about six and half decades from 35 million at the time of independence in 1947 to nearly 195.4 million in 2015–2016. [16] At the present rate of growth, Pakistan will become the fourth largest nation by 2050. [17] A more defining troublesome feature of population explosion is its youth bulge; currently 38 percent of Pakistan's population is its youth. [18] The young form the unemployed and unemployable sections of society and have hardly any stake in the current system of governance, as neither the military nor the civilian governments have ever evolved an inclusive youth focused development strategy. This younger population with adequate training, skill, and scientific education could be an asset for Pakistan for more rapid development. Instead, a section of the youth has fallen in the hands of extremist elements, opting out of the system to become the foot soldiers of internal and external jihadist movements.

The younger population of Pakistan in general has grown disillusioned with democracy, and seems to have lost confidence in the future of the dynastic representative system. [19] This is particularly true for the educated youth that have diplomas in hand but no substantive education, skills, or entrepreneurial spirit. They lack the four primary characteristics that empower the youth in successful countries—market orientation, quality education, skills, and assets. Having nothing or very little of them, pushes them toward extremist ideologies and militant groups—usually ethnic, sectarian, and radical in religious orientations. Joining them and working for them gives the youth access to resources that they never had and a sense of false purpose and empowerment.

Every successful society invests in the development of human resources, and countries having a large human resource base, such as Pakistan, have an added reason to invest even more. The investment through universal, high quality education and skill development is undertaken not only with the intended objective of social stability and order but also for the general progress of society. Pakistan could have done better with respect to the enrichment and development of its human resources through developing a

broad and solid scientific and industrial base. In contrast to Pakistan, vision-
ary nationalist political leaders elsewhere have brought about progress into
their states by investing in human and social capital resulting in progress.
They planned and visualized future progress by focusing on present genera-
tions and ensured that they received education and skills that would make
them competitive in the world. In this respect, Pakistan has missed many
opportunities of enabling the younger generations to become the agents of
social and economic change. The good thing however, has been that the
vacuum left by the state in quality and universal public education has partly
been filled by the private sector, the civil society and charitable founda-
tions.[20] That said, while these may serve as models of excellence, and the
public sector can learn from their successes, they cannot be a substitute for
public education.

The median age of Pakistanis today is twenty-one years and approximate-
ly 34.5 percent of the population is under fifteen years of age.[21] It is unfortu-
nate that the youth bulge that Pakistan could have used to its advantage,
through proper human development and allocation of resources, is one of its
heaviest burdens and one of the biggest potential threats to its stability. The
youth, not just in the border regions of Pakistan but also in other parts, have
drifted toward militant organizations. Apart from ideological zeal for radical
Islam and feelings of ethnicity as motivating factors, their inclination to join
such groups is highly influenced by prospects of empowerment through bear-
ing and using arms and affiliated economic gains. Any futuristic vision for
Pakistan and plans for reviving it must focus on universal quality education
and skill development to prevent painful crises, which the country has been
going through for the past two decades, from repeating. Further failure may
continue to breed inequality, extremism, violence, and greater political in-
stability.

Another symptom of state failure is widespread corruption from top to
bottom both in the bureaucracy as well as among the ruling political parties.
Even though some development economists and sociologists explain corrup-
tion in developing countries as an acceptable cost for speeding up the process
of governance, and many theorists and practitioners of democratization allow
for political patronage, but greedy elites in some developing countries, such
as Pakistan, use it as a pretext for crony capitalism and nepotism.[22] More-
over, there is a thin line between increasing efficiency of state bureaucracies
and siphoning off limited public resources, a good part of which has been
taken as loans from internal and external resources by the party bosses, and
then taken to secure offshore places.[23] The chief minister of the Punjab, the
largest province in the Pakistan federation, while deploring corruption, ad-
mitted that half of the province's budget is pilfered.[24] While this may be a bit
of an exaggeration, elite corruption, which has been going on for decades has
produced two major consequences. The first one is economic inequality, its

persistence, and intensity in marginal peripheral sections of society. The second is a wide perception of illegitimacy of the elite and their governments in the eyes of the poor, who are becoming radicalized through both religious as well as "secular" education.

According to Transparency International, Pakistan ranks among the top corrupt countries of the world—this is at a time when it is borrowing heavily both domestically and internationally and facing ethnic and religious-radical insurgencies.[25] Unfortunately, the ruling groups of Pakistan that have held power, and had have the primary responsibility of defending public interest and serving the society, have done the opposite. They have been committing organized and systematic corruption at a vast scale at all tiers. This has gone unchecked regardless of which party formed the government and whether or not the government was civilian or military. Powerful sectors of society have stashed billions of dollars in Swiss and Emirati banks.[26] An estimated one percent of GDP leaves the country every year, which cumulatively accounts for perhaps an even greater plunder of Pakistan in dollar terms than colonial extraction by the British during the times of the British Raj.

A weak state apparatus has facilitated the massive corruption by the corrupt ruling oligarchies; stronger, more effective, and autonomous state institutions might have impeded corruption in Pakistan. But the corrupt ruling elite have benefited from the weak state and have ensured that the authority of law, accountability, and even the judicial arm of the state remain weak and dysfunctional. The decline of the state of Pakistan has created the perfect conditions for corruption in which "crooks and terrorists thrive."[27] Corruption at the highest and most powerful places, such as the presidents, prime ministers and their cabinet members has greatly contributed to deterioration of not only the legal regime but also societal values. This character of the Pakistani elite has contributed to de-legitimation of the ruling parties, political groups, and the political system and has paved the way for the corrupt ones to acquire and exercise power. This is one of the major reasons that the "country is stalked by 'Islamist' terror."[28] The Islamist groups and parties use corruption, degeneration of values, dependence, and "loss of sovereignty" as arguments to win public support against the "democratic" political order and in support of an Islamic system.[29]

The most obvious sign of weakness of the state is the emergence of not only militant groups in the border regions but also land grabbers, powerful ethnic mafia, and criminal gangs in urban areas as well.[30]

Terrorist networks, some contained and others defeated and evicted from their strongholds in the tribal regions by the dedicated military operation *Zarb-e-Azb* (2014), had grown into a major security threat in terms of capturing territorial space, organizational strength, and capacity to damage state and society.[31] Even in retreat, they have retained latent capacity and sleeper cells to strike soft targets ranging from mosques to public parks.[32] There are

hundreds of militant organizations, a large majority of which are sectarian, religious, and ethnic, that have frequently used violence to protect their social and political turfs by silencing their rivals and intimidating the state. The reasons for the rise of militant groups will be delved in detail in chapters 6 and 7. One thing that stands out in this respect and has been a constant factor is close networking among religiously oriented organizations. Secondly, all of them have a political façade in the form of a religious political party with very vocal leadership, such as Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami, and other sectarian political parties. Moreover, they do more and better grass root politics through establishing charitable organizations, which serve the local communities and are better connected with the local communities than the mainstream political parties especially with the lower classes and social layers. The political parties access mass society only through the local and regional elite networks, and have not struck the kind of social roots that some of the religious groups have invested their resources to develop.

LAWLESS RULE

Pakistan's drift toward unconstitutional and unlawful political order or disorder started with military takeovers that undid the sanctity of the two vital institutions of the state; the constitution and judiciary. These two essential institutions hold democratic systems together and provide legal space for it to grow and flourish; the constitution establishes a structure of governance, fundamental rights, and procedures for acquiring power by legitimate means and the judiciary becomes the neutral arbitrator. For all essential matters, the judiciary plays the role of an honest and fair arbitrator. While the military rulers, kept both these institutions they changed their character and composition to serve their own power interests and defend their flawed political vision of restructuring the polity. The military and the judiciary, which was packed with military sympathizers, worked together to manufacture the legal basis for legitimizing and prolonging military regimes.[33] The military had other influential partners as well that came from political parties, both religious and mainstream, from the media, civil society and the elite social class. Once these sectors jumped on the military bandwagon, their "democratic" principles took a backseat; a fact they never felt embarrassed or belittled by. Rather, they defended joining the military regimes on grounds of national interest and to help aide the eventual political transition back to the civilian regimes. Actually, such frequent somersaults by the opportunistic political class of Pakistan have contributed greatly to the imbalance of power between the civilian and the military institutions. Interestingly, these classes became enthusiastic supporters of military rulers who in turn accepted them as the political façade—facilitators for public support and to serve as the political

front for the military. Therefore, every transition back to civilian rule has been problematic and marred by constitutional and institutional issues. The military regimes have left the political order worse off by destroying its natural balances.[34]

The military regimes have cultivated a class of individuals and groups that have flourished under its tutelage. Even some of the politicians with genuine public support have turned out to be opportunists by political necessity, knowing that the military in Pakistan is a political reality. Their calculations have showed that it is better to work with the military and enjoy the privileges of power, and it has proven to be a good political bargain for the growth of their personal power, and clout in their constituencies. Pakistan's competitive social system at the local elite level propels them toward seeking state patronage to do better against the political rival. A fact that also explains the frequent shifts in party affiliation based on the party's rise or decline. There are very few noble exceptions to these political re-arrangements. And it is the same pro-military clique of politicians and parties that starts urging the military to step in when they see any popular government in crisis.

By promising political offices, and even opening opportunity to make illegal monies, the military rulers enlisted the support of political figures with an independent social base. The changing of political loyalties from one party to another is one of the deep-seated effects of the military rules, which has developed into a political norm in Pakistan. This practice in a parliamentary form of government, like the one in Pakistan, introduces instability, as numbers in the legislature are important for maintaining executive power.

We need to examine social and political effects of shifting political allegiances on the society, polity, and state-society relations. Jumping political fences is now a trademark of Pakistani politics, and has assumed a normal political character. All political parties from left to right play this game to create artificial majorities to rule a province or the whole country by offering elected representatives to change their loyalties for the right price. Further exacerbating the situation is the fact that bribes, excessive patronage, and tolerance of corruption, without exception, has been on public expense and has included the doling out of public funds to elected representatives for local development. The legislators have become deft at selling out loyalties; they form political fronts, and in weaker moments extract undue concessions by holding the executive hostage.

A traded political horse in Pakistani politics has only one objective; continuing to stay on the green pastures, claiming more for themselves and devouring as much of whatever their heart desires. The political and military traders of these political horses have an interest in keeping them well-satiated as it allows the traders to run an illegal political economy which they need to run Pakistan in accordance to their perverted notion of law, justice, and

human rights. The horse-trading (buying off political loyalties) market has reduced the ethical foundation of politics to dust, which is blown away in frequent political storms. This immorality of elites is one of the reasons why the Pakistani society has been going through an unending cycle of value disorientation in every sphere of national life. We cannot understand the crisis of governance or the decline of the state without understanding how the military and political oligarchies have subordinated the vital institutions of the state to personal will, greed, ambition, and illegal means for accumulating wealth.

The elected governments, even after securing electoral legitimacy, have shown little consistent interest in establishing the rule of law tradition or resting politics on common moral or ethical grounds. They read and practice politics through a Machiavellian perspective, as pursuit of power and having its own morality, which cannot be judged by prevalent moral standards of society.[35] This attitude goes well with the social basis of the elite structure of society, which includes the tribal, feudal, and social class categories. The feudal mind-set of most dynastic party leaders has cultural roots in the long historical tradition of the Mughal rule, which in nutshell loosely translates to all is mine and you can prosper only under my shadow. In the Mughal cultural tradition, which is essentially tribal-feudalistic, loyalty is more important than principle, and this loyalty is primarily to the party bosses, and not to the constitution, rule of law, or basic democratic norms.

It is then not without reason that the weak fabric of the Weberian state model of colonial British India, which was then at a developing stage, has greatly weakened with the emergence of informal authority structures that operate parallel to the state. This is not just in the case of far-flung tribal regions, but even in areas that the Pakistani state had traditionally governed for decades where it now faces competition from a large and complex variety of non-state actors, notably religious and political parties with militant wings. They take on different names, social characteristics, and occupy different social and political domains, but all encroach on some form of the state authority, power, or functional responsibility-such as getting extortion instead of state taxation, informal means for resolution of conflicts, and provision of local security to affiliated members. This is primarily because of the declining faith and trust in state institutions to perform their functions, primarily in the areas of justice and social order. Either the populations have no access to the resources of the state, or they can only gain access after incurring costs in illegal graft, unbearable delays in justice delivery, or getting poor quality of services in education and health.

The constitutional deviations by the military and civilian oligarchy and sub-ordination of judiciary and other institutions of the state to their personalized power interests for decades have corroded the moral authority of the state among ordinary citizens. The executives in Pakistan have persistently

attacked these two vital institutions of the state because they have wanted to rule without any legal or judicial restraint. Whenever the judiciary with the power of determining the constitutionality of any act or acts of government showed independence, it was attacked or its sanctity was violated, and in some cases the judges were even personally humiliated.[36] The fourth military dictator of Pakistan, General Musharraf went a step farther than all others; he put sixty judges of the superior courts along with their families including minors and school-going children under house arrest on November 3, 2007 when he declared a state of emergency.[37] Not a single member of the ruling party, Pakistan Muslim League—Quaid-e-Azam, quit the government or registered any protest against this unconstitutional act, including constitutional amendments by Musharraf. After six months of illegal detention, the newly elected government announced their release.[38] It was not the first time in history that judges of the superior court were humiliated in 2007. In Nawaz Sharif's second term (1997–1999) frustrated by the activism of the Supreme Court, the government contemplated the arrest of the Chief Justice of Pakistan.[39] Party leaders and activists belonging to Sharif's Muslim League attacked the Supreme Court while the judges were hearing a corruption case against Sharif that many believed could go against him.[40]

The misuse of constitutional power and authority has been a sort of norm in Pakistani polity rather than an exception. In popular perceptions, law and accountability are only for the weaker sections of society and not applicable to the powerful and mighty. Dual track policies have created double standards, which sustain the domination of the traditional ruling groups, and the military and its allies when it has assumed direct reign of the country. The authoritarian tilt of the Pakistani state has worked against the interest of lower sections of the society, which is the majority. Consequently, the growth of social and political modernity at a popular level has been retarded and remains confined to the upper and upper middle parts of the society.

Pakistan's continuous tilt toward the political right for decades and the rise of extremist ideas and groups has been a consequence of neglecting social development and using extremist groups as proxies in foreign wars.[41] The successive coalitions of ruling oligarchies, and military regimes have reduced the nuclear state into an empty shell in terms of moral legitimacy, governance and delivery of vital services to the people, making it vulnerable to the forces of political Islam. The representative legitimacy of ruling oligarchies, which is their ticket to power, is suspected because of the manipulated electoral process. The local elite network disempowers the caste and tribe based voting blocs by denying them justice, development, and even dignity. Our view is that growth in radical Islam and its seemingly greater hold on society is almost in equal measure to the declining legitimacy of the ruling mainstream political parties of Pakistan, which are run by dynastic politicians.

There cannot be a bigger sign of bigotry in any society than when roughly one hundred thousand citizens turn out to attend the funeral of a convicted murderer guilty of killing a serving governor, Salman Taseer, of the most populous province.[42] There is a much deeper extremism prevalent that images on television and the printed word cannot capture. Moreover, the law and constitution cannot be used as effective tools to control or change the behavior of groups involved in unlawful acts when the moral legitimacy of the ruling oligarchies is weak or non-existent, and when the law and constitution have been reduced to mere personal will and subjected to narrow personal interests. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that law is applied arbitrarily, as certain classes and groups remain above the law, and forces of law apply only to the weak. The law can only be respected when it is equitable and fair for all, and delayed justice or reduced legal writ promotes extremism and militancy and further weakens the state apparatus.

THE FRONTLINE OF JIHAD

Pakistan must do some reflective thinking on its past policies of supporting and sponsoring proxy militant groups in pursuit of its policies toward India and Afghanistan. Every proxy war has created blowback effects of two kinds; first is the power and influence of militant organizations and their regional connections with similar groups, and the second is tactics undertaken to de-stabilize Pakistan by India and Afghanistan for supporting proxy wars in their countries. In hindsight, such policies have proven to be counterproductive; Pakistan chose to become the frontline of jihad against then the communist power with the start of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. The choice was based on strategic calculations, as Pakistan believed that effective and consolidated control of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union would threaten Pakistan's security and stability. Other reasons, perhaps more compelling than this fear inherited from the British colonial experience, also existed. Afghanistan presented itself as a perfect theater of proxy conflict in a global environment shaped by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, fears of insecurity in the Gulf region, and rivalry between the two superpowers. The Afghan resistance was a national uprising against the invasion and ferocity of Soviet attacks on the Pashtun regions, which had driven out about one fifth of population out of the country. The invasion reignited the Afghan nationalism and spirit of jihad. There was yet another reason for Pakistan leading the jihad against the Soviet Union, which centered on General Zia ul Haq's quest for legitimacy and recognition. General Zia had become an international pariah after executing an elected prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. General Zia was also cultivating a religious constituency to support him and his political program; and his initially secret and then open support

for the Afghan mujahedeen cemented a triangular relationship—the military, the religious parties, and the Afghan mujahedeen. But Pakistan was not alone in this support; it was only the frontline state in facilitating the counter intervention in Afghanistan. Thousands of Islamic warriors, coming to the area from many other countries became part of a larger international coalition against the communist regime and its Soviet backers. The United States and the Western countries driven by their Cold War strategic interests played a central role in building, funding, and sustaining this international coalition for assisting the Islamist warriors in multiple ways.

The Islamist legacy of jihad with successive bouts of conflict in Afghanistan has created a backlash for Pakistan and all other states, including the United States that assisted the Islamists in Afghanistan. The consequences for Pakistan have been too many, too serious, and too stubborn to go away.[43] The challenge of radical Islam that Pakistan faces today is an outcome of its own strategic game in Afghanistan that it had played in partnership with the West. It continues to deal with the rubble of the war and the ensuing social and security chaos after the superpowers left Afghanistan to fend for itself, leaving the onus on Afghanistan and Pakistan to deal with the post-conflict legacies. An equally important factor in the creation of jihadist networks has been the sense of triumphalism in humiliating and forcing the Soviet superpower to retreat from Afghanistan, which has been led by tens of thousands of young men from Pakistan and other Muslim countries.[44] Let us not forget that the jihadist legacy is not a purely Afghan phenomenon; in the early years of Pakistan the country had mobilized tribal warriors to support the uprising against the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir when he was stalling on the decision of accession to India or Pakistan.[45] The irony is that today Pakistan is fighting the Taliban in the same regions from where they had originally recruited the jihadists for their proxy wars.

The conflict in Afghanistan and competing strategies of the neighboring states, not too distant in the past, created an informal alliance between the security establishment of the Pakistani state and militant Islamic groups such as the Taliban. They shared some basic common political and security interests in fighting and resisting common enemies. Some analysts observing Pakistan closely are on the mark when they talk about the existence of a "mullah-military" alliance during the decades of the eighties and nineties.[46] However, there is very little debate over the detrimental social, sectarian, and political consequences this alliance has produced in society.

It is however debatable whether the security establishment understood the long-term consequences of this dangerous alignment with private militant groups that had a completely different ideological composition along with a few shared security objectives. Another pertinent question is whether the alignment was confined to foreign adventures or did it also extend to Islamizing the Pakistani state. There was no ambiguity about common ideological

and security concerns of the two under the military regime of Zia ul Haq. The two shared, to some degree, a common vision of Islamization of the state and a common interest in supporting the mujahedeen in Afghanistan and disputed Kashmir. The mullahs wanted to go far beyond the ground that Zia had conceded to them in return for their support. With the end of the Zia regime, at least the Islamization process, which was already measured and controlled, halted. Moreover, questions about the political legitimacy of the Islamization process, and how it cultivated multiple sectarian and social conflicts began to be raised with more strident critique than during the Zia tenure.

But a decisive shift in the orientation of the state toward an Islamic ideology—a politically contested plank—had taken place. No successive leader, military, or civilian has been willing to reset the Islamization button, let alone reverse even the most controversial Islamic laws such as the Hadood ordinances.[47] It is more important to consider why a military dictator without any constitutional or political legitimacy arrogated to himself the responsibility of redefining Pakistan's fundamental character from a nominal Islamic republic to a substantive Islamic state. The short answer is; the Islamization program was a convenient political tool for Zia to overcome the looming legitimacy crisis he faced. The long answer includes the perception of religious parties, conservative sections of the society, and radical Islamist groups of Zia being a modern-day reincarnation of a pious Muslim ruler. They aligned with him, gave him ideas on how to proceed with Islamization, and supported him in this endeavor. The conservative religious groups had never in Pakistan's history found so much political space, voice, and opportunity to reshape Pakistan according to their conceptions of an Islamic state. Since then, the Pakistani society has gradually kept shifting toward the right, with a conservative, religious orientation. Extremist ideas and radical Islamic views have been riding on the strong wave of Islamization since the Zia years. The national climate during those years, and after the several cycles of the Afghan conflict, along with Pakistan's regional policies have greatly contributed to the rise of Islamic radicalism.

POLITICAL USE OF ISLAM

Islamic thought and ideas run deep in society though in great variation along different theological lines. Deep down, Pakistani society is invariably embedded in Islamic culture, civilization, and religious practices. For centuries, Islam has been a dominant feature of these lands, and it has co-existed with Hinduism and other sub-continental religions. The fusion of Islam with politics started only with the independence of Pakistan, as some of the religious groups began to demand establishment of an Islamic state. These groups lack the popularity and public support but have been able to show greater street

power than any other groups throughout the history of Pakistan. They have adopted and excelled at street agitation, sit-ins, and violent demonstrations in support of their demands. The tragedy of the Pakistani elite is that instead of countering the ideas of the Islamist groups they chose to use a diluted Islamic agenda in a vain attempt to delegitimize and compete with the religious groups. That was, and has been a bad strategy, as the political elites have increasingly found it difficult to beat the religious parties on their own agenda, which has kept expanding. In the process, they have subverted Pakistan's moderate and modernist political heritage. Islamization by the statist elites, particularly under general Zia, not only legitimized the use of religion for political ends, but more significantly, it legitimized the Islamic agenda of the religious groups and parties. Consequently, religious groups of every sect and idea have proliferated; they have become more resourceful, recalcitrant in their attitudes, and some have turned to radicalism and militancy hoping they can force the Pakistani state to implement their demands of implementation of the Sharia. These actors, once aligned with the Pakistani state, have over time, captured more social and political space at the grass-roots level.

The role religion should play in modern day politics is a well-debated but settled issue in the Western world since the separation of the Church and secular authority a few centuries back. But the culture and values that religion, any religion for that matter, generates within the society seek to influence politics. But in Islamic countries, where religion dominates social life, the role religion plays in politics remains widely undefined and unsettled. How much of politics, law and public policy, or private attitudes and behaviors should be determined by religion is a contentious and sometimes an inflammable political issue. In Pakistan, we witness two different political worldviews on the relation between religious and politics. The religious groups, parties and the hugely expanded madrassa network, some of which are connected with religious parties insist that Islam is the ideology of Pakistan and is reason for becoming an independent state. They consider their demand for Islamization as a religious obligation and refuse to settle on anything less than that.[48] The liberal, moderates sections of the society and the leaders of mainstream political parties suffer from ambivalence on the role of religion and often feel threatened, intimidated, and weak. They evade the big question and its challenge more than taking it head on by insisting that the logic, circumstances and the ideas that defined the struggle for Pakistan are very different—an independent state in Muslim majority areas based on constitutionalism, representation, and inclusion. Simply put, Pakistan was conceived as a territorial nation state with equal citizenship.

The political leaders and some of the military rulers of Pakistan have refused to own, develop, and popularize a liberal vision of Pakistan, with the exception of Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf to some extent. The rest, rather than dousing the flames of religious politics, have added more fuel to it

by using it for legitimacy, political acceptance, or as in the case of the Musharraf regime, aligning with the religious parties and groups, to weaken the moderate, mainstream, and secular nationalist political parties. This alignment was most obvious in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2002–2008). Every expedient move to draw religious political parties closer to the centers of power has empowered them more and highlighted their strength far beyond their limited and narrow social support base.

The appropriation of the Islamic pulpit by political elites, or playing on the *Islamic wicket* to use cricket terminology, has forced them to play a defensive game against the mullahs who know the bounce and pace of the wicket far better than them. Moreover, some of the prominent political leaders not out of conviction but out of political necessity, such as Z.A. Bhutto, have played on that wicket and been stumped out on the first ball.[49] The cynical use of religion to compete with the religious political parties has served the political interests of the Islamists, giving an impression as though the creation of Pakistan, its survival in the modern turbulent world order, and its future depends on shaping the state and its policies according to the notions of Islamic ideology.[50]

A persistent attitude of religious deception, cynical use of Islam and open hypocrisy about the state acquiring religious character has led huge numbers of poor populations to disappointment and ideological confusion. Parallel to the rise of radical Islamic ideology, one can discern a massive explosion of a religious media market that includes everything from twenty-four-hour religious channels to videos and books that glorify Muslim conquests in history and celebrate the heroism of the conquerors. The contradiction between the imagined glory of the past, in which the regions that now constitute Pakistan had no contribution, and the stark and bitter reality of life among the poor make the narrative of jihad pretty attractive. A good section of society appears to have lost the value of practical reasoning, pragmatic thinking, and even the value of life and living. The dominant wave of religious thought and practices denounces materialism and material progress, terming them as a Western idea. The state of Pakistan and those who run it from the top must be vigorous and consistent on emphasizing state and nation building by solving social and other myriad of problems through pragmatic and workable solutions. Relying on old religious debates would mean the leaders, intellectuals, and the society at large have run out of ideas, imagination, and talent to relate to and live in the modern world of science and technology. On the other hand, material progress with appreciable gains for the poor and the marginalized would give them a better sense of religion as well as life, away from dogmatism, fundamentalism, and fatalism. Not that Pakistan has abandoned this path, but its progress has been slow, patchy, and inconsistent, while at the same time anti-modernist ideas have taken deeper roots.

We would tend to characterize the decay of the Pakistani state, not in terms of total collapse or physical disintegration, which in fact happened with its eastern wing becoming Bangladesh but in terms of the collapse of the ideas, philosophy, and vision that drove millions of Muslims to demand an independent homeland. One way this collapse has happened is through questioning the very vision and purpose of the creation of Pakistan by Islamist ideologues and political activists. These actors have been involved in selectively using the political slogans of "Islamic government, Islamic state, and Islamic constitution—the slogans of the last years of empire and the first of independence" to redefine the purpose of Pakistan in their own terms.[51] Some of the prominent ulema from the famous Deoband School were Indian nationalists and thought that Muslims could live and prosper in united India, and believed that Muslims did not have to constitute an independent state of their own in order practice Islam.[52] Those who separated themselves from the nationalist ulema and supported the Muslim League's struggle for Pakistan represented a minority, and as such their view about what ought to be the character of the Pakistani state should have had proportionate significance. However, this Islamist minority has succeeded in romanticizing the conception of the Pakistani polity for the protection of Islamic culture and values. It has found resonance with conservative religious sections alienated youth in colleges and madrassa clerics and students, but still remains far short of having a broad popular support.

Baseless imagery, such as "Islam is in danger" is a cause as well as a symptom of the disorientation of the Pakistani society. This is the consequence of phony issues gaining salience over substantive politics which has generated a convoluted debate on religion and politics. "Islam in danger" and "Pakistan in danger" are the sort of narratives that have promoted a negative politics of fear, hate, and radicalism. While giving rise to damaging controversies, the religious tide has pushed the modernist project of a constitutionalist and democratic state based on rule of law and citizenship rights off the rails. How can Pakistanis improve their lives, develop institutions and achieve economic progress and stability are real, immediate and fundamental issues. Resolving these issues has been one of the major successes of modern-day nation states that have been able to achieve a greater degree of internal coherence and national security.

DE-LEGITIMIZED POLITICAL AUTHORITY

The dominant political elites avoid answering the question about their role in the decline of Pakistan. Rather, they scapegoat the military, the mullahs, and generally the American role in Afghanistan for the rise of radical ideas and movement. They are the primary political actors and have dominated the

political structure of the country, in alliance with the military and at times quite independent of it. Their massive systematic corruption, rather plunder, has invoked questions about their legitimacy, character, and their role in the drift of the country toward chaos. Pakistan's ruling oligarchies have usually placed their personal political interests before the institutional and social priorities of the state. The political, military, and bureaucratic elites have disempowered the state for the benefit of empowering themselves that has produced a culture of graft in public institutions and development agencies from top to bottom. Continual disregard for quality governance and a lack of accountability of public servants and office holders has created social and political alienation of the public, which increasingly questions democracy and liberal constitutional political arrangements. A general impression at the popular level is that democracy has failed in Pakistan works in favor of the military and the mullahs.

Unfortunately, the failures and the weaknesses of the political class have been affixed on the political order for which the ruling classes of Pakistan cannot escape responsibility. Their persistent failure to establish justice, equality, and rule of law has reduced the politics of state building to political networking and maneuvering of coalitions among the landed aristocracy and partnerships between them and the military. The failure to bring the feudal and military oligarchy under the limits of the law and constitution has stunted institutional growth of the state in Pakistan. This has been a regular pattern of Pakistani politics for decades, which is necessary to understand why the state in Pakistan has been vulnerable to the challenge of radical Islam as an alternative to the ruling classes.

One can clearly read disappointment and frustration in the eyes of an average Pakistani, in some areas more than others, because the endowment of natural resources and local efforts to include citizens in development vary across regions. The Islamists, most of them belonging to underprivileged sections themselves, have perhaps done a better job in understanding the despair of the populations at the local levels, and have used religion to mobilize support for militancy. The Pakistani state has had a nominal presence in the vast rural periphery where, since colonial times, its functionaries negotiated some space and role with a powerful social class of tribal chiefs and feudal landlords. The state very rarely challenged the parallel informal authority structures that continue to exist beyond major cities and dominate the Western borderlands of the country. Even in instances that the state has tried to challenge these parallel structures, it has done so only under political compulsion and has soon retreated to its nominal role after the political compulsion has ended. Its assertion of power has been temporary, targeted against specific individuals and groups and has not become institutionalized. This is precisely the dilemma Pakistan faces in reconstructing the post-conflict areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Swat. Rebuilding

institutions and transfer of security and development to the civilian sector continue to remain work in progress.

As the degeneration in Karachi over the years into chaos explains, the waning of the Pakistani state is no longer confined to rural and far-off regions. Karachi and other urban areas of the country have witnessed high incidence of murders, kidnappings for ransom, honor killings, and gross violations of human rights and at times even crime and abuse inflicted by the police and powerful clan leaders. Perhaps in a smaller degree, urban areas are better governed but the pattern of decay of Pakistani state institutions is visible via heaps of uncollected garbage and flowing of sewerage on roads depending primarily on which part of the town you live in. Greedy individuals, criminal gangs, and clerics of all denominations continue to encroach upon public parks and use money, threat and influence to get public property allotted. The streets of slow dying Pakistani cities—Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar, and Lahore—present a picture of anarchy, closely resembling its fractured political life. There is some reversal of this trend in Peshawar and Lahore, as the two rival parties, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Pakistan Muslim League (N), are competing for the control of these two provinces. This also demonstrates how healthy and peaceful democratic competition can produce positive gains for the society.

The restoration of democracy since 2008, after the departure of fourth military regime has opened up prospects of consolidating constitutional rule, but like all post-military regimes in Pakistan, it has a legacy of militancy, Talibanization, and radical Islam.[53] There appears to be a big contrast between expectations of the general public and performance of the "democratic" governments. The people of Pakistan have waited for too long, and have betted heavily on military and civilian messiahs with the hope that their next government will do better than the present one. All declared efforts of cleaning up the mess, providing good governance, improving efficiency and making government servants and elected representatives accountable, have met dead-ends.

The collective interest of Pakistan's ruling political class, which comprises mainly of tribal chiefs, influential landowners, and clan elders, is in keeping the state at bay, so that they can maintain their social and territorial fiefdoms. The political nexus between the military and the landowning elites and tribal chiefs has considerably reduced the functional autonomy and impartiality of the district administration, which was once the hub of effective service delivery, justice, and development under the British and also in the first few decades of independence.[54]

This decline is equally visible in urban areas as well. The influence of the political class over government departments has been accepted as a political necessity to help loyalists gain patronage through jobs, transfers, and immunity to offenders by helping them escape the grip of the law. Aligning the

bureaucracy with the political interests of the ruling groups has gravely damaged the principle of rationality, which is a central pillar of the modern state. Therefore, weakening of the state on the margins and as well as at the center in the cities of Pakistan does not come as a surprise. It has been progressively slipping, with very few scattered signs of recovery.

THE RULING OLIGARCHIES

It is important to identify the ruling oligarchic factions that have undermined the authority of the state and posed serious social and political consequences that Pakistan faces today. In no order of their notoriety, they include the land owing families, prominent business houses, civilian bureaucracy, and the military. If there is any objective notion of the "establishment" in Pakistan, these sectors of society constitute it. There is however, a misconceived idea of the establishment in popular discourse in a country that centers on the military as the major institution. There is no doubt that it has been a major political player both in power, and when not in power behind the scene, but all other powerful sectors of the ruling oligarchy either joined it or gave it passive support. The military was never a lone player in the political history of Pakistan, it always had the support of a dominant section of all other elite segments who contributed their part in the interest of "reform and development," protecting the "ideology of Pakistan," and bringing about 'true democracy."[55] These have been some of the ruses to justify switching political loyalty over to the military.

At least two of the military regimes, as indicated above, cultivated religious factions and parties. This broad based coalition (elite consociationalism) could in fact be the basis of national consensus on democratic political order, good society, and social, political, and economic modernization. Unfortunately, these coalitions have proved to be more or less opportunistic and self-centered.

Naturally, the coalitions of governing elite groups could not run the country or rule the way they have without demolishing the three pillars of constraints against the constitutional deviations and abuse of power. These three pillars, like in most other states, are constitutionalism, rule of law, and effective and impartial accountability of public office holders. But these pillars in any stable constitutionalist democracy rest on the foundation of an independent judiciary, which is supposed to determine the boundaries of lawfulness and enforce the rule of law. Like mentioned before, all the civilian elected governments and the military regimes have, one after another, attacked the judiciary through many familiar and ingenious ways to place themselves firmly in power and rule the country without any constraint or limit on their exercise of power. It was only for the first time in Pakistan's history that the

lawyers' community, civil society, and media—some of the new social forces—launched a movement against military general Musharraf turned president, to restore an independent judiciary (2007–2008). The efforts of the judiciary to assert itself and its independence have not gone well with the parliament and the traditional parties and dynastic leaders. A tension, often on the appointment of new judges and in cases where state has to respect fundamental rights, continues to simmer.

Pakistan, like many other developing countries, has a ruling class or a "ruling caste." We cannot understand the failure of the state without delving deep into the social structure of the ruling class, its values, political culture, and style of governance. If we consider the social and economic base as the foundation of class structure the ruling classes of Pakistan into three categories; landed and tribal aristocracy, the bureaucratic-military elites, and the business-industrial complex.

The landed and tribal aristocracy can be better understood as the feudal class. We know feudalism is a contested social category, but given its classical character and reproduction of social relations of dominance and subordination, it is no different from other such classes in history in other geographical zones of the world. The major difference with its European counterparts of the pre-modern nation state periods is that it was the product of colonial convenience. The British wanted a firmer, stable, and durable rule, and lacking the modern apparatus of the state they could not govern effectively without an intermediary class of powerful clan leaders, tribal chiefs, and *pirs* (dynastic spiritual leaders). This class was to provide a local popular overlay on the new state institutions that the British began to introduce, such as district civil administration, police, and the armed forces. To empower the collaborative aristocracy, the British gave them land ownership rights, access to elite education, and entry in the officer class in the armed forces and civil bureaucracy. The clan leaders were granted exalted titles and magisterial powers to work as partners of the British Raj. Since its independence, Pakistan's political class since its independence has largely come from this socially engineered feudal class of the British time.

With the exception of religious political parties and some emerging urban political formations all political parties, whether regional, ethnic, or mainstream, are dominated by the feudal class. By character of their class, the feudal politicians are traditionalists not modernist. In power or without it, they have been resistant to change and modernization through education and economic development. This has contributed to little progress, both in terms of human development and economic opportunities, in regions where feudal elites dominate the political process. Comparatively, those areas where middle class farmers are in larger numbers, or land holdings are smaller, social and economic development has been better.

The feudal class has continued its domination of the political arena both during open democracy and during the "guided" democracy under the military brass. Its members get elected again and again without any real challenge from the middle class, which is emerging fast but with little political clout in the vast rural periphery. The large number of political parties in Pakistan and the number of candidates they field gives a false impression of competitive politics, which in fact it is not. The competition is actually between the members of the same families, clans or class, and the feudal aristocrats.

The political values and orientations of the feudal class of Pakistan are rooted in traditional social values; chief among them are patriarchy, social stratification, and authoritarianism. This class has been more concerned with preserving feudalistic social and political relations than transitioning the country into a modern progressive society. In addition to their local social base and local elite networks based on patron-client relations, the feudal politicians have very effectively used elections and party affiliations to acquire electoral legitimacy. Their democratic and liberal vision ends right there and has never transcended to addressing the larger questions of rights, genuine welfare of their constituents, good governance, or the exercise of power in public interest. Rather, apart from a few rare exceptions, the members of Pakistan's political class have used public offices, time and again, for amassing private fortunes. The stories of corruption of this class and how its eminent leaders have robbed the society are well reflected in many of the leaks and disclosures of accounts and property holdings abroad.[56]

The other two social classes of Pakistan, the bureaucratic-military elites and the business-industrial complex are no different when it comes to placing private ends before public interest. The bureaucratic-military elites have ruled the country for roughly three decades and have damaged state institutions far more perhaps than the feudal class, which at least has some pretension of a representative status. The members of the landowning aristocracy continue to have deep social roots and a web of influence relationships that help them a great deal in contesting elections and becoming important figures in the political party system of Pakistan. One may argue that the political rise of the Sharif political dynasty that began under the patronage of the military regime in 1980s, reflects the challenge old ruling classes of Pakistan face from the emerging industrial and business houses, the media, and middle class-based civil society of Pakistan.

EXTREMISM AND VIOLENCE

Like its sub-continental neighbors, Pakistan is among those developing countries where political violence is more of a norm than an exception. Religious

forces have historically been a part of the violent history, particularly during the turbulent communal strife before and after the partition. But in recent decades, radical Islamists have become more organized and have declared war against the state and security forces in particular. The radical and jihadist ideas beginning with the Afghan jihad of 1980 morphed into violent extremist movements against the Pakistani state around 2007. The militant factions and their generation appear to be new, but the ideas shaping their violent response to the Pakistani state and its policies are rooted in their deep theological lineage and in their experience in wars of Afghanistan. For the last one decade, Pakistan has been locked in an existential struggle against extremism and terrorism, suffering enormously at the hands of terrorists.

Any form of violence is a dehumanizing act. It leaves deep psychological scars on both the victims and the perpetrators. It badly affects the social psyche of a nation, especially when the cycle of violence lasts very long and the groups involved glorify it or give it religious meanings, as is the case with religiously motivated terrorism. The consequences of political violence and terrorism, therefore, go much beyond the personal tragedy of those who fall victim to it. It impacts the social structure, values, and more important, and in a long-lasting way, the politics and stability of the country, and finally trust in the institutions of the state to provide protection.

Pakistani society, some regions more than others, and politics have seen much violence since independence, and the country's journey on this tragic path continues without much reflection on who has landed it in this condition. The regions on the periphery of Pakistan, Balochistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have suffered the most in terms of number of attacks by the terrorists and number of causalities.[57] With a nationwide network of sympathizers and active supporter, the Taliban, sectarian groups, and militant wings of some of the political parties in Karachi have inflicted tremendous damage on society.[58] There are many causes of Pakistan's drift to extremism that we will deal with exhaustively in chapter 6. Just for reference, two of the most important reasons are: permissive social environment for violence, and state failure in areas of justice and social development. The frequency and persistence of violence that manifests in religious, sectarian, and ethnic forms has further weakened the state apparatus, sharpened divisions within the society and imposed heavy human and material costs. Violence in politics is neither new nor confined to Pakistan or the Muslim parts of the world; but the frequency of violent outbursts, the diversity of groups that are involved in it, and the gradual erosion of the capacity of the state to protect its citizens makes Pakistan stand out more than other regions and countries. Furthermore, violence in Pakistan is rooted in extremist religious ideas of exclusion, self-defined religious authenticity, and a dogmatic view of Islam in a rationalist-modern world.

In the past few years, religious extremism and violence in Pakistan has increased manifold with suicide bombers exploding themselves in the middle of worship places, in the busy and populated markets and public parks, especially aiming their violence at security personnel and their institutions. [59] Hardly any city or community has been spared from terror attacks, and in a tragic way these attacks have frozen both human and religious sensibilities of the larger part of the population. The war on 'terror' is an ongoing project with offenders and victims on both sides, but the message it conveys about the state and society is that of resolve and resilience to fight it out. Pakistan has no other option, but to win, no matter what the costs.

It may take many years before violence winds down in Pakistan, if at all, as violence can be traced back to very complex structural reasons. Chief among which are poor governance, an ineffective and corrupt judicial system along with predatory political elites. These run alongside idealized narratives of jihad, an active role of extremist religious organizations, and the state's flawed policy of courting the support of the jihadists in support of its foreign policy objectives in the past. To deflect attention from the domestic causes of violence typical Pakistani analysts, media persons and political leaders ascribe the cause to unknown forces and regional and international conspiracies. Pakistanis have lived in a state of denial about the internal cancer of extremism for too long. One can find many oblique references in these conspiracies to the United States, Israel, and India trying to create troubles for Pakistan. By not looking at the troubling social and political facts, Pakistani ruling groups have delayed or postponed hard decisions that they should have taken with full responsibility to retrieve the situation. They have been consumed by their self-interest and have failed to guard the country against the dangers of religious extremism. Pakistan has faced the dilemma of being confronted with the politics of Islam from its inception and the ruling groups have lacked the intellectual vigor, vision, and creative thought to balance the religious culture with modernity.

There is a great deal that Pakistan can learn from the experience of industrial democracies and some developing countries, which have consistently pursued modernism and economic rationalism, which has resulted in visible dividends for the society. The ideas of good life, peace, and progress have gained popular acceptance because of their clear and demonstrable positive effects on social and political life. These polities are more concerned about the future of their societies than emotional ancient theological controversies and devotion on intractable problems, which has been the sad story of Pakistan. We see similar trends in the Middle East today on account of religious differences where the states are backing private groups locked in self-destructive conflict in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. The bigger picture perhaps signified the conflict between Islam and modernism, which is also cast in civilizational terms.

Adoption of modernist thought and modernizing policies, which is distinct from Westernization, would reduce the occurrence of violence in the Muslim parts of the world, including Pakistan. But that would be possible only if the state and society set themselves on the path of reform, development, and transition to law-bound democratic norms. The dilemma of Pakistan is that it has to cultivate democracy in an unfertile cultural climate of tradition, religious orthodoxy, and caste-ridden social structures.

The present political domination of repressive and corrupt ruling classes in Pakistan, as indicated earlier, has weakened the state and its institutions, and de-legitimized the political process greatly. This vacuum has created a window of opportunity for all kind of violent groups to challenge the state and the authenticity of its political system, some of whom would like to substitute it with Islam without really explaining what it would mean, except claiming it would entail an enforcement of Islamic laws. Their critique of the political system, ruling elites, and their corruption has found an attractive audience among the poor in the madrassa networks, and in other segments of society. Their glorification of Islamic principles and the earlier years of Islam impresses their followers and creates a demand for the "Islamic system." Simplistic as it might sound, it is not without ideologically motivated and committed religious parties and groups. They see all the problems as deviations from Islamic principles and the only solution for Pakistan in the adoption of the Islamic system.

Extremism and continuing violence for a decade has turned Pakistan into a wounded society. The country will continue to wear some of the ugly scars of neglect, bad policies, and state sponsored use of militant groups in Afghanistan for a very long time. While the bonds cultivated in the heat of the cold war between the military and jihadist elements have broken down, the jihadist spirit and ethos have survived and continue to manifest themselves in terrorism against the state and society. That said, the roots of terrorism are too diverse to be explained by this alliance alone. The decline of the state capacity to govern effectively and provide justice is one of the reasons that drive the poor toward radical religious groups. These groups lure marginalized sections by idealizing Islamic notions of just society and just social order. Devising and implementing a constitutional and democratic system that delivers justice, equality and development for all will be the key to restore faith in the system and weakening the appeal of the religious demagogues.

NOTES

1. Griff Witte, "Pakistan Forces Reclaim Swat Valley's Largest City," *Washington Post,* May 31, 2009.

2. In 2015, Pakistan was ranked thirteenth on the list of fragile state, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org.

3. Tim Craig, "Pakistan's Prime Minister Is Defying the Clerics—Very Carefully," *Washington Post*, March 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistans-prime-minister-is-defying-the-clerics--very-carefully/2016/03/08/a6ecea88-e450–11e5-a6f3–21ccdbc5f74e_story.html#.

4. Kalbe Ali, "Religious Scholars Vow to Resist 'Liberalization of Pakistan,'" *Dawn*, November 22, 2015.

5. *Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2015–16*, 280.

6. Amin Ahmed, "Ghost Schools Cause Loss of Billion: Report," *Dawn*, October 2, 2013.

7. John Bray, "Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline?" *International Affairs* 73, no. 2 (April 1997): 315–331.

8. "Survey Findings: Punjab Scores Well for Good Governance," *Express Tribune*, September 3, 2014.

9. William Millam, "Pakistan's Precipitous Decline," *New York Times*, April 4, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/opinion/global/pakistans-precipitous-decline.html?_r=0.

10. The Fund for Peace, *The 2015 Fragile States Index,* http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf.

11. See a critical note by Christine Fair on this subject in "Is Pakistan a Failed State? No," *Foreign Policy,* June 24, 2010, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/24/is-pakistan-a-failed-state-no//.

12. World Bank, "Pakistan's Economy Needs to Accelerate Growth," April 28, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/28/pakistans-economy-need-to-accelerate-growth; United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2015,* http://hdr.undp.org/en/2015-report.

13. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2015*.

14. Author's interviews with police officials in Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan, June 18–21, 2015.

15. Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff, *Beyond Madrassas*: *Assessing the link between Education and Militancy in Pakistan*, Working Paper 2, Centre for Universal Education at Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, June 2010, 21–26.

16. *Pakistan Economic Survey 2015–16* (Islamabad: Economic Advisor's Wing, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, June 2016), http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1516.html, 199.

17. *World Population Prospects 2015: Key Findings and Advance Tables* (New York: UN Populations Division,), https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf.

18. *Pakistan Economic Survey 2009–10* (Islamabad: Economic Advisor's Wing, Finance Division, 2010), 235–238.

19. The British Council Pakistan, *Pakistan: The Next Generation* (Islamabad: BCP), November 2009), iv.

20. Quynh T. Nguyen and Dhushyanth Raju, "Private School Participation in Pakistan," *Lahore Journal of Economics* 20, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 1–46.

21. *Pakistan Economic Survey 2015*–16, p. 201.

22. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (Middlesex: A Pelican Book, 1968), vol. 2, 949–951.

23. Shahid Kardar, "Black Money in Swiss Banks," *Dawn*, February 17, 2015.

24. Deploring rampant corruption in government departments, Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif admitted at least half of the province's budget is devoured by the unholy alliance of "the thief and the guard," see "Half of Punjab Budget Being Pilfered: CM," *Dawn*, June 13, 2010.

25. Pakistan ranks thirtieth in the corruption ranking only a few notches above Afghanistan, although it has improved from its twenty-seventh ranking in 2012.. Transparency International, *Corruption Trends in Asia Pacific Region,* February 2016, https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Corruption_trends_in_Asia_Pacific_region.pdf, 2.

26. Finance minister of Pakistan told the national parliament in 2014 that Pakistanis have US$200 billions in Swiss banks. Khawar Ghumman, "$ 200bn of Pakistan in Swiss banks: Dar," *Dawn*, May 10, 2014.

27. Irfan Husain, "Parallel Tracks to Disaster," *Dawn*, June 26, 2010.

28. Rifaat Hamid Ghani, "Debating Corruption," *Dawn*, June 15, 2010.

29. Author's interviews with three Administrators and teachers of Madrassas in Peshawar, March 25, 2016.

30. Zahid Hussain, "Crime and Politics," *Dawn*, February 3, 2016.

31. Ron Moreau, "Where the Jihad Lives Now," *Newsweek*, October 20, 2007.

32. A suicide bomber, a graduate of madrassa and madrassa teacher in Lahore exploded himself on Easter Day, March 27, 2016, when most of the Christian families and children had gathered in a park in Lahore. He killed 72, mostly children and women and wounded 300. *Dawn*, March 28, 2016.

33. Paula R. Newberg, "Balancing Act: Prudence, Impunity, and Pakistan's Jurisprudence," in Paul Brass, *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 178.

34. Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947*–1997 (Lahore: Sange-e-Meel, 2000), 14.

35. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Irving, TX: University of Dallas Press, 1980).

36. The chief justice of Pakistan, Chaudhary Iftikhar Mohammad was called by the Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf, detained there for all day, humiliated and threatened and suspended from his office on March 9, 2007 for refusal to give guarantees against ineligibility of Musharraf to contest next presidential elections toward the end of the year, which he couldn't being in uniform according to law. "Musharraf Wants CJP Out," *Daily Times*, March 9, 2007.

37. "General Musharraf's Second Coup," *Dawn*, November 4, 2007.

38. "PM's 1st Order; Release Judges," *Daily Times*, March 25, 2008.

39. Gohar Ayub Khan, *Glimpses into the Corridors of Power* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 284.

40. "Contempt Case against PM: Rowdyism at SC Disrupts Hearing," *Dawn*, November 29, 1997.

41. "Another Bombing: This Time in Pakistan," *New York Times*, March 28, 2016.

42. Amir Yasin, "Thousands Attend Qadri's Funeral," *Dawn*, March 2, 2016.

43. Omar Noman, "Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy," *Third World Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (January 1989): 50–54.

44. Zahid Husain, *The Scorpion's Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan-And How It Threatens America* (New York: Free Press, 2010).

45. Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1975).

46. Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan between Mosque and Military* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), 159–198.

47. Hadood Ordinances relate to Islamic punishments. See Craig Baxter, "Restructuring the Pakistan Political System," in *Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq*, ed. Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 27–48.

48. Author's interviews with ulema in Chistian, Bahawalnagar, March 23, 2016, and Peshawar, March 25, 2016.

49. Muhammad Iqbal Chawala et al., "Islamization in Pakistan: An Overview," *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan* 52, no. 1 (January–June 2015), 276.

50. Dr. Javed Iqbal, *Islam and Pakistan's Identity* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan and Vanguard Books, 2003), 103.

51. Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, 4

52. Muhammad Akram Khan, *Millat aur Watan: A Debate between Maulana Syed Husain Ahmad Madni and Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal* (Nation and Country: A debate between Maulana Syed Husain Ahmad Madni and Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal) (Multan: Idara Rosenama Shams, 1938); Zia ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963).

53. Saeed Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 257.

54. Charles H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987).

55. These were the legitimizing or political planks of the three military rulers—Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf tended to be secular and didn't use "defense of Pakistan ideology" in their political rhetoric. On the other hand, Yahya Khan and Zia ul Haq used defense of Pakistan ideology, development, and democratic reconstruction.

56. "What the Panama papers disclose about Pakistani politicians," *Dawn*, April 4, 2016. The estimates of how much the elites of Pakistan have stolen and deposited in safe place in foreign accounts, notable in Swiss banks vary from US$100 to US$200 billions. See "$ 200 Billion in Swiss Banks Can't Be Brought Back: FBR," *Nations*, June 11, 2015. This is also true of real estate investments in Dubai. Imran Khan, leader of PTI claims that the Pakistanis have assets worth $ 9 billion. See Aamir Shafqat Khan, "Pakistanis Invest $2.18 Billions in Dubai Properties," *Dawn*, February 26, 2016.

57. "12, 456 Killed in Five Years in Terror Attacks in KPK and FATA," *Nation*, March 18, 2013.

58. Huma Yusuf, *Conflict Dynamics in Karachi* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW82-Conflict%20Dynamics%20in%20Karachi.pdf.

59. Sarah Eleazar, "The Day Horror Invaded the Park," *New York Times*, March 30, 2016.

Chapter Six

The Politics of Islamic Revival

Does radical Islam pose a challenge to the liberal conception of a civic state in Pakistan, or does it pose no challenge at all, as some apologists of political Islamism argue? What is the true nature of the Islamist threat; is it rooted in the political use of Islam? How important was the alliance between the Zia regime and religious groups in pulling Islamists from the fringes of society to the center of politics, and in determining foreign and security policy choices in the 1980s? These are some of the questions that we will address in this chapter.

The issue of religion and politics in post-colonial Muslim states does not lend itself to an easy explanation. Rather, it generates intellectual controversies, causes polarization, and even political conflict between the secular modernists and the Islamists.[1]

The history of Western political ideas, political evolution, and the experience of Western democracies that were gradually built on secular foundations do not help much in understanding Muslim polities where Islam has played a fundamental role. The big question is: can Muslim states, or states with vastly different histories and cultures, build constitutional democratic orders in approximation to a universal ideal of a modern state? This is a question that post-colonial theorists and observers of post-colonial states raise as well when studying attempts to reconcile colonial modernity with stubborn social structures and ground realities in former colonial states.[2]

While tradition, religion, and modernity may continue to flow according to their historical paths there are many meeting points. There are examples of states with non-western traditions that are modernizing and democratizing while also retaining religious and cultural identities. Muslim states cannot be outliers, as both orientalists as well as Islamists scholars have presented them, though for contradictory reasons. The orientalist analysis of democracy

deficit in Muslim countries, including Pakistan, takes a cultural argument: Islamic beliefs shape political attitudes that are essentially authoritarian. [3]

On the other hand, Islamists are hung up on an Islamic system, instead of democracy, which in their view does not separate religion from politics or other aspects of life. How can democratic ideals be accommodated with Islamic traditions is a continuing intellectual engagement within the Islamist circles. [4] They argue that Islam is a complete order, encompassing all aspects of life, including the polity, the state, and state-society relations. [5] They present Islam as a polar opposite to the Western order of societies and wish to reconstruct societies and states using Islamic beliefs, principles, institutions, and some historical precedents. The heritage of Islamic law and its role in Muslim societies is of fundamental importance to the Islamists, as they strive to renegotiate a new contract between state and society by any means available and necessary in the political environment they operate in. This movement is partly shaped by an Islamic post-coloniality, and partly by concerns of Islamic identity—a quest for spiritual renewal in a confused, chaotic modern world that has a heavy imprint of the 'imperial' and materialistic West. When trying to explain their society's relationship with the West, they do so in terms of hegemony, exploitation, and dominance. On this prognosis, they construct their own mythology of 'freedom' and 'recovery' by making references to the mythical, glorious, and romanticized era of Muslim power and dominance. Islamism in this respect is instrumental to the Islamist political dream of constructing the future in the light of the spirit of the past in the conditions of the modern world. [6]

Why religion is such a social and political signifier in the contemporary Muslim majority states is a question that is at the center of many intellectual and political discourses within the Islamic countries as well as in the West. [7] This question does not only stem from the general skepticism about Islam's accommodation with modern law, politics, and institutions. One must examine Islam as an ideological question in the context of intellectual debates and controversies about how to shape post-colonial societies.

Political Islam in its self-definition or in its relationship with state and society has not been static in the changing political environment of Pakistan. Rather, it has shifted noticeably in selecting issues, making alliances, and reformulating political strategy. In order to understand the development of political Islam in Pakistan and its role today, it would be useful to examine the three stages or waves through which the movement has passed. Much of these shifts have occurred on account of domestic political developments, the regional security environment, and global power relationships, as they played out in the four cycles of war in neighboring Afghanistan.

THE FIRST WAVE

In an age of competing ideologies from the 1920s on, according to which, states were being defined and restructured, Muslim scholars and politicians could not remain uninfluenced by the intellectual temperament of the time. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in the early twentieth century, and then Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy challenged the ideological hegemony of capitalism and democracy. In the interwar years, nationalism in many forms and with different socio-cultural roots, but with a common objective of liberation from Western imperial rule, emerged as the most popular political ideology in the colonized world. However, nationalism in Muslim regions, struggling to establish new states in the Middle East and South Asia, had different dynamics, social structures, and vision for the future. The evolution of Muslim nationalism in the Indian Subcontinent acquired a territorial character after other alternatives failed.[8] The struggle for empowerment and acquiring political power and sovereignty in the image of the European state system was a popular theme among mainstream Muslim nationalists, but not so among a good number of Muslim scholars of the Subcontinent.[9] Some Muslim scholars were not comfortable with the idea of a territorial secular state even in Muslim majority areas.[10] Throughout the Muslim world, parallel to modernist discourses on constructing territorial national states, there was and still is presentation of Islam as an alternative to Western political liberalism and democracy.

Muslim scholars' quest for an ideology that stemmed from religious traditions was natural, as all political groups were groping for suitable ideas and philosophies with which to rebuild Muslims societies once they won freedom. The intellectual and political roots of this pursuit go back to early twentieth century debates about defining the identity of Muslims states and the role Islam will play in them.[11]

In the global context of competing ideologies cultural identities largely determine the self-definition of the Muslim community. The Islamist intellectuals have turned to Islamic history, culture, traditions, and civilizational identity to seek authenticity for Islam as an ideology.[12] Obviously, the counter-quest for an Islamic state, as opposed to a Western secular model of nation states that most dominant elite groups in Muslim states are in the process of building, has shaped two rival political traditions. The second political tradition has a more integrationist and modernist approach with shades of progressive liberalism. While keeping Islamic identity markers in place, it purses modernity through social reconstruction and economic change. The modernist stream among traditional Muslims elites and state systems runs on the notion of compatibility between modern politics, economy and society, and Muslim cultural values and civilizational identity.[13]

Balancing modernity and cultural values rooted in religion is not an easy task in the social and political context of most Muslim societies, notably Pakistan because the two rival traditions an ideal of Islamic state and liberal modernity run parallel to each other. Pakistan continues to confront ideological rifts, political controversies and bitter, often violent, political struggles over the soul of the state. These struggles have varied in intensity, some have been stronger than others and some have taken on a more violent character, but have been an important part of the political history of Pakistan.

The struggle over the destiny of Pakistan will be one of the central themes of politics in the present and coming decades. Pakistani society is caught between two opposite forces- traditional Islam and modernity. We see mixed trends of growing cultural homogenization that consumerism, global finance and capital, and the general process of globalization seems to have introduced.[14] The globalization of cultures, essentially of political values, such as individualism, freedom and civil rights, has both integrationist and confrontationist potential. Its integrationist elements may draw urban, educated, and socially mobile sectors of population closer to the Western world through interdependence, mutual benefit, and common aspirations.

There can be, and are, counter-effects of emerging globalization or the global march of modernity, as it generates the fear of losing cultural identity and religious values through the promotion of materialism, Western values, and institutions. Therefore, both pride in Islamic civilization as well as the fear of it being swept away by the tides of globalization, may continue to shape the politics of cultural and ideological resistance against secular modernity. This resistance has some traction with the conservative urban middle classes of Pakistan, the religious right, and the religious political parties that pursue the ideal of an Islamic state.

The developmental model of the state and nation in Pakistan has not succeeded in settling the troubled relationship between Islam and politics. Far from that goal, the multiple failures of post-colonial elites in Pakistan have increasingly pushed the marginalized sections of society toward the radical version of political Islam. Therefore, the first wave of Islamism, seeking ideological identity as the highest purpose of the Muslim state, has not died out as modernization theorists expected, but remains one of the strongest political impulses among disenfranchised populations ruled by rapacious elites.[15]

Pakistan's political heritage and experience with accommodating Islam is very different from other Muslim countries. Its constitutionalist inheritance allowed the first wave of political Islam and the religious parties espousing it the same space as it did to ethnic, regional, and other brands of ideological parties. It is not just the constitutional framework of the country that brings the religious political parties as political equals into the political process alone. It is also their political claim on shaping the identity, vision, and

direction of the country that has placed them in the same political basket as regular political parties. In our view, religious parties cannot and should not be cast out of modern politics. Pakistani elites have avoided the mistakes many Middle Eastern countries made in banning and suppressing them. The pluralistic streak in the Pakistani culture and its constitutionalist political vision recognize religious parties' legal and constitutional right to operate and compete for social and political power and influence in society within the limits of law. Only a totalitarian or fascistic state would deny them participation. The regimes in the Middle East and North Africa that have suppressed the religious parties have neither earned peace nor legitimacy. Rather, their oppression and violent exclusion has produced an equally violent backlash.[16]

Some may rightly argue that Islam is part of the national narrative of Pakistan, and was perhaps a vital genetic element of its creation, intricately woven into its culture and society. Islam was an identity marker in shaping the political character of the Muslim community in undivided India and became the basis of the two-nation theory—a controversial ground on which the idea of Pakistan unfolded. This theory served an important political purpose of ethnic differentiation on the basis of religion, and as an instrument of Muslim political consciousness and mobilization. Beyond this, it had no other purpose and has not played any role in the contemporary politics of the country. Religious political groups that were either silent or were opposed to the idea of Pakistan began to interpret the state's creation in Islamic ideological terms, arguing that Pakistan was an ideological state with the purpose of establishing Islamic law.[17] They argue that other states have an ideological template and political history, which becomes the basis for their constitutions. Thus, in the religious parties' perspective Islam is the sole reason for Pakistan's creation and existence.[18] While this is a minority political view, it is more coherent and potentially more attractive to a limited section of society than the alternative liberal modernist vision that shaped the idea of Pakistan and its realization.

The first wave of Islamism in Pakistan was close to similar movements in the Middle East and other Muslim lands that were searching for a political identity. It was greatly influenced by the political thought, organizational style, and ideological template of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[19] It professed a sort of Islamic modernism, as it used the concepts of state, nation, political order, party, ideology, elections, and political legitimacy. The Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islamist party founded by Maulana Abul A'la Mawdudi, is the closest Pakistani equivalent of the Brotherhood and seems to have been greatly influenced by the Egyptian movement.[20] Mawdudi, a nontraditional Islamic scholar, propounded the theory of an Islamic state; analyzing in detail its inner soul, purpose of existence, and necessity in the modern world.[21] Interestingly, he used the concepts, idiom and vocabulary of modern

politics—nation, state, sovereignty, laws, elections, political parties and ac-
countability. No other comparable non-traditional scholar has left such a
deep influence on the thought and practice of political Islam in Pakistan as
Mawdudi has through his monumental works.[22]

In the political and historical context of Pakistan, three features of the first
wave of Islamism stand out prominently. First, Islam is not like other relig-
ions, as it does not express separation of religion from politics. In other
words, Islam is the fountainhead of all politics, political institutions, and the
identity of the state. In this respect, Mawdudi assigns a central role to Islam
in designing and running modern statecraft where Muslims happen to be in
majority.[23] He belongs to the category of post-colonial Muslim scholars that
have been occupied with the notion of the Islamic state as a distinctive
political category in its philosophy and ideology albeit not in the structure
and institutions. He considers Islam as the first political principle of the state
and the foundation of the constitution and law.[24] Mawdudi, like other Islamic
scholars of his category, conjectures about renegotiating the relationship of
Islam with the modern nation state with a bold and defining imprint of Islam
on the state.

While raising Islam above private matters of belief and ritual into the
realm of politics—a radical departure from medieval times—the first wave of
Islamism rejects violent, revolutionary means. Its second characteristic, the
representational route, draws it closer to mainstream electoral politics. In this
sense, the first wave and the Jamaat are institutionalist. While Islamization
has remained a distinctive political and ideological plank, the methodology
of how to achieve it has changed with reference to domestic, regional, and
international politics and power relations. Its public face even today rests on
seeking representation by increasing popular social base, and when necessary
enter into electoral alliances with major parties. Parties such as the Jamaat
and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam have functioned within the democratic
framework of the country, and have used accepted norms for their growth,
empowerment, and access to political space. While unable to win majorities,
except in the provincial elections of 2002 in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (then the
North-West Frontier Province) and forming governments in two strategic
provinces, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, they have kept pressuriz-
ing the successive governments to promulgate Islamic laws, bring existing
laws in conformity with Islam, and pursue a foreign policy in support of
Islamic causes worldwide. In articulating such demands, religious parties
essentially play the role of a pressure group by mobilizing their cadres in the
urban streets, a political tool they have used effectively to paralyze govern-
ments on some occasions.

A third feature of political Islam is its focus on the decolonization of the
Muslim mind, which some secular nationalist movements have also at-
tempted by using indigenous culture, traditions and nationalistic historical

narratives. Political Islam uses Islamic symbols, themes, and constructs in contrast to the secular idiom of post-coloniality. It continues to cast the West as a binary opposite to the Muslim world, and makes its followers and general public believe that the Western powers, particularly the United States, work against the interests of the Muslim states.[25] In its view, the Western political order for all intents and purposes is alien, incompatible with Islam, hegemonic, and a threat to the cultural identity of Islam and Muslim communities.[26] Skewed as it is, this view shapes the attitude of political Islam toward the national political elites that it is quick to label as surrogates that are serving the objectives of foreign, former colonial masters more than the national interests.[27]

The Islamists present Islam as an absolute alternative to all Western political institutions, systems of thought, and social values to de-colonize Muslim thought and institutions. While they do not reject modernity entirely, particularly its scientific and technological progress, they reject facets of its social and political ideologies that drive the individual toward secularism and Western culture, lifestyle, and social attitudes. The big challenge for all traditional societies, Islamic or otherwise, is embracing science and technology, and some form of liberal democracy with the strong belief in individual freedoms and rights, while at the same time, retaining religion, social institutions, and national cultures. Balancing the two impulses has been and will remain problematic. In an age of scientific revolutions and globalization, it is hard to imagine if any society would achieve a satisfactory or enduring balance between the two worlds.

Islamists have created an intellectual and political community in Pakistan that strives to protect and spread Islamic values and counter westernization through propaganda literature, that mocks Western societies, and by building multiple community networks. They present themselves and their ideas as cultural and social resistance to the westernization of the society but not to the modern science, education, or even the democratic political process.

The social roots of the first wave of Islamism lie in modern social and political institutions, universities, political parties, the media, and interest groups. In its social origin, the first wave of Islamism is itself the product of modernity. Interestingly, the very colonial modernity that it wants to evict from the social and cultural consciousness has produced the intellectual class of the Islamists. The parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami continue to recruit their young cadre from the modern educational institutions, unlike the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, which has its roots in the madrassa networks.[28] The professional middle classes, retailers in the bazaars, and political activists have tended to embrace the Islamic ideology in the free environment of the modern university. Educational institutions with strongholds of Islamist teachers, small in number but more active than others, continue to influence young students that mainly come from rural backgrounds. When these stu-

dents graduate and join professions, a good number of them maintain their ideological affinity with political Islam as doctors, engineers, lawyers, or businesspersons.

The first wave of political Islam however, was not able to make any impact beyond the educated middle and professional classes. Nor was the political strategy of recruitment by the Jamaat-e-Islami, the flag bearer of political Islam in Pakistan, based on a mass politics model.[29] Rather, this party stole a page from totalitarian, fascist, and communist parties on how to indoctrinate, socialize, and train a dedicated cadre for political work.[30] Agreement with the religious thought and political mission of creating an Islamic state are pre-requisites to enter the ranks of the Jamaat-e-Islami. This policy of political recruitment has kept Jamaat-e-Islami limited in its social base.

The Jamaat-e-Islami's other rivals from within the religious sphere, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan have shallow popular support and different political alignments but act in concert against any law that they deem as un-Islamic. In 2016, they put their differences aside and joined in several conferences to denounce the Protection of Women against Violence Bill passed by the Punjab Assembly.[31] Their electoral performance has remained poor, as several elections under various regimes show, including, most remarkably, the 1970 general election, which is considered the first ever, free electoral exercise in Pakistan.[32]

Many factors—cultural, social, and political—have frustrated the attempts of religious parties and their plank of an Islamic state through democratic means. Pakistan, by any objective standard, is a Muslim society in its cultural core. Islam is practiced as a cultural trait, as a habit without any constraints on the preaching or establishing religious institutions. Pakistanis practicing religion, day and night, have not bought into the narrative of "Islam is in danger," and that only the Jamaat-e-Islami and a few other religious parties can save Islam from internal and external threats. Rather, compared to mainstream political parties that have been selectively targeted by military regimes, religious parties have had open and unconstrained political space. Their mixing of religion and politics has offered them forums to continue politicking as usual even when normal political activities were banned or were under severe scrutiny.

Let us examine the other social factors that have constrained and may continue to constrain the popular reach of the religious parties. The basic, but unacknowledged, cultural truth of Pakistan is that the overwhelming majority of the population across regions, ethnic groups, and religious denominations is moderate in religious outlook. The essential characteristic of Islam in Pakistan is pluralistic; it is diverse and tolerant of other sects. All communities have historically lived as integrated social units, sharing the same geographical spaces and joining one another in grief and joy. They have

demonstrated solidarity and harmony over the centuries, an aspect generally not recognized by national commentators and the outside world. However, there are some good reasons why this view in not reflected adequately.

Unfortunately, the moderate pluralistic face of Pakistani society has been buried under the rising weight of radical Islamism and extremism that attracts greater coverage and political attention because of its effects on regional and global security. The practicing but moderate Muslims in Pakistan are not motivated by the manifesto of political Islam. The dominant view is closer to that of the Medieval Muslim consensus of two spheres—the religious and the political. A common Pakistani believes that the cleric belongs to the mosque and the madrassa, not to politics, and involvement in politics often invokes negative connotations. [33]

There is another factor rooted in the social structures of Pakistan. The social base of traditional political leaders that have dominated party politics as well as the electoral arena in Pakistan is generally rural, where caste, tribal affiliations, and social networks among the landowning class play a fundamental role in the outcomes of elections. Local clan and caste considerations along with patron-client relationships influence the Pakistani voter instead of the party manifestos, ideologies, or national issues. [34] Religious parties have so far failed to break the electoral monopoly of the landowning class, with very few exceptions in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Feudal social relations and culture in a way has proved to be a barrier against the religious parties to strike strong roots. The same is also true of mainstream parties that also reach out to the common man through influential figures in respective electoral constituencies—that form the electable class.

Compared to mainstream political parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami in particular is better organized and functions as a modern political organization with regular elections for the top leadership, which has changed several times since the demise its founders in 1979. All religious parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami more than others, have a solid base of highly indoctrinated and dedicated workers, but with a narrow social base, they cannot compete with the social and political resources of the dominant feudal families. Moreover, Pakistan's educated, urban, middle classes and the urban poor are not attracted by political Islam in numbers that would give the religious parties electoral sweeps.

THE SECOND WAVE OF ISLAMISM

With all these social and cultural factors going against them, how have religious parties gained greater power and political influence in contemporary Pakistan than they had until the 1970s? This can be attributed to the state patronage they received through an alliance with the military regime of Gen-

eral Zia ul Haq (1977–1988). Failing to sink in with popular roots, radical religious parties and groups took the short route to power—the patronage of a military dictator. But why did the state, with one of the largest, well-equipped, and professional armies of the world, draw in religious groups into its domestic as well as strategic framework? The short answer is that it was a combination of domestic, regional, and international developments coinciding with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 that shaped a new strategic partnership between the military regime and the religious groups.

Before we explain some of these developments, we need to emphasize that national security was the primary impulse in driving the military toward religious groups. It is interesting how some of the religious parties that opposed the creation of a territorial state transformed themselves into its defenders, espousing chauvinistic Pakistani nationalism. It was not for the first time in Pakistan's history that the rulers of the country had drafted the religious figures and groups into their service. It had started in the final phase of struggle for Pakistan, in the 1946 elections, when the Muslim League obtained the support of clerics and custodians of the holy shrines to support its candidates in the Punjab and other provinces. The military had tried religious groups as strategic partners during the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971, when the military regime of General Yahya Khan (1969–1971) launched an operation against activists of the Awami League, which had won the 1970 general elections. The Jamaat-e-Islami mobilized its cadre and constituency to assist the army in countering the secessionism of the Awami League.[35] The Jamaat-e-Islami leaders involved in support of the Pakistan Army have been tried and convicted of treason by the Bangladesh government decades later, which is itself controversial because of the time lag.[36]

A decade later, in the 1980s, the political and strategic dynamics around Pakistan were very different. A third military regime had toppled the elected government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by July 1977. The Zia regime was politically isolated, insecure, and feared a definite return of Bhutto's party into power if it conducted free and fair elections within ninety days, as promised by Zia when he took over. Zia's survival instinct forced him to play Machiavellian politics. While oppressing the country's largest party, the Pakistan People's Party, which Bhutto had founded and led, Zia courted the religious parties turning them into ideological allies for a common goal—Islamization. From the outset, the military ruler vowed that his major objectives were restoring stability, reviving the economy, and enforcing Islamic laws.[37]

There is some background to how Zia cultivated a religious constituency in the country to gain political acceptance. Religious parties were an important component of the alliance of the nine parties that had contested elections under the umbrella of the Pakistan National Alliance against the Pakistan Peoples Party in the controversial general elections of 1977. These parties challenged the fairness of the elections, accusing Bhutto of massive rigging,

and launched a mass movement for an electoral rerun. One of the objectives of the religious groups in the agitation against Bhutto in the summer of 1977 was enforcement of an Islamic system in the country. Zia, very skillfully, appropriated the Islamic manifesto and sentiment that had been cultivated through the agitation. An Islamization program offered a perfect political match between Zia's political needs and the demands of the religious parties for turning a moderate Pakistan into an Islamic state. Lacking political legitimacy, Zia badly needed the religious groups' support to counter the popularity of the Pakistan Peoples Party. The religious parties, with a weak electoral base, wanted Zia to do their bidding, that is enforcement of Islamic laws. While Zia enacted Islamic laws, he did so in a measured fashion, and his program fell far short of the Islamic agenda of the religious parties. This signified the beginning of a new alliance between the military and religious parties, which eventually shaped the character of the second wave of Islamism.

The second wave of political Islam in Pakistan was different from the first wave in many important ways. First, it was designed, directed, and enforced from the top on the ruse that Pakistan was an Islamic society and the country was created in the name of Islam, and that it was a reflection of popular sentiments. The military-dominated state became the agency of Islamization. It is important to note the contrast in character, ideological orientation, and social philosophies of the first military ruler General Ayub Khan and General Zia. The former was a secularist with a development approach for enhancing the power of the country through modernization, while the second wanted to change its character to an Islamic state. Second, the content of Islamization and its theological orientation were controversial and in the second wave it was driven by the Deobandi-Wahhabi theological line. The process itself and the heavy imprint of Deobandi and Hanafi views gave it a sectarian character provoking resistance from Shia Muslims. Consequently, the Deobandi factions that form the religious base of the Taliban and their suicide terrorism and insurgency today, became highly empowered and increasingly intolerant toward the other Muslim sects and religious minorities.

There are some other factors in the making of the second wave and its political essence that we need to discuss closely. Two regional events have had lasting effects on the religious, political, and security scene, and have also significantly contributed to the alliance between religious groups and the state in Pakistan. First, it was the Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979 that overthrew the Shah, an American ally and close friend of Pakistan on whom the country had relied on in difficult times. Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary regime was not content with political change in Iran alone; it wanted neighboring Muslim countries to follow its path.[38] In the initial stage of revolutionary fervor, it instigated uprisings against pro-American regimes in the region. Pakistan also fell in the category of pro-Western countries and

faced covert Iranian intervention through the mobilization and support of like-minded Shia sectarian groups.

Apart from sharpening the sectarian divide leading to setting up of rival militant factions, the Iranian revolution brought the Islamic clergy into power for the first time in modern Muslim history. Its demonstrative effect was that it rekindled the hopes of Pakistan's Sunni clergy as well to take control of the politics of Pakistan. The revolution, in more ways than one, ignited the fires of radical Islam in Pakistan that took many forms. The radicals asked that if Iran could be a Shia state, why could there not be a similarly fashioned Sunni Islamic state in Pakistan. It was such radicals that set up the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (Pakistan's army of the companions of the Prophet).[39] The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and its offshoots, such as Lashkar-e-Jangvi have continued to spread sectarian hatred and engaged in target killings for the past three and half decades. Although they are officially banned and have been the target of the security forces, they have retained their latent capacity to harm the society.

There was, and still is, a regional dimension to sectarian extremism and conflict in Pakistan.[40] The specter of rising Iranian influence in Pakistan was accompanied by covert support for anti-Iran Islamic radicals by monarchical Arab regimes, which had been Pakistan's traditional partner. Pakistan became a new battleground for the old historical sectarian conflict and Middle Eastern power games. All players in this deadly and violent game in Pakistan are motivated by power and influence, but it has had unintended effects of spreading Islamic radicalism and empowering religious groups of all denominations in Pakistan itself.

The Islamic revolution of Iran and its political and religious effects greatly changed the idiom of politics from liberalism and modernization to religious authenticity and the establishment of a true Islamic state in Pakistan. Zia's military regime was encouraged by the growing religious sentiment in the country and within the region to further legitimize its Islamization process. Besides, religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, and conservative sections of the society, the rural as well as urban middle classes lent support to Zia and his religious program. Many leaders before him had employed religion as a political tool to gather support, but he was the first to use it as effectively and systematically. It helped him cultivate a strong and lasting support base among conservative sections of the society for whom democracy was not as important a consideration as the implementation of Islamic laws. Zia cultivated his personal image as a pious, just, fearless, and nationalist leader that appealed to an atavistic population longing for such a sultan.

While the revolution in Iran stoked the fires of Islam and Islamic differences among Muslim communities and states, the Soviet march into Afghanistan to defend a client communist regime in Kabul provoked insecurity in Pakistan. The Shia Islamic revolution and communist takeover next door

magnified the national security threat perceptions of Pakistan and added a new and dangerous dimension to its regional environment. Being in a state of strategic rivalry with India to the east, Pakistan faced a strategic nutcracker when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in 1980. Iran's Islamic regime was not a direct security threat, but its radicalism, anti-Western policies, and Islamist rhetoric encouraged Islamists of all types in Pakistan to fantasize about their own revolutions, further squeezing the space for the liberal sections of the society.

An Islamic revolution on the pattern of Iran was not a practical option in Pakistan, as the Pakistani clergy and Islamist parties lacked the structural cohesion and theological unity of Shia Islam, therefore they chose to get maximum political mileage out of Zia. Furthermore, neither was the Pakistani state as weak as Iran's had been to collapse under Islamist agitation and nor did the religious parties perceive any need for such a confrontational strategy on their part, when they had a military ruler on their side. The collaboration between Zia and the religious parties was more than a marriage of convenience; it was the convergence of their religious and strategic outlook that went far beyond their immediate political needs. It was an ideological union shaped both by fears of India and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, as much as by the aspirations and ideals of Islamizing Pakistan. This union, for the first time ever, began to redefine Pakistan's identity as truly Islamic in a structural sense and it went far beyond the nominal and symbolic uses of religion in politics- setting the stage for an internal duel that continues to threaten and destabilize Pakistan even today.

The Military-Islamist partnership directed its energies and political resources toward liberating Afghanistan through a transnational Islamist struggle that was shaped by the ethos of jihad. The transnational element is a very important feature of the second wave of Islamism in Pakistan, and remains a key aspect of the regional security complex more than three decades later. It involved a strange mix of Islamist actors imbued with the spirit of jihad from near and abroad. Interestingly, it was greatly aided by the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States.

All the actors—Islamic, secular, state and non-state, regional, and international—entered the Afghan war zone with different motives, conflicting interests and varying visions, but with a singly unifying objective: to ensure the defeat of the Soviet Union and the communist regime in Afghanistan. For Washington, it was straightforward Cold War strategic gaming, and it set its aim to 'bleed' the Soviet Union, not bothering much about who came to fight in Afghanistan, from where, and with what post-conflict strategic objectives. It was after almost a decade of conflict in Afghanistan when the United States realized it was sleeping with dangerous bedfellows, with whom its interests and objectives of a peaceful Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East differed greatly. From the outset, the United States and the transnational

jihadists had different dreams and ideals. It was the joint struggle and gigantic task of rolling back the Soviet aggression that clouded the American view of its jihadist partners.

The central motivation of Islamist fighters that congregated in Pakistan to fight their ideological war against the 'godless' Soviets was liberation of Afghanistan as well as the establishment of an Islamic state. They were influenced by bitter memories of the oppression of Muslim populations of the Caucasus and Central Asia, who were first humiliated first by Russian imperialism and then by the Soviet Union. It was an opportunity for many of these Islamic fighters to pay back the Russians for what they had done to their people and civilization. That generated a deep animosity toward the Soviet leaders. More than avenging history, it was a sense of Islamic duty to fight for a Muslim country and free its peoples from communism and the Afghan communist puppet leaders. It may be too simplistic an explanation of such a complex affair as the Afghan resistance; it was however, a transnational view of the global Muslim community and a consequent sense of duty toward those who had fallen under foreign oppression, that was central to the sentiment of jihad in Afghanistan.

Political Islam forms the ideological roots for the transnational jihadist spirit that was shaped by a polarized civilizational worldview among Muslim youth of post-colonial Muslims states. For decades, resistance to Western culture and political domination had been in the making, though only among the more dedicated and politically organized sections of the Islamists. Soviet aggression provided impetus to a slow-moving creed of cultural resistance to become an armed resistance, engendering a jihadist spirit at a much wider social level.

The perception of a collective security threat from the Soviet Union in the wake of the anxieties generated by the Iranian revolution among pro-Western Arab states turned them into allies of the Islamic resistance in Afghanistan. Not only did they provide billions of dollars in material assistance, they also gave Islamists unhindered access to their populations to recruit fighters for the Afghan jihad. The Soviet threat had to be first countered at its weakest point at the outer regional frontier, that is Afghanistan. In the context of regional and global strategic calculations, Pakistan acquired the pivotal status of a frontline state. In this capacity, it masterminded, directed, and controlled the mujahedeen. Pakistan had the confidence of the Afghan resistance groups, most Islamic countries, notably the Arab monarchies, and the West at large, notably the United States.

The Afghan resistance became a meeting point for non-state Islamist actors for becoming a transnational network whose second and third generation of jihadists now threatens each of the states that had courted them during the Afghan war. The war in Afghanistan gave them experience in all areas of strategic planning for resistance against their own national states as well as

against their old imperial nemesis, the West symbolized by American power and influence in the Middle East.

The second wave of Islamism in Pakistan and the region did not just benefit from practical guerrilla warfare, but more important, it acquired a sense of triumphalism, unparalleled in modern Islamist struggles. The political battle they could not win on their home turfs, they were able to win in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan, and not just against an ordinary power but a mighty superpower with a reputation for ruthlessness. The mythology of victory in Afghanistan has survived and continues to be the defining narrative of the jihadists within and around Pakistan.

DANGEROUS ALLIANCE

The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1994 and their ride to power in Kabul by the fall of 1996 was one of the consequences of Afghanistan's political fragmentation and subsequent civil war among the warlords, ethnic groups, and mujahedeen factions. Having lost the state and with its sovereignty fractured, Afghanistan became the battleground of yet another war - - in-fighting between the numerous Afghan groups and their foreign backers. Once again, Afghanistan was left to find its own balance and stability with the regional powers vying to exploit its power vacuum. Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, and some Central Asian states competed with one another in lending material assistance to the Afghan players to settle the power game by force. What is intriguing in the case of Pakistan is why and how the Pakistani state shifted its focus from mujahedeen parties such as the Hizb-e-Islami, its old time favorite, to the new Taliban? It was a pragmatic shift in light of the destructive war among the mujahedeen factions that was yielding no winners and plunging Afghanistan into chaos and fragmentation. The Taliban had a whirling and rapid rise in which they acquired an image of a highly motivated religious-oriented militia that could deliver the political and security goods in Afghanistan, where the squabbling mujahedeen had failed.

There are many interpretations of Pakistan's role in the emergence of the Taliban movement and this space may not be enough to cover all of them. But all that has been said or written about Pakistani support to the Taliban through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have one point in common: the rationale for the support was ensuring national security through strategic depth in Afghanistan.[41] Under the competitive security environment of the region with each regional power jostling for space in a climate of uncertainty in Afghanistan, Pakistan put its bet on the Taliban horse.

This choice was dictated by political realism—the pursuit of security interests more than any ideological affinity with the Taliban. How much did Pakistan contribute to the rise and success of the militia coming out of the

Afghan and Pakistani madrassas and how much of that can be attributed to the Taliban's own domestic power base in Afghanistan's Pashtuns regions, is open to question.[42] In our judgment, Pakistan played a key role from the beginning to the end. In some critical areas, Pakistan extended invaluable assistance: access to food and medical supplies, provision of fuel that the Taliban badly needed to run and move their war machine, recruitment and fundraising through private sources, and finally a diplomatic link to the out-side world by recognizing their regime as the legitimate power in Kabul.[43] Pakistan also persuaded its two Arab allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to extend recognition to the Taliban regime in Kabul. It is also believed that Pakistan offered the Taliban intelligence support and strategic advice in key battles, and helped negotiate political deals with local commanders and war-lords who opposed them.

The Afghan Taliban like the mujahedeen had a strong, natural base among the Deobandi religious networks and the Pashtun ethnic groups of Pakistan, a base that has served the purpose of a sanctuary as well as a frontline to stage counter offensives against Afghan and international secur-ity forces when they were active in the war (2002–2014). The Taliban had, and continue to have, a counter strategic depth. Another, perhaps deadlier component of the Taliban movement, were transnational fighters from Arab and Central Asian countries, many of them having lived in the trans-Afghani-stan-Pakistan region for decades. Above all, the shifting of the Al Qaeda network with its top leadership active around the region greatly changed the power equation in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the Northern Front in 1998.

Around that time, Pakistan did not sense any danger to its future security from transnational jihadists and from Pakistani sectarian elements extending support to them through funds, weapons, and thousands of volunteers. Pressed by the dynamics of regional rivalry and the elusive quest for influ-ence in Afghanistan, the Pakistani security establishment that has always exercised dominant influence in framing the Afghan policy, became fixated on blocking Iranian and Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan never gave any serious thought to the blowback from supporting Islamic radicalism next door and its influence on Pakistani politics, society, and security. There was an obvious connection between the Afghan and Pakistani jihadists that had been allies since the beginning of the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union. As we have mentioned already, political Islam was an ally of the Pakistani state in the second wave. The Pakistani policy makers viewed the Taliban movement through the same security and foreign policy lenses.

It was never calculated how the Islamists of Pakistan, ideologically in-spired and connected with the Afghan Taliban, would one day butcher thou-sands of Pakistan's security forces and innocent civilians, attack Pakistan's symbols of power, religion, and culture, and attempt to sink the country's

economy. [44] Pakistan also ignored clear warning signs about the entry of Al Qaeda into Afghanistan and Al Qaeda's links with Pakistani sympathizers from within the ranks of Islamists and jihadist factions. Maybe it was lack of proper analysis of the transnational jihadist vision of Al Qaeda or the security establishment of Pakistan took Al Qaeda as a benign resourceful element with a collateral stake in the Taliban project. With the benefit of hindsight, whether it was neglect or policy, it was disastrous for Pakistan. Letting the international jihadists grow, dig deep, and roam around freely in the regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan has proven to be very costly for every one that has encountered them—from the US-led security forces to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

For one thing, Al Qaeda leaders and their war machine were not new to the political and security environment of Afghanistan or the border tribes and regions of Pakistan. For a decade, they had mobilized, organized, and trained fighters from Arab countries to free Afghanistan from Soviet occupation, and in that sense Osama bin Laden and his jihadist colleagues were former partners of Pakistan and its Western allies. By bringing in thousands of Arab fighters and tons of relief goods and money for refugees, the Arab jihadists had earned a good reputation and respect among the Afghans refugees, the fighters, and their Pakistani partners. Where would the Arab and other fighters go, what would be their next project, would they assimilate back in the normal stream of their native populations or march on to some other fronts were questions that Pakistan and its allies ignored in their analysis as getting the Soviets out was the first and immediate priority.

As it appears now, Afghanistan was not the termination point of jihad, as far as Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were concerned. Having mobilized tens of thousands of jihadist volunteers and commanding them in the field against a superpower was no an ordinary experience. For the private Arab groups, forcing humiliation on Russia was their first victory against the West. The Islamist sections of the Muslim world continue to have a lingering, deep, and agonizing narrative of the fall of the Islamic powers and colonization. Afghanistan, for them, was a turning point. After tasting victory in Afghanistan, Arab veterans of the Afghan war went on to plan more ambitious projects. Their expansive agenda included higher goals from confronting and changing domestic regimes to countering American power and influence in the region. [45]

A legitimate question to ask is what was Afghanistan's relevance to the pursuit of these grandiose objectives? It was the idea of availability of free space that these militant groups could control. Under the mujahedeen, and later with the rise of the Taliban, a stateless Afghanistan offered that free space, and there were many such spaces that became sanctuaries for Al Qaeda leaders, providing them a place to hide, plan, and launch attacks against targets in the Middle East and beyond. One of the less explored issues

is how Al Qaeda operated inside Afghanistan and to what extent did it act as a state within the Taliban-dominated state.

There is an erroneous impression about the Taliban sharing interests and a worldview with Al Qaeda. In fact, the relationship between the two was born out of necessity and the long involvement of Arab jihadists in Afghanistan. A less explored and rarely examined fact is that the Taliban were a product of the domestic political struggles, Pashtun ethnicity, Afghan nationalism, and Islam as understood and practiced by the Pashtuns. Contrarily, Al Qaeda had a global mission of liberating Islamic lands from both pro-West regimes and direct American domination. There is hardly any evidence to support the conception that Taliban leaders shared Al Qaeda's goal of pursuing global jihad. Rather, the agenda and strategy of Al Qaeda greatly conflicted with the political interests of the Taliban, whose objectives were limited to consolidating their rule in Afghanistan. Even the Taliban's understanding of Islam cannot be equated with the modernist political Islam of the Middle East or that of Pakistan. The Taliban's Islamist quest was thus, within the social boundaries of the Afghan tradition, customs, and tribal institutions. The same is also true to some extent of the Pakistani Taliban—the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan—who are waging jihad against the Pakistani state and society.

Let us not forget that the Taliban movements on either side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the Al Qaeda have common roots in the Afghan war of resistance. Therefore, the question of the Taliban's collaboration with Al Qaeda needs to be contextualized in the Afghan war more than in any ideological commitments of the Taliban beyond Afghanistan's borders. The country was stateless, ungoverned, and the local warlords controlled territorial fragments that offered protection and hospitality to such elements for money, weapons, and fighters that they required to outbalance their local and far-end rivals. Al Qaeda was more resourceful than other non-state actors, and it was more connected with local Afghan warlords since the Soviet war. More than its global jihadist mission, it was money and social work in the absence of the state that attracted some of the Afghans, including a faction of the Taliban leaders, toward Al Qaeda. There is hardly any evidence to suggest if all Taliban leaders wholly embraced Al Qaeda as an ideological ally or as a partner beyond the Afghan theater.

This opinion is open to some serious questioning though. Why did the Taliban leaders not act when some of them rightly argued that Al Qaeda was not just seeking refuge in Afghanistan but had an aggressive agenda against foreign states, including Saudi Arabia, one of the three countries that had recognized their government?[46] Before resettling in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda functionaries attacked the American navy ship *USS Cole* in Yemen and bombed two US embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.[47] While in Afghanistan, they planned bigger adventures, for the 'liberation' of Arab lands. Why did the Taliban leaders not confront Al Qaeda in

areas they controlled in Afghanistan? There is much ambiguity about whether or not the Taliban leaders knew anything about Al Qaeda's plans to attack targets in the United States, one of which was the tragic 9/11 attacks. When the brutal attacks took place on that fatal day, why did the Taliban resist all pressure and persuasion from friends like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to hand over Al Qaeda leaders to the United States, or even to some Muslim countries for trial?

These are legitimate questions that contradict the narrative that Taliban leaders like Mullah Umar put forth, asserting that they felt helpless against Osama bin Laden. According to this view, the anti-Americanism and globalist jihadist vision of Bin Laden had greater appeal to the younger generation of Taliban than Mullah Umar's focus on Afghanistan. The global jihad appeared glamorous to some sections of the Afghan, Pakistani, and Arab fighters who imagined themselves as holy warriors on a global mission to evict the West and its influence from their lands.

Some insiders of the Taliban game think that Mullah Umar and some of his associates had objected to Al Qaeda creating an autonomous space for itself and attempting to implement its global jihadist program using Afghan soil against foreign powers and nationals. In one of the meetings with a top Pakistani interlocutor trying to persuade Mullah Umar to disassociate himself from Bin Laden, he confided that he (Bin Laden) was "struck in his throat like a bone. Neither could he swallow nor could he cough out."[48]

This hostage theory appears to be less credible in light of the fact that Mullah Umar was willing to sacrifice everything and stood firm on his refusal to hand over bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders, as he did till the last moment. The recalcitrant position they took on this issue even at the risk of losing their government and in the face of an imminent war cannot be explained merely by fear of backlash from Bin Laden loyalists within the Taliban ranks. Equally questionable are the grounds of deference to the Afghan honor code of giving protection to guests when pursued by their enemies.

Was the Taliban refusal thoughtless, irrational, and devoid of any plan? Yes, according to the common view. But we need to re-examine the 'irrationality' of the Taliban and reconsider a normal assumption of them as rational players that understood international players and their politics and power to harm. Could it be that the Taliban became convinced that even capturing Bin Laden and giving him into the custody of the West would not guarantee them security or survival, as they might have thought that Washington had made up its mind to impose a war on their government? Perhaps they concluded that the Americans would intervene in Afghanistan with or without the expulsion of Al Qaeda. Or they thought that the Americans would not intervene in such a remote country and would be deterred by the cost of waging such a war. Also, did the Taliban play Al Qaeda's strategic game in tricking the

Americans into Afghanistan? Was resistance by the Taliban planned the way it has re-emerged since 2005, or is it the failure of the post-2001 state and nation-building project that has offered them an opportunity to regroup and reorganize? There cannot be a single explanation to these questions. There are many factors, indigenous and regional, that have shaped and reshaped the militant groups fighting in Afghanistan, including the Taliban. Pashtun alienation, the American decision to invade Iraq after declaring "victory" in Afghanistan, and many political and strategic mistakes the United States made in Afghanistan have brought the Taliban back in as a major player and a grave threat to the stability of the country. [49]

Whatever the consequences for Afghanistan, Al Qaeda has succeeded in achieving one of their central objectives—creating a broad sentiment against the United States and the West, and radicalizing large sections of Muslim populations in parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and many other Muslim countries. It is this radical Islamist sentiment that has fed into the 'liberation' theology and symbolism of Taliban resistance in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It seems as if Taliban sympathizers, wearing different often soft organizational labels, in Pakistan are acting according to their own script of a "clash of civilizations." Islamists present the Afghan and Iraq wars as fresh evidence of the historical continuity of Western hegemony, power plays, and humiliation of Muslims. This sustains the narrative of injustice and victimhood. [50]

The influence this mind-set has been able to build up among critical sections of Muslim populations is generally undetermined. This narrative dominates the popular discourses in the modern media, educational institutions, seminars and conferences, and pervades the cyberspace. The closet Taliban in the Pakistani media and religious political parties, along with some political commentators, for long have created a benign myth about the Taliban as an Islamic force willing to sacrifice anything to defeat Western "imperialism" and its surrogate elites in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Taliban in Pakistan have gradually lost that image as a result of the reaction against terrorist attacks, especially suicide bombings, and the war against the Pakistani state. However, the conflict that they have generated has imposed and continues to impose, enormous human and material costs. Moreover, the ideological allies and supporters of the Taliban have not been marginalized enough, they may seem down, with the success of last decisive operation *Zarb-e-Azb* that started in early 2015, but are certainly not all-out. They continue to build religious networks and institutions to advance their mission to set up an Islamic state in Pakistan.

THE MADRASSA AND THE TALIBAN

Two other aspects of the second wave of Islamism need to be stressed here as they have fed into the third wave that Pakistan confronts today. First is the network of Islamic schools or madrassas and their degree of expansion in recent decades. There is a lot of controversy about the rate of growth of madrassas compared to the growth of mainstream schools in the country. One of the best studies on religious school enrollment conducted by Tahir Andrabi et al. suggests that the percentage of students enrolled in religious schools is "statistically insignificant for the average Pakistani household."[51] The madrassa is one of the traditional institutions of higher Islamic learning in the Muslim world that the ulema have maintained as their turf. Its curriculum covers Qur'anic interpretation, Prophetic traditions, Islamic law, and theology. Historically, the classic madrassas in the Middle East and in the Subcontinent also used to impart knowledge of human sciences, history, natural sciences, philosophy, and the arts. The Islamic scholars affiliated with such madrassas made contributions to languages and literature as well.[52] But in contemporary Pakistan, the madrassa has resisted curriculum reform and inclusion of modern sciences and subjects. One cannot deny the importance of religious scholarship and learning and its transfer to new generations through the madrassa, but madrassa's exclusive focus on traditional subjects makes its graduates unemployable in any sector of economy, except setting up a mosque and expanding it later into a new madrassa.

What worries the Pakistani state and society is the proliferation of unregistered madrassas in recent decades whose sources of funding are generally unknown.[53] They are churning out tens of thousands of graduates without the skills to survive in a modern economy, and this adds to a rising underclass of religious activists. The theological line of most Islamic schools and the political doctrine of the young clergymen and women they produce are fundamentalist in religious orientations and supportive of political Islam. Their poor background, a puritanical environment of the institution, and the exclusive religious focus of learning, sets them apart from the general Pakistani society and graduates of modern educational institutions.

To have a clear idea about the proliferation of madrassas in Pakistan, one needs to understand the failure of Pakistan's public education system, the class-based character of education in general and the reasons the poorest of the poor choosing madrassas for educating their children, which includes a large number of girls. A good number of female madrassas have also emerged in recent years.[54] A great number of madrassas are residential institutions; they provide free accommodation, food, and medical care. In a significant way, the madrassa is a means of self-development and social significance for the marginalized as most of the students cannot afford public education, nor have access to it.[55] There are others who argue that it is not

just the poor, but also the middle class that send children to the madrassas to get religious education.[56]

The growth of the madrassa continues unabated, and is supported by private charities from Pakistan and oil-rich Middle Eastern countries. One is puzzled by the proliferation of madrassas in the urban areas of Pakistan, including the capital city Islamabad. There is a big question mark on whether this is unplanned growth driven by a quest for Islamic knowledge, or if they are being set up with a strategic political vision to Islamize the society. There is a competitive struggle among rival religious sects to establish more madrassas, with the Deobandi network outnumbering all others.[57] Behind each madrassa is a well-thought out scheme of educating and grooming young, often poor students, to maintain and further spread the religious influence of a particular sect. With a sectarian outlook, each madrassa is exclusive in terms of teachers, students, sponsors and its ideological agenda. However, there are exceptions in rural areas where in some places families belonging to different Sunni sects may send their children to another sect's madrassa because either it offers better standards or there is no other choice.[58] The sect-based madrassa networks, quietly and dangerously, promote sectarian and intolerant religious outlooks that have been fueling sectarian conflict in Pakistan for decades.

There is a security dimension to the madrassa in Afghanistan and Pakistan that dates back to the Afghan war. In the long years of war in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal borderlands, the Taliban have been major actors. They have been the main combatants fighting against the Pakistani forces and the international coalition in Afghanistan. Not all Taliban militants in Pakistan have a madrassa background. Quite contrary to the general assessment, most Taliban militants from areas other than Federally Administered Tribal Areas have come from public educational institutions and thus, the role and numbers of the madrassa students is highly exaggerated.[59] The story of Federally Administered Tribal Areas is different, as there the madrassas have filled the vacuum left by the public sector. It is in these areas where the number of madrassa-educated militants has been higher.[60] The Taliban movements of Afghanistan and Pakistan are not exclusively made up of clergy or madrassa students. They have supporters, sympathizers, and financiers from other social, religious, and political ranks that share the vision of the Taliban.

The madrassa network and its expansion, particularly in and around the major cities of Pakistan, has a strategic political purpose and cannot be seen in isolation from the larger objectives of political Islam. It is both about creating a religious mind-set in society as well as preparing for a future showdown with the state if it adopts policies that the clerics and their political allies in the religious political parties see in conflict with their designs of an Islamic state. The madrassa network is therefore more than a place of

Islamic learning: its clerics and students may be mobilized for urban agitation and protest as they have been on some occasions in the past. Most of the madrassas have affiliations with the religious parties, and some with jihadist organizations and sectarian outfits.[61] If the madrassas remain unregistered, unreformed, and unregulated, they may emerge as a serious challenge to urban peace and security.

THE THIRD WAVE: TALIBANIZATION

The three successive cycles of war in Afghanistan and Pakistan's frontline role in them have influenced the emergence of the third wave of political Islam in Pakistan. Pakistan faces a grave challenge to its national security at a scale like never before. But in the making of this challenge, Pakistan's security policy toward Afghanistan and intervention in support of Afghan factions and groups such as the Taliban has played a major role.

This wave is violent, radical, and jihadist in its ethos. It has taken the traditional historical route of Islamic conquerors to capture Afghanistan and Pakistan through violent means. The notions of territorialized nation states or constitutional order are foreign, secular, and colonial ideas for the Taliban.[62] In their alternative ideological explorations, the Taliban and their supporters place the Islamist revolution higher in their political values, to be achieved by any means that they may consider moral and justified.

The third wave of political Islam reflects a broader but loose coalition of religious groups and parties, including the religious political parties that have taken the democratic route. It has multiple militant fronts—sectarian groups, groups that have fought with Kashmiri insurgents in Indian-held Kashmir, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, and tens of other militant organizations. One of the most dangerous aspects of the third wave is that several of its organizations are linked with the globalist jihad of Al Qaeda and its transnational affiliates in the extended Middle Eastern region.[63] Some of the factions have shown loyalty to the Islamic State (*Daesh*), though it remains debatable how much power the Islamic State has been able to build in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[64]

The third wave represents a transformation of the second wave from an ally of the Pakistani state, particularly the security establishment, into its adversary. This change is a reaction to Pakistan's support of America and the International Coalition in the war that ousted the Taliban regime in 2001, and Pakistan's continuing partnership in the war on terror. There are two more reasons because of which jihadist organizations have turned against the Pakistani state: its withdrawal of support to them in their involvement in the Kashmir insurgency, and the second is, its insistence that the Taliban cut off their links with Al Qaeda.[65]

Pakistan has paid a heavy cost of its policy of using jihadist proxies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistani state had aligned with the private Islamist groups with it that were willing to fight in Afghanistan during the Afghan war, and later in the attempt to liberate Kashmir from Indian occupation in 1980s and 1990s. The relationship between the state and jihadist political Islam was both strategic and as well as ideological during the Zia regime (1977–1988). The ideological dimension began to fade off with the death of Zia, but pragmatic security interests in having competitive influence in Afghanistan and forcing India to negotiate a resolution of the Kashmir dispute survived until 9/11. The audacity of the terror network to inflict such a big injury shook the world, and pulled the rug from under Pakistan's regional security paradigm. The ensuing changes in US policy toward Afghanistan, militant Islam, and terrorism gravely affected Pakistan's security options in Afghanistan and Kashmir. On several occasions, Pakistani leaders were confronted and told that there cannot be a differentiation between good and bad terrorists, and the difference Pakistan had drawn between terrorists and freedom fighters in Kashmir was no longer acceptable to the United States or any other foreign strategic partner. It took some time for Pakistan to realize that its policy of supporting intervention through proxy jihadist organizations was in conflict with its national security interests in the vastly changed regional and international strategic landscape after 9/11. However, the change has been slow and selective and lacks credibility.[66] The world order post-9/11 has greatly changed the imperatives of its security, requiring a fundamental shift in its policy toward the secessionist insurgency in Kashmir and the war in Afghanistan. It is questionable if that shift has actually taken place or not.[67]

A great number of leaders of jihadist organizations, who were former allies of the state in foreign security enterprises, understood the pressures, restraints, and difficulties imposed by the new regional circumstances, triggered by 9/11. But with tens of thousands of dedicated fighters on a religious and ideological mission, they could not ensure any coherence, nor had they the capacity to pull them back from their operational zones or make them all rethink their ideological commitment. Some of the second tier leaders of jihadist organizations rather, rebelled against their own leaders and began to set up splinter groups, adding a new front to their war against the Pakistani state. In their view, the Pakistani state betrayed them and compromised the causes that they had shared for two decades by joining the American war on terror, and acquiescing to Indian pressures to change its Kashmir policy.

The jihadist elements of the third wave view the Pakistani state as an enemy, and therefore have decided to wage a war, which they started by gradually occupying ungoverned spaces in the tribal hinterland. There are many reasons for this strategic choice. First, the state was weakest in these areas, with a nominal presence and the tribes had a long warring tradition

along with a history of resistance against modern political authority both British colonial as well as Pakistani, national. Second, the border regions had served as the geographical frontline, the entry point to Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war that spanned transnational connections. Third, the wars in Afghanistan had affected the power structure of the tribal regions. Gradually, the emergence of militia leaders with guns, their international connections, and flow of foreign money disrupted the old triangular political order—local tribal chiefs, political agents of the Government of Pakistan, and the security forces. Finally, the social landscape of the region also changed with the mushrooming madrassas spreading jihadist influences.

The third wave of political Islam, today, presents a critical security challenge to the Pakistani state in more than one ways. It is not just about setting up of mini Islamic states in remote, politically unsettled areas, but also about the terms of their alliances with similar groups that provide them material and political support from other parts of the country. They have developed a nationwide national network of support, safe houses, and sleeper cells to attack soft targets when ordered. After having been evicted from its stronghold in South Waziristan and other tribal agencies, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan supported by other forces of the third wave, is now waging an insurgency in tribal regions on the border of Afghanistan where hundreds of thousands of Pakistani troops are deployed. The same elements of the third wave have given refuge and protection to Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban fugitives and leaders in towns and cities across Pakistan.

The scope of targets and the larger agenda of the third wave are not confined to the Pakistani state, while they have targeted the state at the weak periphery through insurgency and via suicide attacks in the centers of the cities, they wish to gradually expand the war. Their local affiliates, while passive but well organized, frequently attack rival religious sects, often in places of work and worship, and the security personnel. The objective is to spread fear and terrorize the population as well as demonstrate weaknesses of the Pakistani state. Consequently, the moderate and somewhat liberal social and intellectual constituencies in Pakistan and the civilian state institutions dealing with law and order and dispensing justice appeared to be scared, and seemed to be functioning with restraint until the launching of *Zarb-e-Azb,* which has had major success in dismantling the terrorist sanctuaries in the tribal regions.

In this regard, we would consider the challenge of the third wave of radical Islam as gravely serious and more threatening to Pakistan's national security than any other domestic insurgency or the running rivalry and conflict with India. More than the militia, it is about ideology, the mind-set, and the narrative. In a nutshell, this war is about capturing the soul of a nuclear state at the center of three strategic regions. What character the Pakistani state takes in terms of ideological choices between the modernist vision of its

founders that is now under attack, and the Islamist radical ideal of political Islam, will determine the stability of Afghanistan and the regions beyond it. The same might be true about the Afghan state as its identity and stability influences the politics, security, and ideological choices of neighboring states, specifically Pakistan to some degree.

The challenge of the third wave is not restricted to Pakistan alone, even though Pakistan remains the immediate primary target. It poses an international threat, mostly targeting the Western states. Disillusioned Muslim youth that is socially excluded and economically marginalized in some of these countries have embraced radical Islamist ideas and have turned against the societies that bred them and have sheltered their families for decades. The terrorist attacks in San Bernardino, California, Paris, and Brussels demonstrate the result of radicalization and transnational links among the terrorists.[68] There are many unanswered questions about the loss of identity, religious revivalism, and the West as Islam's enemy among the Muslim diaspora in the West.[69] While many factors fuel the anger and frustration among the Muslim youth in the West, it is clear that they view world divided essentially between the West and Islam; they see Muslims under attack, their lands under occupation, and a constant state of war in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.[70] Thus, the jihadist worldview is not confined to the poor, illiterate sections of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Going by the profiles of the Arab suicide attackers of 9/11 or the bombing suspects caught in Britain and elsewhere, extremists also come from relatively successful families. The radicalized and violent fringe is alienated and somewhat angry about the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has serious issues with negotiating their respective religiosity within the pluralistic Western culture.[71] This has led them to make the fatalistic choice of leaving their normal lives and joining terror networks. This fatalism takes a religious priority over family, children, parents, and spouses.[72] An illustration of this is how the couple involved in the shooting at San Bernardino left their baby in the cradle, knowing well that they would not come back alive.[73] This is a regular pattern of jihadists in every war zone—they are heartless, numbed, zealous, and inhumane.

There is yet another view of what is shaping the jihadist mind-set among the Muslim youth in Western countries and their nexus to the region. For decades, such elements had been filtering into Afghanistan to get inspiration for jihad, train, fight, and take back ideas of militancy to their home countries. Since the ouster of the Taliban regime, the epicenter of jihadist networks has shifted to the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghan Taliban leaders, fighters, and Al Qaeda members have moved there to continue the war. Most of the bombing plots, from July 7, 2005 subway attacks in London to the failed Times Square attempt on May 1, 2010, and many others have been traced to jihadist networks working out of the border, tribal regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[74] It is in the rugged moun-

tains of the borderlands and in the secret terrorist cells operating in most of the major cities of Pakistan, where new foreign recruits have had opportunities to meet the local Al Qaeda affiliates with the ambition to harm Western societies. The converging of global jihadists since decades has turned the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan into the "most dangerous place in the world."[75]

The jihadists would like Pakistan to become a weak and failed state, so that they can take over its infrastructure, capture the security establishment, control its human and material resources, and take advantage of the strategic space it occupies. Pakistan's descent into the hands of religious extremists (a remote possibility), would bury the dream of a modernist Pakistan and endanger every neighboring state. Islamist radicals have enough strength for now to keep the country in turmoil through various subversive activities, especially suicide bombings, but they lack the coherence, strength, and public support to defeat the Pakistani state. They have however, been able to impose a long, uncertain, and costly war on the Pakistani state and society.

The conflict between the Pakistani state and radical Islamist terrorists is not likely to end soon, although the physical and social space for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and their affiliates is shrinking and the security forces and the society together appear to be succeeding in countering this menace. It is a long war, protracted insurgency, and violent wave of extremism, all in one. This should push the stakes of the international community, especially those of the United States and European countries, higher in supporting Pakistan against the radical Islamic threat. There is a consensus among Pakistan's international partners that its troubles may not remain its own and would spill over to other countries, as they have in the past. Inside the country, there is a new consensus among the political elites, security establishment, and the general public that it is "our" war where the enemy is within and there is no other option but to defeat this enemy. This realization and the resolve appear to mark a new beginning. There is, however, no agreement on the means, the strategy, and the timeframe of eliminating the twin threats of extremism and radicalism. This success, if and when achieved, will mark the real beginning of Pakistan's revival as a moderate and modern Muslim state.

NOTES

1. Aziz Ahmad and G. E. Von Grunebaum, eds., *Muslim Self-statement in India and Pakistan, 1857–1968* (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2004). The anthology includes the most significant modernist and Islamist thinkers from Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, modernist-rationalist thinker and reformer to Muhammad Ayub Khan; see also Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

2. Douglas M. Peers and Nandini Goopta, *India and the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). For critical views of modernity, see Anshuman A. Mondal, *National-*

ism and Post-Colonial Identity: Culture and Ideology in India and Egypt (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

3. For this argument, see Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political* Power (New York: Basic Books, 1983); V.S. Naipaul, *Among the Believers: An Islamic* Journey (New York: Knopf, 1981). On how Islamic reformation in Islamic countries cannot make the transition to democracy, see John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 116–118, and Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Be Democratic," *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no. 2 (Summer, 1984), 193–218; Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," *World Politics* 55 (October 2002): 4–37.

4. Fatima Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World* (Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1992); John L. Esposito et al., *Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Yasser Elethy, *Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy: Classical and Modern Interpretations* (London: Routledge, 2015).

5. See Syed Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Islami Tehzib aur uske Usul'u Mabadi* (Islamic civilization, its principles and Foundations) (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80–83.

6. John Cooper and Ronald L. Nettler, *Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009).

7. Ali A. Mazrui, Ramzi Bdran, and Thomas Uthup, eds., *Resurgent Islam and Politics of Identity* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2014), 1–20; Farhan Mujahid Chak, *Islam and Pakistan's Political Culture* (London: Routledge, 2015); Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan* (London: Pluto Press, 2011); Ali Usman Qasmi, "God's Kingdom on Earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947–1969," *Modern Asian Studies* 44,nNo. 6 (2010): 1197–1253.

8. K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism* (Lahore: Sange-e-Meel, 2002).

9. Hafeez Malik, *Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1963), ch. 9.

10. The Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind opposed creation of Pakistan. See their point of view in Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, *Pakistan aur Khutbat-i-Usmani* (Pakistan and addresses of Usmani) (Lahore: Shahid Book Depot, 1989), 3–40.

11. See an excellent compilation on this subject consisting of original writing of what we may term Muslim modernists: Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, eds., *Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

12. See, for instance, Khaled Hroub, ed., *Political Islam, Context Versus Ideology* (London: SOAS, 2012); Hamid Dabashi, *The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Theology of Discontent* (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006); Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution*.

13. Amir Ali, "The Rationalist and Philosophical Spirit of Islam," in *Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam: A Reader,* ed. Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 35–40; Muhammad Abduh, "The Necessity of Religious Reforms," in ibid., 45–52.

14. Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld," *The Atlantic*, March 1992.

15. On the modernization theory, see the works of Marx, Nietzsche, Lerner, and Bell in Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65, no.1 (February 2000): 19–51. Their conclusions support that modernization impacts the tendency toward religion and traditional values. For more detail, see Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and his *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York : Basic Books, 1976); Daniel Chirot, *How Societies Change* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 1994); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958) and Karl Marx, *Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

16. Lahouari Addi, "Algeria's Army, Algeria's Agony," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 4 (July–August 1998): 44–53.

17. This theme is routinely highlighted in the election manifestoes of the religious political parties. It started however well before any general elections were held in the country. See, for instance, Maulana Syed Abul A'la Mawdudi, "Matalba-i-Nizam-i-Isami" (Demand for an Islamic system), *Tarjuman ul-Quran* 32, no. 1 (1959): 12–18.

18. See Nasir Islam, "Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangladesh," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13, no.1 (Feb., 1981), pp. 55–72.

19. Brynjar Lia, *The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942* (New York: Ithaca Press, 2006); Muhammad Amein Rais, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Its Rise, Demise, and Resurgence* (Chicago: University Microfilms International, 2002).

20. See Seyyed Vali Raza Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism," *Political Science Quarterly* 110, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 261–285 and Seyyed Vali Raza Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 64.

21. Syed Abul A'la Mawdudi, *The Islamic State,* Trans. Khurshid Ahmed (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1969).

22. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 40–44.

23. Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution*, 20–21.

24. See Syed Abu'l-A' la Mawdudi, *The Islamic Way of Life,* eds. Khuram Murad and Khurshid Ahmed, trans. Khuram Murad and Khurshid Ahmed (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1986), 9; Syed Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Jama'at-i-Islami; tarikh, maqsad aur la'ihah-i' amal* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1963), 8–9, 17–19 and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 87–96.

25. Whatever the views of the Islamists, the public opinion in Pakistan about the United States and the Western powers had neither been static, nor had it been shaped any singular factor. See, for instance, Hamid H. Kizilbash, "Anti-Americanism in Pakistan," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (May 1988), 58–65; "Is Anti-American Sentiment on the Decline in Pakistan?" *Express Tribune*, May 4, 2015.

26. Mishal Fahm al-Sulami, *The West and Islam: Western Liberal Democracy Versus the System of Shura* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Khurshid Ahmad, "Islam and Democracy: Some Conceptual and Contemporary Dimensions," *Policy Perspectives* 2, no. 1, (Islamabad. Institute of Policy Studies, n.d.), http://www.ips.org.pk/the-muslim-world/1116-islam-and-democracy-some-conceptual-and-contemporary-dimensions.

27. John L. Esposito, *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 209–11; Imran Ali, "Power and Islamic Legitimacy in Pakistan," in *Islamic Legitimacy in Plural Asia,* ed. Anthony Reid and Michael Gilsenan (New York: Routledge, 2007), 117–138.

28. The leaders, activists, and workers of the Jamaat are graduates of modern day colleges and universities.

29. M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947–58* (Islamabad: National Institute of History and Culture, 1986).

30. Nobody is accepted into the fold of the Jamaat readily on application. One has to go through stages of training and socialization until his thought and practice transforms according to the religious and political beliefs of the party.

31. "Religious Parties Denounce Law Protecting Women from Abuse as 'un-Islamic,'" *Dawn*, March 16, 2016.

32. Jamaat-e-Islami got only four seats in National Assembly out of 291, *Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam* got 7 seats, JUP-H also got seven seats and other religious parties had no seats in National Assembly; see Sharif-al Mujahid, "Pakistan: First General Elections," *Asian Survey* 11, no. 2 (February 1971), 159–171.

33. John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think* (New York: Gallup Press, 2008), 29–64.

34. See Andrew R. Wilder, *Pakistani Voter* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 149–187.

35. Jamaat organized a militia known as "volunteers" during war in East Pakistan in 1971; see Rafiuddin Ahmed, "Redefining Muslim Identity in South Asia: The Transformation of Jama'at Islami," in *Accounting for Fundamentalists: The Dynamic Character of Movements,* ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (University of Chicago Press, 2004), 682.

36. "Bangladesh Executes Top Jamaat Leader, Motiur Rahman over '1971 War Crimes,'" *Dawn*, May 11, 2016.

37. "The aim of military intervention was to save the country from an impending civil war, to disengage the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan National Alliance from their unending political broil, and to hold free, fair and impartial elections to further the cause of democracy in Pakistan. . . . I was obliged to step in to fill in the vacuum created by the political leaders. I have accepted this challenge as the true solider of Islam. My sole aim is to organize free and fair polls." See General Zia ul Haq's first speech in the *Pakistan Times*, July 6, 1977.

38. Arif Rafiq, "How Pakistan Protects Itself from Regional Sectarian War," *National Interest*, September 18, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-pakistan-protects-itself-regional-sectarian-war-13873.

39. The SSP was established in 1985. For its manifesto, see Afak Hyder, "The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan," in *Pakistan: Founder's Aspirations and Today's ,* ed. Hafeez Malik (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 263–286.

40. Ahmad, *Sectarian War*, 81–102.

41. On Pakistan' role in the conflict, see Frederic Grare, *Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict, 1979*–1985 (Karachi: Oxford University), 39–75.

42. Neamatollah Najumi, "The Rise and Fall of the Taliban," in *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan,* ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 90–117.

43. Authors' conversation with a former officer of the Intelligence Bureau who was based in Dera Ghazi Khan, March 12, 2016.

44. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan attacked the GHQ in Rawalpindi on October 9, 2009, *The News International*, October 10, 2009. Three suicide bombers exploded themselves among the worshippers at Data Darbar, one of the holiest shrines of the country in Lahore on July 1, 2010, *Dawn*, July 2, 2010; and offices of the ISI and security forces on May 27, 2009, *Daily Times*, May 28, 2009.

45. Fouad Ajami, "The Uneasy Imperium: Pax Americana in the Middle East," in *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War,* ed. James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose (New York: BBS, Public Affairs, 2001), 15–30.

46. Pakistan and United Arab Emirates were other two countries that recognized the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which former Chief of Army Staff and president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, later reflected was a mistake. "Recognizing Taliban Govt Was Pakistan's Mistake, Musharraf," *Dawn*, December 4, 2014.

47. Jason Burke, "Africa Embassy Bombings: Attacks That Propelled Bin Laden into the Limelight," *Guardian*, January 20, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/20/africa-embassy-bombings-osama-bin-laden-kenya-tanzania-al-qaida.

48. Author's interview with former director general of the ISI, Lahore, March 29, 2010.

49. Ahmed Rashid, *Dissent into Chaos* (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 240–264.

50. Author's interviews with clerics in Peshawar and Chishtian. March 23 and March 25, 2016.

51. Tahir Andrabi, Jinshnu Das et al., *Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data* (Cambridge: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005), 4.

52. Kuldip Kaur, *Madrassa Education in India: A Study of Its Past and Present* (Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural & Industrial Development, 1990), 153–174.

53. In 1947 there were only 246 madrassas in Pakistan, the number grew manifold by 1988, during the Afghan jihad years into 2,861, and multiplied by 2011 into 20,000 according the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan's records. See Ali K. Chishti, "The Madrassa Menace!" *Friday Times*, January 21–27, 2011. The numbers have been on the rise and continue

to increase every year. The number in 2015 was estimated to be around 35,000. "Report Says Over 35,000 Madrassas Operating in Pakistan," *Pakistan Today*, July 31, 2015.

54. Riazat Butt, "All-Female Madrasas Boom in Pakistan," *Guardian*, May 14, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/14/pakistan-madrasas-islam-girls-women.

55. Mumtaz Ahmad, "Madrassa Education in Pakistan Bangladesh and Bangladesh" in *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia,* ed. Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik, and Robert G. Wirsing (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), 108.

56. Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, *Madrassa Education in Pakistan: Controversies, Challenges and Prospects*, Report No. 3 (Kirkeveien, Norway: Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, March 4, 2013), 28.

57. Ahmad, "Madrassa Education in Pakistan Bangladesh and Bangladesh," 107.

58. Author's visits to madrassas and interviews with the religious teachers in Bahawalpur division, Punjab, March 2016.

59. Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The Madrassa Scapegoat," *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006).

60. Conversation with Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, then director of research and analysis, National Counter Terrorism Authority, July 6, 2010.

61. Zaidi, *Madrassa Education in Pakistan*, 16.

62. See a speech by Sufi Mohammad, the leader of the defunct Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Mohammadan Law) in which he said the following: "We are custodians of Pakistan and its Constitution, while the judges of Supreme Court and High Courts, democratic ulema, politicians and Khawaneen (feudal lords) are their enemies." He said that there is no room for democracy in Islam and the existing political system in Pakistan was a contravention of the Quran and Sunah. See "' Superior Courts 'un-Islamic,'" Says Swat Sufi: Govt Asked to Set Up Darul Qaza by 23rd," *Dawn*, April 20, 2009.

63. Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2007), 119–140.

64. Arif Rafiq, "What Happened to ISIS's Afghanistan-Pakistan Province?" *Diplomat*, February 2, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-happened-to-isiss-afghanistan-pakistan-province/.

65. C. Christine Fair, "The Militant Challenge of Pakistan" *Asia Policy*, no. 11 (January 2011): 105–37.

66. Cyril Almeida, "Crossroads, Again," *Dawn*, January 18, 2015.

67. Sameer Lalwani, "Pakistan's Shocking Strategic Shift," *National Interest*, August 4, 2015. For a counter argument, particularly with reference to Afghanistan, see Moeed Yusuf, *Decoding Pakistan's "Strategic Shift" in Afghanistan* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2013).

68. David Thurffell, "The Struggle to Stay on the Middle Ground: The Radicalization of Muslims in Sweden," in *Muslim Diaspora in the West: Negotiating Gender, Home and Belonging,* ed. Haideh Moghissi and Halleh Ghorashi (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 130–144. Syed Kamall, "What Drives Young Muslim to Radicalization?" *Wall Street Journal*, February 5, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/syed-kamall-what-drives-young-muslims-to-radicalization-1423169290.

69. Javaid Rehman, "Islam, War on Terror and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings," *Human Rights Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (November 2007),845.

70. Peter Bergen, "Why Do Terrorists Commit Terrorism?" *New York Times*, June 14, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/opinion/why-do-terrorists-commit-terrorism.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=Moth-Visible&moduleDetail=inside-nyt-region-3&module=inside-nyt-region&region=inside-nyt-region&WT.nav=inside-nyt-region.

71. Akil N. Awan, "Transitional Religiosity Experiences: Contextual Disjuncture and Islamic Political Radicalism," in *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: The British Experience,* ed. Tahir Abbas (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 207–230; Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Don't Know," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33 (2010): 797–814.

72. Petter Nesser, "Joining Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe: Explaining Motivational Aspects of Recruitment and Radicalization" in *Understanding Violent Radicalization: Terrorist*

and Jihadist Movements in Europe, ed. Magnus Ranstrop (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 87–114.

73. Adam Nagourney and Salman Masood, "Killers Were Long Radicalized, F.B.I. Investigators Say," *New York Times*, December 7, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/us/fbi-says-san-bernardino-assailants-were-radicalized.html?_r=0.

74. Ted R. Bromund and Lisa Curtis. "The Pakistan–Britain Terror Connection: Lessons and Warnings for the United States," *Backgrounder* no. 2337 (The Heritage Foundation, 6 November 2009).

75. President Barack Obama's remarks announcing new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. "Obama Announces New Afghanistan, Pakistan Strategies," *Washington Post,* March 27, 2009.

Chapter Seven

The Struggle Within

Pakistan has been confronting an existential threat and the enemy is not any external power, but it is within its own borders. It is a complex network of militant jihadi organizations that has flourished over the decades, as a spillover from Pakistan's connection with the Afghan wars. As we have explained it earlier in the book, the main reason is the decline of state institutions and massive corruption by the political elite that has produced a climate of injustice, poverty, inequality, and distrust of the state and ruling groups of the country. The Islamist radicals have opened up different fronts in various parts of the country and have used every terror tactic to create chaos, fear, and insecurity. While it is unlikely that they would succeed in capturing the state but state and society have had to bear high costs of combating them. Pakistan has been in a state of war against Islamist radicals for almost a decade under the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which represents a broader coalition of splinter groups from militant organizations and sectarian outfits. Since its founding in 2007, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has waged "total war" against Pakistan.[1] It is total in the sense that radical Islamists have attacked every symbol of the Pakistani state and society; sacred places, installations of security forces, women and men in market places, and sadly even children in schools and parks. There are no geographical, demographic, or professional exceptions in Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan's choice of targets-any person and location is fair game, as long as the terrorists achieve their evil objectives i.e. mass murder and a terrorized population. The minorities have also not been spared particularly, the poorest of the poor, the Christian community in Pakistan.[2]

The Pakistani state and its rulers have, for too long, lived in a state of denial about who the real enemy is whereas observers and the society at large saw the Taliban groups and their affiliates, involved in preaching extremism

and acts of violence, as big threats. In the making of the extremist mind-set and terrorism some deadly narratives went on unquestioned by the authorities. These narratives gave a big space to the extremists and terrorist groups to create a solid ideological support base in disaffected parts of the society. The pace and intensity of extremist views in justification of violence and the thinly veiled support of terrorism within the country increased significantly with the American-led intervention in Afghanistan. The print and the proliferating electronic media offered itself as an open forum to the representatives of the extremist groups, their political fronts, and their sympathizers. The media generated a wave of sympathy for the Afghan Taliban, ousted by the international coalition, by presenting them as freedom fighters. A very large number of Taliban from the Pakistan side of the border joined the Taliban fight.[3] This was, however, in conflict with the declared policy of the government of extending support to the United States to stabilize Afghanistan. Those in power, first Pervez Musharraf and his allies and later two successive governments of two different political parties, did little or nothing by way of resolve or leadership to counter extremism and violent groups. Rather for a very long time, those in powerful positions thought of violent extremist groups as allies and supporters. They were considered to be part of a "grand strategy" to win larger battles in the region. This created a deadly confusion over "good" and "bad" Taliban, the latter being a euphemism for tolerance of violent groups. Pakistan's power groups both state-based and those from the political stream hardly had any understanding of the long-term effects of such tolerance of militant groups and their narrative on the rest of society. They did not care about what might happen to the society and to the people. This is always the case when a society has no real say or power in selecting those who rule over it.

DEADLY NARRATIVES

Three political narratives have gone largely ignored or inadequately countered. First, with regard to the Taliban and other organizations, state and society has perpetuated the narrative of "these are our people." The sympathizers and apologists of extremist groups have been trying to cultivate a friendly image of the terrorist groups. The impression that the carefully and socially sensitive phrase "these are our people" has created is that the Taliban are well-intentioned good people who are fighting for a good cause. This has come about in the context of the glorification of the mujahedeen's war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the Western and Pakistani press.[4] The Taliban were the successors of the same groups and products of the same ideology.[5] The capture of Swat by a local affiliate of the Pakistani Taliban that showed allegiance to late Mullah Omar was not enough to wake

up those in power. It was the public flogging of a woman and horrific stories of public executions that finally moved the federal and provincial governments to take some action by which time too much damage had already been done.

The second narrative that has kept resurfacing is that 'our people cannot do this' or that a Muslim cannot commit heinous and terrible acts, such as suicide bombings, attacks against minorities and other sects, and targeting the security forces of the country. The apologists shift the blame to 'other' countries, forces and agencies that they claim are operating through local agents. Weaving conspiracy theories, which is a common intellectual pursuit, transfers the responsibility to invisible foreign hands. How these apologists can ignore the responsibility claims by the Taliban and similar terror groups for attacks against the security forces and the unsuspecting civilians leads to the third narrative that 'the terrorists are acting in self-defense."[6] Finally, this is "not our war" is yet another narrative that dominated the media and political discourses in Pakistan. Such an assertion was shocking especially since the terrorists did not even spare children in schools and continuously targeted security forces both in the border areas as well as in the cities. Whose war was the war on terror then? The right-wing media commentators and the religious parties argued that terrorism was a reaction against the American-led international intervention in Afghanistan.[7] It was an American war against Afghanistan, they argued, and Pakistan had unnecessarily become a party in it. This line of thinking evoked a political echo in the Pashtun areas of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that gave the coalition of religious parties a resounding and historic victory in the 2002 general elections.[8]

ALIGNING IN THE WAR ON TERROR

The military regime of Pervez Musharraf appeared to be secretive, apologetic and nontransparent about its alliances with the United States in the war on terror. Privately and publically, it defended its partnership with the United States as a necessity, imposed on it by the regional and international circumstances. For reasons of political correctness and to appease the religious groups that appeared to be rising in the wake of their support for the Afghan Taliban and against the American-led war, Musharraf refused to own the war on terror. He left the narrative to the religious parties, Taliban sympathizers in the media, and conservative intellectual circles. Musharraf presented the choice of siding with the United States as an imperative dictated by US resolve to punish the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks—Al Qaeda and its Afghan backers, the Taliban, and their supporters.[9] Neutrality in the war was not a choice; rather such a policy could put Pakistan's security at risk.

The Musharraf regime did not present its case to the public on true convergence of interests around terrorism, threat of Islamic radicalism, or emergence of a jihadist cult and culture that posed as much danger to Pakistan as the Western interests. Under veiled coercion and threatening circumstances, Pakistan took the U-turn on its Afghan policy from being an ally of the Taliban to an ally of the United States and supporting the latter in evicting the Taliban from power and assisting a war against them as a strategic compulsion.[10] This indirectly supported the pro-Taliban groups within the country in justifying their holy war against the West. It further strengthened the jihadist narrative, groups, and organizations that portrayed the Afghan war as a "clash of civilizations."[11] For jihadists, such a "clash" leaves little choice but to fight and die in support of their fellow Muslims. The Afghans were locked in a self-destructive war over real political interests, ethnic considerations, tribal loyalties, and religion, and all groups in the struggle for power welcomed intervention by their supportive external powers. The wars in Afghanistan have had a strong bearing on Pakistan, as groups fighting there have connections in Pakistan—institutionally, organizationally, and ideologically. The last war could not be contained within the Afghan frontiers, nor will any future wars be contained. Jihadists from other countries have been oblivious to the fact that all cycles of the Afghan conflict have been among the Afghans and motivated by personal and ethnic group interests.

Musharraf's military regime wanted to make virtue out of necessity for supporting the US-led war in Afghanistan. The domestic political conditions required the military government to be non-transparent on the kind of support, facilities, and intelligence sharing it had agreed to provide to the US war efforts. Having toppled a popular, elected government, the military wanted the religious groups and the general public on their side. Never have the generals ruled by the institutional strength of the armed forces alone, and have always crafted a political façade as a means for public support. Isolated and publically rebuffed by President Bill Clinton when he shortened his visit to Pakistan and refused to have a photograph taken with Pervez Musharraf, the general found the opportunity to be connected with the United States and the world when he was asked that familiar question in the wake of 9/11: "are you with us or with them?" He was delighted to say yes, affirm that he was with the United States, and was eager to accept every demand presented to him.[12] In return, he needed American political and military support to stay in power and build up the country's economic and military strength. This enabled Musharraf to stay in power for almost a decade and the country to get billions of dollars in economic and military assistance. Since 9/11, Pakistan has secured more than US$13 billion in the Coalition Support Fund, which constitutes about one-fifth of military expenditure. In security-related assistance Pakistan has been receiving roughly US$1.2 billion annually but with

the winding down of American involvement this assistance is likely to face cuts.[13]

This bargain and Pakistan's indirect participation in the Afghan war has produced adverse consequences for the state and society, and while they might be unintended, they are not unrelated to the war in Afghanistan. The first and foremost is that radical elements, infuriated by Musharraf's strategic choice, began to view the Pakistan's security establishment of Pakistan as sold out to American interests.[14] The impression that the United States manipulates Pakistan's critical domestic and foreign policy decisions has become more entrenched in Pakistani society. The jihadists have raised serious questions about the autonomy and nationalism of the armed forces of Pakistan. Some sections of them, despite being allies in the pursuit of regional interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir, turned their guns on the Pakistani state. The mullah-military alliance shaped by the anti-Soviet war collapsed under the divergent perceptions and interests of the two during the anti-Taliban war (2001–2015). That said, not all elements of the alliance broke up; however, the ones that did turn against the Pakistani state have been able to inflict grave damage to Pakistan's internal security. It led to the emergence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan around 2007 that has been continuing war through the means of terrorism against the Pakistani state and society. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan is by every definition the "bad" Taliban being the true enemy of the state and the biggest threat to the internal security of the country.

Western policymakers, particularly the Americans, and quite a few Pakistani analysts accuse the state and its security establishment of extending clandestine support to the Afghan Taliban and other warring groups, notably the Haqqanis that are influential in southern eastern provinces of Afghanistan.[15] It has been reported that the top Taliban leadership sought safe houses and refuge in Pakistan, and have reorganized their resistance against the American and Afghan forces from these safe houses.[16] How can one explain the conflictive position on the Taliban movement that is considered "bad" on the Pakistani side of the border and "good" on the Afghan side of the border? The simple answer is that Pakistan's Afghan policy has been consistent in terms of preventing adversarial powers from dominating the geopolitics of Afghanistan and using the same against Pakistan's interests. Some have explained this challenge with reference to the idea of "strategic depth."[17] It is a defensive strategic posture to guard against Indian influence that Pakistan fears would be used to destabilize it.[18] Pakistan's quest is for a neutral or at best, a friendly, Afghanistan that does not allow any power to work against Pakistan's interests.

THE BLOWBACK EFFECTS OF THE AFGHAN POLICY

Pakistan's Afghan policy suffered a grave blow with the ouster of the Taliban; one concession that Pakistan had expected while shifting its alliance from Taliban to the United States was that Pakistan's security imperatives would be considered in the future security and political order of Afghanistan. Pakistan hoped that that no adversarial power would use the Afghan territorial space to interfere in Pakistan and that Afghanistan would not host or support ethnic, sectarian, or religious groups that commit hostile acts against Pakistan. However, Pakistan found itself on the sideline of Afghan's political and security reconstruction. The American-led war changed the strategic map of the region to a great extent as far as Pakistan's interests were concerned. Washington developed a strategic partnership with India, placing it at the center of its South Asia policy and making it a vital partner in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.[19] The post-Taliban power groups of Afghanistan were openly hostile to Pakistan owing to its past policies of favoring the Taliban, and were more willing to become closer to India than Pakistan. Pakistan found itself not only cornered and discriminated against but also maligned for its alleged support to the Afghan Taliban movement. Pakistan continued to face hostile pressures, distrust, and persistent demands for "doing more" in terms of taking military action against the Pakistani militants aligned with the Afghan Taliban and sheltering the Afghan Taliban leaders.[20]

Pakistan's security establishment that often writes the script of the Afghan policy, once again, grew disillusioned with the United States. It realized that Washington was unwilling to accommodate Pakistan's concerns about Indian influence in Afghanistan. There is a deep distrust of Indian motives in the region and a deep history of proxy wars between the two countries. In Pakistan's assessment, a weak and insecure Afghanistan dependent on and allied with India, would offer itself as a base to the Indians for destabilizing Pakistan. It has in fact even brought forward evidence of Indian intervention in support of Baloch insurgents to the international attention.[21] The distrust between the United States and Pakistan, despite bonhomie of public diplomacy has been mutual. A marriage of convenience compelled by the circumstances of Afghanistan gradually transformed into double-dealing on both sides of the partnership. Failing to influence US policy regarding Indian influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan either overlooked the revitalization of the Afghan Taliban or willingly allowed it to establish and use sanctuaries in Pakistan. Some might argue, as they have, that Pakistan never abandoned the Taliban option as a lever of influence in Afghanistan to off-balance India and deal with the complex uncertainty of security situation.[22]

There are other, generally ignored, factors at work in Pakistan's security thinking when considering its Afghan policy. The first, is Pakistan's view of post-Taliban political reconstruction of Afghanistan. The Bonn Process,

through which the international coalition of forces legitimized the state and nation building in Afghanistan, excluded the Taliban. The assumption was that they were part of the problem, and therefore couldn't be part of any political solution. In the jubilation of quick victory over the Taliban militia, the United States and its advisors forgot all lessons of the Afghan history, society, and past wars. The Taliban were a religious movement but they had much deeper roots in Pashtun ethnicity than religion.[23] Exclusion of Taliban has proven to be disastrous, as they have regrouped and threatened the stability of Afghanistan and its political order again. In the coalition's view prominent individuals of Pashtun origins, such as President Hamid Karzai, Ashraf Ghani, and many others represented the Pashtun regions, however, the Taliban exclusion became perceived as Pashtun exclusion that created a space for the revival of the Taliban movement. The war against the Taliban in the Pashtun territories had caused large collateral damage, which led to a climate of perpetual conflict and it became much harder to implement the national reconstruction. From the very outset, Pakistan had advocated a policy of negotiating with Taliban and sharing power with them.[24] Failure to recognize that a negotiated settlement with the Taliban was necessary for the stability of the country, allowed the war to simmer which greatly disadvantaged the Afghan state. The Afghan state is now seeking negotiations with the Taliban when their power appears to be on the rise and the Afghan state's security forces face desertions, demoralization, and inadequate access to training and equipment.[25] Instability in Afghanistan has been a festering wound for Pakistani society because of the spillover effects on militant and ethnic groups that impact state and society.

The second consideration is the hasty declaration of victory over the Taliban and decision to attack Iraq, which proved fatal for Washington's Afghanistan project. American resources and attention shifted, and the state and nation-building project in Afghanistan got derailed. The United States gradually got embroiled in counter-insurgency operations, which drained it heavily and made the job of stability, order, and peace in Afghanistan an increasingly impossible task. The Taliban began to surge, taking informal control of much of the Pashtun countryside. Neither the US forces, which were spread too thin, nor Pakistan found a coherent convergence of deeper interests and enough trust to defeat the Taliban movement.

Additionally, the Pashtun populations were alienated through the indiscriminate nature of the war that included night raids, aerial strikes, arrests, and torture. This converted the old ethnic hostility of the population into support for the Taliban who started to be seen, once again, as their local protectors. There was no moral standing of the warlords that were patronized by the coalition and re-marketed as generals and office bearers in the Afghan National Army. For the Pashtun, they were worse than the Taliban. President Obama's decision in 2013 to end the war by 2014 and to leave Afghanistan

to the Afghans by the end of 2014 after modest gains of US military involvement[26] was considered as retreat of the international forces by the Taliban leaders and an opening for them to step up their attacks.[27] This is exactly what has transpired since then.

The effects of the escalation of the conflict have been bad for Pakistan, as they been in the past, and the first casualty has been the trust between Pakistan and the United States. While Washington has appreciated Pakistan's support to the war on terror and the sacrifices it has made, it has never been satisfied with the nature of cooperation Pakistan has extended. The rise of the Taliban has many reasons, as explained above, but their alleged sanctuary in Pakistan and the inability, or unwillingness of Islamabad to expel or combat the Afghan Taliban on its territory is considered by the outside world as the real reason for the failure of pacification of Afghanistan. The escalation of conflict over the past two years, even after the death of Mullah Omar, has once again strained relations between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghanistan wants Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table or to take action against them. A climate of cold war has developed between the two countries.

Two other consequences of the conflict in Afghanistan, in this respect, for Pakistan cannot be ignored. First, there is a heavy tilt of Afghanistan toward India that also complicates the Afghan situation as this means that the traditional rivals of South Asia are now competing in Afghanistan for strategic influence by various, often dubious means. One of the means they have been using includes proxy wars through the empty spaces in Afghanistan. Second, Afghanistan, as a reaction to Pakistan's alleged support to the Taliban has given sanctuary to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leaders and has also increased its strategic cooperation with India. These two factors continue to influence the Taliban insurgency in the tribal regions, and even deep inside Pakistani cities.

DRONES AND THE WAR ON TERROR

One of the worst adverse effects that the war in Afghanistan has left on Pakistan's security is alienation, anger, and hostility against the Pakistani state among the tribes in the Western borders. There are many factors related to history, politics, and security policy that have turned this region into the front-line of wars and interventions into and from Afghanistan. Because of the thin presence of the state, it has become a refuge, shelter, and in some places a staging ground for remnant elements of Al Qaeda, Taliban, and a host of domestic and foreign intelligence networks. Historically, the region has been a sanctuary for criminals, kidnappers for ransom, smugglers of arms, and drug traffickers. A weak and archaic administrative structure from

the colonial days facilitated the growth of an illegal economy and criminal networks. But the involvement of the Pakistani state during the Soviet-Afghan war in sending arms and fighters into Afghanistan created transnational networks among the militants hailing from Arab lands to the Central Asian countries. The region became a convenient hiding backyard for the fleeing Al Qaeda leaders, Taliban, and Central Asian militant groups, after the US-led forces ousted the Taliban regime. The presence of militant networks and sanctuaries that the terrorists have used both against Afghanistan and Pakistan has invited a response in the form of drone attacks by the United States and a series of military operations by Pakistan.

The US drone-attacks, undertaken in obvious collaboration with Pakistan although the authorities publically deny it, have caused fear and physical dislocations in the tribal regions. One of the first strikes was on a religious seminary in Damadola, Bajour Agency that killed eighty-two people, the clerics, and young students on October 30, 2006. It was a drone attack operated by the CIA from its bases across the border in Afghanistan. Curiously, the Pakistan Army owned the attack and told the media that it attacked the seminary on the intelligence that it was training militants and had them in the compound.[28] That was the beginning of fresh uprisings in the tribal region. A gathering of clerics to deliberate on the incident and suggest a future course of action established that the attack was a collaborative mass murder by the United States and the government of Pakistan, and hence, issued a *fatwa* (religious edict) that avenging it by jihad was an obligation for the tribesmen.[29] This set the stage for a new war—more militants, more drone strikes and the expansion of the terrorist network in the region and its war against the Pakistani state and society. Drone warfare has hit the region very hard— not just the militants but also unsuspecting, ordinary tribesmen, women and children. The destruction of their homes and lives in many places has caused a shift in their loyalties from the state to the militants. Their cooperation with the Taliban was not always a fear of the gun of the militants but a complex numbers of factors of tribal loyalties and genuine feelings for the Taliban as a force of "good."

The drone warfare driven by the objective of eliminating terrorists has not been sensitive to what happens to the local populations where the terrorists are suspected of hiding.[30] It resembles the British colonial policy of collective punishment for the tribes for the crime of one or few. It is harder for eyes from the sky or those pushing the drone buttons from the other end of the world to see precisely what lies wasted under the rubble of mud houses in the tribal regions of Pakistan. The loud claims of "successfully" targeting terrorists have drowned the cries of the local population whose children, women, and men that have been killed in these attacks since a decade. Civilian casualties must not disappear from the human radar after being termed collateral damage. True, we cannot escape human tragedies for larger ends of the war

on terror, but we also need to take responsibility for errors of judgment, and devise better strategies to prevent collateral damage. In the spiral of war in the region, the Pakistani state appeared to be helpless, confining itself to issuing condemnations, while secretively cooperating with the United States. This duplicity did not work in the age of free media and open discussion. It has been common knowledge among the tribesmen that drones attacking the region could not operate without permission from the Pakistan authorities.

The advanced technology of push-button drone warfare is not capable of capturing the true image of the human and physical rubble it leaves behind and there is very little interest in digging through the rubble. The job to pull out their loved ones from the rubble and rush them to expanding graveyards is left to the villagers. The attackers, having done the job, move on to monitor other targets for the next attack. While the US government acknowledged and apologized for the death of two Western hostages, Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, held by Al Qaeda in the tribal region on April 23, 2015, the US drone warfare refuses to acknowledge the death of innocent Pakistani civilians.[31] What has happened and continues to happen in the tribal regions of Pakistan receives little or no sympathy due to non-transparency of the drone wars. International powers and Pakistan have ignored local security concerns, human rights issues, and the broader question of legality and morality of using drones in civilian areas.[32] Since 2005, the United States has launched 402 strikes killing an estimated 2,282–3,623 persons, of which 255–315 are reported be civilians, 1,851–3,030 militants and 176–278 have been "unknown."[33] In the fog of covert war, it is hard to know the actual number of people killed and very hard to make a distinction between civilians and militants in this region. The drone campaign has produced rather opposite effects—anger, alienation, and militancy. There are public protests against drone attacks in Pakistan, and some of the leaders have termed them as counter-productive to peace in the region.[34]

This part of Pakistan and the country itself has been dealing with the rubble of great power wars in Afghanistan for over thirty years. The border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the drone strikes frequently take place have been on the frontline of all the wars. Having been on the margins of the Pakistani state, these spaces have been occupied by terrorists of all shades and regions, including China, Central Asia, and the troubled Middle East. Their physical presence, arms and ammunition, and the monetary assistance coming from mysterious regional sources have upset the traditional social balance and power dynamics of these places. The local populations are caught between three threats—the warlords, the American drones, and the Pakistan military operations. They have been fending for themselves. With repeated military operations by the Pakistan Army, the terrorists have been relocating across the border into Afghanistan or melting into Pakistani soci-

ety. The local populations that have been displaced have little or no means to survive and continue to beg for international attention and rehabilitation. [35]

Once the dust of the war in and around Afghanistan gets settled, only then will the world truly know the scale of the damage inflicted on the local populations. The men and women in uniform and their political bosses have very different standards of measuring success in wars than those who have suffered the consequences. Our view is that there have been no winners in the Afghan wars; with not only each side sustaining tremendous damage but with uncountable loss of life and property of the local populations on whose turf and territories these wars have been fought. Such populations are on the margins of power and affluence and have been very badly affected. Naturally, they harbor feelings of hate and revenge, against both Pakistan and the United States—partners in the drone warfare, which may last very long.

WHOSE WAR IS THIS?

Pakistan's ruling groups have taken a lot of time to realize that the Islamic radicalism manifested in religious extremism and terrorism is a major threat to the stability and security of the country. They responded to the militancy very late when the militants had already established mini religious fiefdoms in Swat and the tribal agencies by ousting the governmental structure. While the terrorists were committing horrible atrocities, a large section of the political elite wanted to negotiate with the militants, allowing the militants a big space in the media and the society. The supporters of militants in the media and the religious parties had also captured the opportunity and advocated the narrative that posits that whose war the war on terror really was. Several of the Taliban groups presented themselves as aligned with the Afghan Taliban, who they believed were fighting a just and defensive war against the United States. The Taliban and their supporters portray themselves as holy warriors fighting for the enforcement of Islamic law and defenders of Pakistan against foreign interference. They attempted to de-legitimize the state by appropriating concepts of nationalism, sovereignty, and Islam. With a government created through an alliance of Islamist parties, the Taliban elements flourished in the tribal regions, and so did their parochial worldview. What was happening in the periphery was not an isolated phenomenon but part of a larger more complex project of capturing the Pakistani state by eliminating its authority, starting with regions where its presence was weak.

Religious groups throughout the country extended support to the militants in many ways such as attacking the state in the media for "provoking" trouble. The religious groups, and their spokesmen said nothing against the insurgents and their brutalities against the security forces, tribal chiefs, and political opponents. Their silence was a political statement of latent support to the

religious insurgency. In a convoluted logic, they often blamed the security forces and the government for the conflict situation more than the violent armed groups that committed unspeakably cruel acts against anyone they could capture and label as a state employee or sympathizer.[36] It was not difficult to understand the quiet support by religious groups to the insurgents, but what was hard to grasp was the silence of some of the mainstream political parties, intelligentsia, and other opinion-making sectors regarding this support. Most of the parties were ambivalent on the issue of religious violence. They appeared to be taking perverse pleasure in watching the Musharraf regime being challenged by religious extremists and their armed fronts. If these parties were in power, their politics and their response to the Taliban insurgency would not have been any different, and they would have adopted the same policies in the rest of the country. Sadly, political opportunism took the best of their judgment on the issue of religious violence and Talibanization. The opposition parties at that time wanted Musharraf to face the music alone because of their belief that he had created the mess by supporting the US-led War on Terror.[37] This was one of the biggest failures of Pakistan's political elite; they did not rise above the partisan lines, and therefore did not see the clear danger to the state and society.

The war on terror has caused Pakistan enormous damage. The first and foremost casualty is the image of the country. Every soft aspect of its rich culture, heritage, ancient history, its place as the meeting point of civilizations, and its majestic natural endowments—the mountains, peaks and valleys—no longer attract any attention or admiration. Pakistan has come to be seen only in terms of terrorism, acts of violence, extremism, corruption, and the failures of its leaders, organizations, and political class. This is even more problematic when juxtaposed with 'shining' India, whose proud image is growing fast making it better connected with the world powers than ever before. There is an open and much debated self-critique as well, that the country could do better and it is in big trouble with hardly any leader of any worth around to steer it back on to the rails of stability at home and respect and connectivity at the global stage.

Second, there has been a great economic cost of the war on terror. According to Government of Pakistan estimates, since 9/11 the country has incurred direct and indirect economic losses of $118.3 billion.[38] And the economic opportunity cost runs into hundreds of billions of rupees. Foreign Direct Investment has also been low, tourist traffic is negligible and resources have been primarily devoted to war efforts.[39] However, there are other factors, mostly domestic, such as power shortages, bad governance, ineffective policy, and high cost of doing business stemming from systematic corruption that have also adversely affected the economy.

Third, the security forces of the country have become spread too thin from continuously fighting against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in the

tribal regions bordering Afghanistan. An even bigger problem is reconstruction, administrative and political reforms, and transfer of control to civilian authority that seems to have become weakened. The burden and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of persons displaced by the conflict remains a gigantic task that remains unfinished. So far, nearly sixty-one percent of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been resettled, and the remaining would to be sent back to their regions by the end of 2016. [40]

It was after several disasters that the Pakistani elite, some very reluctantly, began to realize the dangers the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan's terrorism posed to the society. Terrorism is transnational in this region and its tentacles extend to the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. It is as much other powers' war as it is Pakistan's own war. There is no one reason, one factor or one type of national or regional actor that can be held responsible for the rise of radical forces combatting the country. In the course of this volume, we have alluded to quite a few of them, including Pakistan's own misadventures, wrong policy choices, and use of proxies. Since 2015, there has been a wider recognition that the Taliban are enemies of the state and society and they must be defeated. Some critics argue that the Pakistan has a soft corner for the Afghan Taliban, while it fights its own homegrown Taliban. [41] The declared policy of Pakistan is that a Taliban regime in Afghanistan will not be in the interest of the country.

TALIBANIZATION ON THE PERIPHERY

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, its affiliates and likeminded groups are children of the Afghan wars. Al Qaeda and its xenophobic vision of a global war against the West have influenced a jihadi mind-set of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan that has immediate and central security effects on Pakistan. Its other source of influence and inspiration is the Afghan Taliban movement. Its political conception, birth, and growth bear the deep imprint of this genealogy. The Taliban movements of Afghanistan and Pakistan have for long pursued a grand regional design of establishing an Islamic state or states by weakening the two states through chaos and terror first, and then raising militia to occupy the weakest territorial points. They have acquired deadly skills to terrorize people and hold them hostage by weakening the presence and writ of the state in the border regions. Their mission is to change the character of the Pakistani state to an Islamic state according to their interpretation and theological line. They demand that the Pakistani state enforce Islamic law; a part of their mission which is shared by the religious political parties. The difference between the two is, if any, on how to achieve this objective.

Unlike the religious political parties that generally pursue an institutional, democratic path to power, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has raised armed groups to battle the state and force it to accept their demands for the enforcement of the Sharia. They have used militias in every tribal agency and Swat and its adjoining districts to create mini Islamic states and establish their "Islamic" rule.[42] The process with which they were able to gradually evict the state from the tribal areas and established their power base is a long story. The traditional system of local power had begun to change since the Afghan jihad of the 1980s as local commanders (warlords) and militias with financial muscle, guns, and numbers began to assert a new form of authority. The real change in power relationships took place after the 2001 ouster of the Taliban regime next door in Afghanistan. The Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban had used this terrain and local contacts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) for their war in Afghanistan before. In 2001, the American-led offensive pushed them back into this difficult region where they struck deals with local commanders. During the anti-Soviet war and even before, these regions had been on the frontline of wars in and around Afghanistan. This harsh terrain proved to be an ideal sanctuary for the escaping Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders and fighters.

Bin Laden had for long cultivated relationships with some of the powerful religious and political groups in Pakistan for long, specifically since his entry into the Afghan jihad. A number of factors went in his favor. The Islamization under Zia and the rise of religious parties allied with him in the Afghan war paved the way for a global partnership with Al Qaeda. Bin Laden also reached out to win Islamist elements in the Pakistani media and some influential political leaders. The religious parties and Islamist media persons, by preaching anti-Americanism, have presented the actions of Al Qaeda and the Taliban as morally and politically justified. Because of a strong Islamist constituency in Pakistan, Al Qaeda and the Taliban have got a far greater return on their ideological investment than would normally be the case. Pakistan's religious right continues to give soft and open support to the Taliban and Al Qaeda by explaining terrorism and the present conflict in Pakistan as a reaction to the war in Afghanistan. This is a great fallacy that needs to be confronted and demolished if Pakistan wishes to restore its original vision of a liberal democratic state.

Pakistan's Afghanistan policy shift in the wake of 9/11 under the Musharraf regime failed to squeeze enough breathing space to the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements, despite some remarkable arrests and rendering of the ring leaders, such as Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. They hid in stateless or barely governed zones in the tribal territories. Their survival in the region required that they cultivate the support of trusted individuals and groups within the region. The Taliban in this region and from other areas were their natural partners, as radical Islamism and political designs for the future of Afghani-

stan bound them together. Local Taliban groups had carved out comfortable territorial fiefdoms and spaced out locally influential groups by the time Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders began to arrive. As they marched on with guns and thousands of recruits on their payroll, the writ of the Pakistani state began to shrink.

Having seen the administrative and security order of the tribal regions in 2004, for the first time in the history of the country, the Pakistan Army moved in to South Waziristan to attack militants who had established their base after fleeing from Afghanistan or from different parts of Pakistan. It was a big mix of nationalities—Arabs, Central Asians, Afghans, and Pakistanis. What united them was a common resolve and mission to assist and fight along with the Afghan Taliban against the American forces in Afghanistan. Under pressure from the United States to eliminate sanctuaries of the militants in this area, and in view of its commitments as an ally in the War on Terror, Pakistan had little choice but to take military action. It was not an easy choice, because of the treaties with tribes for joining Pakistan and several of the British debacles in this region informed the security establishment of high risks of deploying the army in the tribal areas. It was something of last resort, as other elements of its administration had lost authority, respect, and efficacy. The first campaign in 2004 proved to be costly with big loss of lives for the army, as the local populations stood with the militants under the leadership of Nek Mohammad. Against the advice of the political agents of the agency, the regional Corps Commander of the Pakistan Army personally met Nek Mohammad and signed a peace deal at Shakai in April 2004. It ended the skirmishes but not the power and influence of the militants. The agreement, a first of its kind, lionized the militants and raised their stature and recognition.[43] The militants wanted to control the front-line of the Taliban war into Afghanistan, while demanding a sort of impunity and autonomy for their actions. For long, the United States had insisted that it could not succeed in its war in Afghanistan without eliminating sanctuaries on the Pakistani side of the border regions. It saw ambivalence and ambiguity in Pakistan's policy in this region, and even unwillingness to combat the militants. Unhappy with Pakistan's reluctance to take on the militants, the United States decided to eliminate militant leadership, including the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda by using drone strikes. The first one killed Nek Mohammad in June 2004, which set in motion the start of a wider and deeper war of revenge from all sides. The Pakistani forces found themselves fighting the tribesmen that had avowed to avenge the casualties of the drone strike. The security forces signed a second peace deal, with Baitullah Mehsud two years later in 2005 and even though the security forces signed two peace agreements with him, the new leader continued to build his army and bring more areas under his control. The fateful decision of the military ruler Pervez Musharraf to invade the *lal masjid* (red mosque) in the heart of Islamabad to eliminate a

cleric and his associates, holding up in the barricaded compound in July 2007, pushed the conflict to a new level.[44] The mosque had a reputation for radicalism, which it has retained, and had been a center of radical activity and gathering of Afghan war veterans with alleged links with the militants operating in the border regions and Afghanistan.[45] It is questionable whether the military operation against a mosque that had been besieged effectively was necessary, especially because negotiations to surrender were still underway. The liberalist circles insisted that the mosque and its clerics had challenged the writ of the state in the capital, and succumbing to their blackmail would send a bad message to the militants in the periphery. The religious political parties, Islamist groups, and militant organizations termed the operation unnecessary and a massacre of innocent students. The controversy continues over how many were killed, who they were, and whether or not such a military action was warranted.[46] The militant narrative about the operation has been very different; they believe that it was wrong and unjust that hundreds of innocent students were killed.[47] With this operation began a new wave of Talibanization in Pakistan and within a few months' time, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan emerged as an umbrella organization of the militants in the tribal regions.

Their first targets were the tribal chiefs that played the role of intermediaries between the Pakistani state and the local populations; about 115 of them have been murdered in the tribal areas and adjacent districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[48] It took the form of a class conflict in a tribal setting, as the subaltern tribal sections empowered by the spirit of radical Islam generously funded by Pakistani and Middle Eastern benefactors turned their guns on their powerful traditional leaders. The tribal chiefs formed a formidable social barrier that the Taliban had to break to take on the next target: the weak symbols of the Pakistan state.[49] After killing hundreds of them and forcing others to flee the region, they went for the ill-trained and ill-equipped Frontier Constabulary (FC) and Khasadars (village police force). Without the supportive tribal chiefs, the FC began to wither away in the face of the brutality of the Taliban. Thus the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan established their "Islamic" rule using unimaginable cruelty that would pale every atrocity committed by tyrants of the past.[50] They delivered their version of justice, maintained order by silencing opponents, and taxed whatever economic activity was left in the area. The scent of power and glorification of violence lured drug traffickers and criminals of all shades to the local warlords.[51] It was for the first time that the Pakistani state lost control of such a large part of its territory.

The rise of another Taliban group in Swat and Malakand administrative divisions followed the same pattern. This region is known for its natural beauty and tourism; both demographically and in terms of social development is far ahead of Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Moreover, it is

relatively developed, the people are moderate, and the society underwent good levels of social development when it was a princely state.[52] However, there remains inequality between the dominant landowning class and the landless peasants. The Pashtuns rulers proscribed non-Pashtun groups to own land, and since then have considered the Pashtun as a lower class in the social ladder. This provided a social base for the Taliban recruitment in Swat.[53] Inequality, real and perceived, was one of the major reasons of the rise of the Taliban under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah, popularly known as Mullah Radio. Since the killing of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Hakeemullah Mehsud, Fazlullah had taken over the command of the Taliban. He used illegal FM radio stations to broadcast threatening sermons and issue fatwas against the government functionaries to intimidate them and those who resisted his rising rule were eliminated by his cronies. He found radio to be a powerful tool for preaching jihad and collecting money, mostly from helpless and vulnerable housewives whose husbands sent them money from the Gulf States.[54]

This region had seen turmoil in the early nineties when Sufi Mohammad, Fazlullah's father-in-law, launched Tehrik Nifaz Shariate-i-Muhammadi (TNSM), a movement to promulgate Islamic laws in the region. Before the princely state of Swat was re-designated as a part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, its laws and court system functioned according to Islamic law. The law and justice system was in a way traditional, well-rooted, inexpensive, and popular among people. Extension of national courts and the legal system failed to get traction. As elsewhere in the country, it takes years, even decades to get a decision; it is expensive and does not have the people's trust. It was largely this replacement of the legal and judicial order that produced the TNSM, and later the Sharia courts under the Taliban rule. The sentiments for promulgating Islamic law continued to simmer for decades. The political and social climate of the region changed with the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001and the end of the Taliban regime. After international coalition forces attacked the Taliban regime in Kabul, Sufi led thousands of young men from this area to fight in support of the Taliban.[55] The adventurist Sufi was advised by fellow clerics of the region not to take his fighters into Afghanistan; advice that he rejected.[56] The results were catastrophic for the young fighters. On return, Sufi Mohammad was arrested, later convicted and spent most of his time in prison. The most negative impact of his fateful decision was on his leadership of the Sharia enforcement in the region. Maulana Fazlullah, representing a younger and more hardline generation of Sharia activists took over the movement. He had been at odds with Sufi on making compromises with the authorities; Fazlullah was, and has been unwilling to make any concessions. The rise of Fazlullah and his brand of Islamization of Swat and adjoining regions forced the police and other agencies of the state to wither away in fear. The Pakistani state lost vast regions of Swat and Malakand in the North

and South Waziristan in the northwest as the Taliban groups strengthened their control.

The Talibanization of Pakistan occurred rapidly from 2004 to 2008 under the demoralized and delegitimized regime of Pervez Musharraf. The Taliban leaders had rich battle experience from Afghanistan, had acquired Al Qaeda's techniques of mass murder, and were combat ready with dedicated fighters and hundreds, if not thousands, of suicide bombers. These suicide bombers were mostly young teenagers that had been brainwashed, indoctrinated, and trained in the tribal sanctuaries of the Taliban.

Confronting this new threat was a daunting task for the Pakistani state, for multiple reasons. To begin with, it had to prepare for a long war with numerous militant groups. The Army rank and file, trained and indoctrinated to fight India, was mentally and tactically ill-prepared to fight its "own people"—militant Muslims. The Army's morale was low and there was very low public and media support for any military action. The pro-Taliban Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal had governments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (2002–2007), which blocked any proposed military action. The military, in turn, could not take action without the approval and cooperation of the provincial governments.[57] Fortified in Swat, radical Islamists saw a real chance of driving the Pakistani state out and changing the character of the regions, they came to occupy on the periphery through an organized, transnational, and integrated militant strategy.

In their rise, terror was the primary instrument to undermine the confidence of the public in the state as their protector. Their tactics of kidnapping, torture (often on camera), suicide bombings, and public executions had tremendous psychological effects on the local populations. The Pakistani state under Musharraf suffered from indecision, leading to a failure in grasping the magnitude of the threat that was growing larger by the day. Even as the terrorists sadistically tortured captured security forces personnel and perpetrated unspeakable cruelty against their civilian victims, religious parties and apologist media persons drew a positive picture of the Taliban and blamed everything on "hidden" hands and "foreign" powers, thereby confusing the public by effectively claiming that the Taliban could never have done such things.

The Pakistani state tried all peaceful means: negotiations, entering into accords, and making tough compromises, in the vain hope to reestablish its writ and bring peace to Taliban-infested regions. It signed roughly six to seven accords with different Taliban groups at different times. The Taliban leaders accused the state of non-compliance on its end of the agreements, often reneged on their commitments and continued to exercise their power within their territorial domains. These had negligible success in stopping Talibanization, because the fundamental interests of the Pakistani state collided with the program of Al Qaeda-backed Taliban. By early 2009, Pakistan

reached a point of reckoning: how much more could it concede to the Taliban before military action against the militants became necessary. Skeptics home and abroad, and those spinning conspiracy theories, saw the security forces conniving with the Taliban. This is an impression that has lingered on since the decade of Islamism's second wave, when Pakistani intelligence agencies forged links with private jihadist outfits operating in Afghanistan and the Indian-held Kashmir.

THE MILITARY OPERATIONS

April 2009 proved to be the turning point. The Pakistan Army launched its biggest operation against the Taliban in Swat and Malakand to reclaim the region from Maulana Fazlullah's militia.[58] The region saw a huge evacuation of the local population with hundreds of thousands leaving their homes for safer locations.[59] The Taliban fighters lost the cover of the local populations, whose sacrifice of displacement paid off, and the Taliban had to confront Pakistani forces in an open arena clear of civilians. The Taliban had been in control of the Swat region for about two years, dispensing their own brand of 'justice' and terrorizing local population. Within two months, the military, by marching around 40,000 troops in the battle rooted out the Taliban from every part of the region, killing about 1,700 militants and forcing its leaders to flee the country. Three factors worked in favor of the military; public support against the Taliban, the numbers they deployed against the Taliban, and the retraining and re-equipping that the Pakistan army had been undertaking prior to the Swat operation.[60] The Pakistan military had confronted Taliban militias in Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, and Khyber with mixed success where it learned two important lessons. First, the war against the militants was going to be long, and second, it had to create stakeholders among the public, media, and the political class. Consolidation of the government writ in these areas has been a daunting task but it has been achieved. The security forces have succeeded in eliminating remnant cells of the Taliban and their fighters that have escaped into the adjoining regions of Afghanistan. From their sanctuaries in Afghanistan they have been attacking members of the village defense committees, landowners, and prominent persons, such as Malala Yousafzai, who is today a global icon.[61]

Before the start of the bigger and decisive military campaign *Zarb-e-Azb* on June 15, 2014 (that is ongoing since then in North Waziristan), the forces had launched four major operations in different parts of the tribal agencies. The major difference is that *Zarb-e-Azb* targeted all groups that had been under the control of the militants for several years in areas, which were considered too difficult, in terms of terrain and social fabric of the society, to deploy large forces against. Within a year, the military rooted out militants

from the major centers and began reconstruction of infrastructure, mainly roads. Most important, the army gained the trust of the local populations, first by evacuating them safely, and later by aiding their resettlement, even though the latter has been increasingly difficult because of the destruction of the war, and emergence of new security threats.[62] The cost of displacement of population, destruction of infrastructure, including hundreds of schools—a favorite target of the Taliban—is incalculable.

The real success was not that the security forces defeated the Taliban in their strongholds and were able to take territory back from them; it was that they were able to gain public support for the military operations. The tide of public opinion turned against the Taliban when they issued videos of soldiers being tortured and slaughtered like animals. They also declared fundamental symbols of the Pakistani state, the constitution and the superior courts, as un-Islamic. The Taliban worldview, their propaganda and violent extremism has never impressed mainstream Pakistani society and their influence has remained confined to a very narrow band of extremists that have never found any respect or major following. The problem is that even with much smaller numbers and being on the fringes of the society, they have acquired a deadly capacity to harm people and national security through terrorism.

As the violent extremism of the Taliban became increasingly apparent on millions of television screens across Pakistan, a sense of revulsion and anger built up against them. The Pakistani political class, particularly from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, for the first time, felt genuinely threatened by the Taliban as the militias, after capturing the state authority at the seams, threatened to move to the center. The threat unified the ranks of mainstream political parties, forcing them to lend political support to army action against the Taliban. As people in different parts of the country saw the real face of radical Islam—medieval beheadings, chopping of limbs, burning victims alive, and other acts of unspeakable torture—they realized what was in store for everyone if the Taliban succeeded. The Taliban brutalities had no bounds; they even attacked the Army Public School in Peshawar on December 16, 2014 and brutally massacred students and teachers in hundreds.[63] The true face of Islamic radicalism emerged clearer than ever with this tragic episode. It created two major political effects. First, it forced the conservative religious groups to finally come out of a state of denial. Having fed themselves and the public the 'Good Taliban' theme, they had previously denied that the Taliban could be involved in such horrendous acts. It had been a part of the politics of misinformation that even the most educated from the middle class social ranks shifted the blame to some invisible forces, foreign conspiracies, and anti-Pakistan intelligence agencies. This has been the staple argument of Pakistan's closet Taliban, an equally dangerous lot, who foment radicalism by creating confusion in society about who the real enemy is.

Second, the political parties, both mainstream and religious, even those that had advocated for negotiations with the Taliban came out very openly in support of the military operation. The military and the civilians in a rare national consensus agreed to end the menace of extremism and terrorism in every form and from every nook and corner of the country. The National Action Program (NAP) represents that consensus.[64] Its Twenty-Point program includes every aspect of extremism and dedicates institutional resources and responsibilities at all levels to end terrorism; from curbing hate-speech, ending glorification of terrorists in the media, to reforming FATA and the madrassas.[65] It is ambitious in its vision but provides key parts of the road map Pakistan must follow to secure itself from extremism and terrorism. By all indicators, while progress on military operations has been a remarkable success, the civilian government even after two years has been slow on the implementation of its part of NAP responsibilities with respect to the resurfacing of banned militant organizations, revival of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority, and the continued media coverage to extremists and terrorists.[66] No promised reforms have been enacted yet to change the national narrative, except some extraordinary measures that included the establishment of military courts to try terrorists and the lifting of the moratorium on execution of condemned prisoners. Both these measures have been controversial and have produced little visible effects on the society.[67]

The military operations in North Waziristan have been a remarkable success. Security forces have achieved at least two critical objectives, i.e. taken the areas back from the militants, and retained military hold on them. The third objective to rebuild society and communities is more difficult. Rebuilding is about resettling populations, training and equipping local security forces, and transferring control to the civilian authorities. The delay in post-conflict reconstruction due to lack of resources continues to make the situation tenuous, but not entirely irreversible even in the face of so many resources expended and lives lost to secure it in the first place. The real problem again, is weak capacity of the civilian governing institutions, i.e. the police, civil administration, and the political arrangement. They have taken too much time to rebuild the institution to facilitate withdrawal of the armed forces. The other problem is reforming and restricting of Federally Administered Tribal Areas, its mainstreaming, and giving up the old system of governance. The reform committee established for this purpose has yet to make recommendations.[68] In the meantime, controversy rages between those who would like to merge Federally Administered Tribal Areas with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and those who would like to restructure it into a new province. An overwhelming number of political parties with influence in the region support merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. But such a landmark reform process, hypothetical at the moment, will be just the beginning of normalizing the conflict zone.[69]

THE BIGGER CHALLENGE: NARRATIVE AND REFORMS

The Pakistani state faces a multitude of problems in the war against terrorism, which is most likely to be a long war during which Pakistan will have to maintain public support at home and a flow of adequate resources from friendly countries, such as the United States that supports military operations through the Coalition Support Fund. At the same time, it will be important that Pakistan sustains the morale of the armed forces. The speed at which Pakistan can consolidate its gains against the Taliban militia depend largely on whether or not the Pakistani political class, known for its incompetence and ineffectiveness, sticks together in reviving the moderate character of the state and society.

In the final analysis, the war against terrorism cannot be won without engaging in yet another long war; this is the war of ideas against intolerance and extremism. This is necessitated by the fact that major themes of culture and politics in the Muslim world, including Pakistan, continue to oscillate sharply between modernity and radical Islam, between secularism and absolutist religious worldviews, between communitarian identity and individual rights, and between an abstract non-territorial conception of the *ummah* (Islamic community) and territorial state based on citizenship. The problem is that Pakistan has gradually moved away from its liberal pluralistic foundation to an increasingly confused state, where the "pathological and abnormal" has become "normal" such as massive corruption of the elite and a culture of complete impunity, weakened state institutions, and poor state of governance. This makes the Pakistani ship rudderless, only driven and afloat by the sheer energy and resilience of its people. Thus, the conflict within cannot be won without material progress of society, with a wider social spread and a focus on the poor, and rooted in strong values of equality and social justice. Otherwise, the young suicide terrorist, a deadly weapon in the hands of the Taliban, will continue to be attracted by the promise of paradise, taking along with him the security, peace, and progress of society.

NOTES

1. "Total Warfare," *News International*, May 10, 2010.
2. Sarah Eleazar, "The Day Horror Invaded the Park," *New York Times*, March 30, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/opinion/the-day-horror-invaded-the-park.html.
3. "200 TNSM Volunteers Reach Kunar" *Dawn*, October 30, 2001.
4. William Claiborne, "The Press and Unintended Consequences in Afghanistan," Nieman Watchdog, September 23, 2010, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=490.
5. Zachary Laub, "The Taliban in Afghanistan," CFR Backgrounders (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

6. The defense appears to be stronger among some clerics belonging to Deobandi sect. Author's interviews in Chistian, March 23, 2016, and Peshawar, March 25, 2016.

7. "Taliban Narrative," *Dawn*, April 7, 2014; "JUI Chief Tells US Change Foreign Policy to Uproot Terrorism," *Dawn*, September 11, 2011.

8. Kamran Asdar Ali, "Pakistani Islamists Gamble on the General," *Middle East Research and Information Project*, vol. 34, Summer 2004, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer231/pakistani-islamists-gamble-general.

9. Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 199–206.

10. "US Threatened to Bomb Pakistan, Says Musharraf," *Telegraph*, September 22, 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1529561/US-threatened-to-bomb-Pakistan-says-Musharraf.html.

11. Humeira Iqtidar, *Secularizing Islamists? Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-ud-Da'wa in Urban Pakistan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 161.

12. Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 219.

13. Nadia Naviwala, "Playing Hardball with Aid to Pakistan," *Foreign Policy*, September 4, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/04/playing-hardball-with-aid-to-pakistan/.

14. "Fazl Warns of Jihad over Tribal Action: Issue Can Be Resolved within Days," *Dawn*, September 12, 2004; "MMA Criticizes Musharraf," *Dawn*, December 9, 2002.

15. Michael R. Gordon, "Q. and A. with Former US Commander in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, January 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/world/asia/q-and-a-with-gen-stanley-mcchrystal.html.

16. "Afghan Taliban Leadership Is in Pakistan, Admits Aziz," *Express Tribune*, March 3, 2016.

17. See Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship," *Asian Survey* n 31, No. 6 (June 1991): 496–511.

18. Mateen Haider, "Dossiers of Indian Hand in Terrorism Handed over to UN Chief: Aziz," *Dawn*, October 2, 2015.

19. Alyssa Ayres, *Why the United States Should Work with India to Stabilize Afghanistan*, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 53 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2015), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/why-united-states-should-work-india-stabilize-afghanistan/p36414.

20. Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, And the Future of the Global Jihad* (Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press, 2011), 121–124; Husain Haqqani, *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013); Daniel S. Markey, *No Exit from Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

21. Salman Masood, "Pakistan Releases Video of Indian Officer, Saying He's a Spy," *New York Times*, March 29, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/asia/pakistan-releases-video-of-indian-officer-saying-hes-a-spy.html?_r=0.

22. Rashid, *Pakistan on the Brink*, 56.

23. For this argument, see Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "*Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008).

24. "Afghanistan Must Share Power with Taliban, Says Musharraf," *Dawn*, February 26, 2015; Vali R. Nasr, "America's Last Task in Kabul," *New York Times*, April 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/opinion/nasr-americas-last-task-in-kabul.html.

25. Rod Nordland, "Taliban Say They Won't Attend Peace Talks, but Officials Aren't Convinced," *New York Times*, March 5, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/world/asia/taliban-say-they-wont-attend-peace-talks-but-officials-arent-convinced.html.

26. Michael D. Shear, "Afghan Strategy Has Loomed over Obama Presidency," *New York Times*, June 22, 2011, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/afghan-strategy-has-loomed-over-obama-presidency/.

27. Ahmad Rashid, "Advantage: Taliban," he *New York Times*, December 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/opinion/11rashid.html.

28. Anwarullah Khan, "82 Die as Missiles Rain on Bajour: Pakistan owns up to strike; locals blame US drones," *Dawn*, October 31, 2006.

29. Author's interviews with clerics in Peshawar, March 25, 2016.

30. An excellent comment on the state and the tribe from colonial to modern times and the response of the tribal society to the war on terror, see, Akbar Ahmed, *The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

31. Greg Miller, "Hostages' Deaths Raise Wider Questions about Drone Strikes' Civilian Toll," *Washington Post*, April 23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hostages-deaths-raise-wider-questions-about-drone-strikes-civilian-toll/2015/04/23/c70568f6-e9e5-11e4-9767-6276fc9b0ada_story.html.

32. Ellen Laipson, "Is Obama's Transparency on Drone Policy too Little too Late?" *Stimson Spotlight.* (Stimson Center: Washington, DC, March 8, 2016), http://www.stimson.org/content/obamas-transparency-drone-policy-too-little-too-late.

33. "American Antiterrorism Wars," New America, n.d., http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan-analysis.html.

34. Salman Masood and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, "Thousands in Pakistan Protest American Drone Strikes," *New York Times*, November 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/in-pakistan-rally-protests-drone-strikes.html.

35. Millions of people have been uprooted by military operation in Swat, and seven tribal agencies. Internally displaced persons from Swat have been repatriated and the painful process of document and resettling is on for other areas. "North Waziristan IDPs Figure Reaches 800,000," *Dawn*, July 8, 2014.

36. Zubair Torwali, "Swat-Paradise Lost," *Friday Times* 25,no. 28, August 23–29, 2013.

37. This view has persisted. Some continue to believe that Musharraf for his own personal interests—legitimacy and need for international support—made a wrong choice of aligning with the United States in war in Afghanistan.

38. *Pakistan Economic Survey, 2015–16* (Islamabad: Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, 2015), 280. See also, "Since 9/11, Pakistan Lost $118.3 Billion to Terror," *Express Tribune*, June 3, 2016.

39. See *Pakistan Economic Survey 2015–16* (Islamabad: Economic Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan, June 2016); Imtiaz Alam, "Political Economy of Doom," *News International*, June 9, 2016.

40. "Gains in Operations but NAP Needs Govt Action: Army," *Dawn*, June 16, 2016.

41. "Afghan President Calls on Pakistan to Battle Taliban," *Dawn*, April 25, 2016.

42. The names of seven tribal agencies are Khyber Agency, Mohmand Agency, Bajaur Agency, Orakzai Agency, Kurram Agency, South Waziristan, and North Waziristan.

43. Babar Sattar, "The Revenge Argument," *Dawn*, September 30, 3013.

44. Carlotta Gall and Salman Masood, "At Least 40 Militants Dead as Pakistan Military Storms Mosque after Talks Fail," *New York Times*, July 10, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/world/asia/10pakistan.html?_r=0.

45. Khaled Ahmed, "What Really Happened at Lal Masjid," *Friday Times*, December 21–27, 2012.

46. Azam Khan, "Five Years On—Lal Masjid Controversy Rises from the Dead," *Express Tribune*, December 2, 2012.

47. "The Lal Masjid Massacre," *Inquilab Pakistan,* https://inquilabpakistan.wordpress.com/the-lal-masjid-massacre-the-true-story/.

48. During the past fourteen years, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan affiliated groups have killed 115 tribal chiefs in the FATA agencies and adjacent districts in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). The details are as follows: Bajaur—fourteen, Mohmand—two, Khyber—two, South Waziristan—twenty-four, North Waziristan—twenty-six, Kohat—twelve, and Tank—thirty-five. Calculated on the basis of document provided by the FATA Secretariat, Peshawar, June 2016.

49. Sadia Qasim Shah, "The Silent Heroes of War against Taliban," *Dawn*, June 12, 2012.

50. "Taliban and Beheading of Soldiers," *Dawn*, July 19, 2012.

51. Dania Ahmed, "Heroin and Extremism in Pakistan," *Foreign Policy*, August 17, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/17/heroin-and-jihad-in-pakistan/; Anwar Iqbal, "Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Using Drug Money to Fund Activities," *Dawn*, December 9, 2014.

52. Sultan-i-Rome, *Swat (1915–1969) from Genesis to Merger: An Analysis of Political, Administrative, Socio-Political, and Economic Development* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008).

53. Kaiser Bengali, "Understanding Swat," *Dawn*, March 1, 2009; Khalid Aziz and Hlge Lura, *Swat: Main Cause of the Rise of Militancy,* Policy Brief, June 2010, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/121829/PB-06–10-Lurås%20and%20Aziz.pdf.

54. Sahar Gul, *Women's Perceptions about Religious Extremism/Talibanization and Military Operation: A Case Study of Malakand Division* (Islamabad: National Commission for the Status of Women, Government of Pakistan, July 2009).

55. See Robert Nichols, *A History of Pashtun Migration 1775–2006* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 160–161.

56. Author's interview with the Maulana, at Khairabad, Peshawar, April 2016.

57. Hassan Belal Zaidi, "MMA Supported Rise of Fazlullah, Says Ex-GOC Swat," *Dawn*, September 10, 2015.

58. "Operation in Swat Intensified: ISPR," *Dawn*, May 11, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/news/850847/operation-in-swat-intensified-ispr.

59. "New Influx of 800,000 IDPs Expected from Swat," *Dawn*, May 10, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/news/463511/newspaper/column.

60. "Pakistan Takes on the Taliban," *Economist* 392, no. 8641 (July 25, 2009): 37–38.

61. Zia ur-Rehman and Declan Walsh, "With Taliban's Revival, Dread Returns to Swat Valley," *New York Times*, July 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/world/asia/with-talibans-revival-dread-returns-to-swat.html?_r=0.

62. Muhammad Amir Rana, "Zarb-i-Azab, One Year On," *Dawn*, June 14, 2015.

63. Ismael Khan, "Taliban Massacre 131 Schoolchildren: Principal among 141 Dead in Attack on Army Public School, Peshawar," *Dawn*, December 17, 2014.

64. "National Action Plan Hailed," *Dawn*, December 26, 2014.

65. Khawar Ghumman, "15 Committees Tasked with Execution of Action Plan," *Dawn*, December 28, 2014.

66. In a briefing at the second anniversary of Operation Zarb-i-Azab in North Waziristan the ISPR shared the following statistics: 3,500 terrorists were killed, 992 hideouts destroyed, 253 tons of explosives recovered, 7,599 improvised explosive devices factories destroyed, 2,841 and 35,310 mines and rockets, respectively, seized. The army conducted 19,347 intelligence-based operations in which 213 terrorists were killed, 490 troops have lost their lives. "Gains in Operations but NAP Needs Govt Action: Army," *Dawn*, June 16, 2016.

67. Amir Wasim, "Government Accused of Going Slow on Implementation of National Action Program," *Dawn*, April 21, 2015.

68. "FATA Reform Committee," *Dawn*, February 15, 2016.

69. "Fata Reforms," *Dawn*, June 15, 2016; Khalid Aziz, "FATA Reforms an Opportunity," *Dawn*, November 30, 2015.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

Reviving the State and Society

What we have argued in this study is that the challenge of radical Islam can only be met through reforming the Pakistani state, by making it truly democratic and modernist in outlook as well as in its institutional and policy manifestations. We have made several references in different contexts in the previous chapters to explain the modernist vision of the founders of the country and its relevance today, and what this progress toward this mission would mean in the present social and political context of Pakistan. Modernity, like democracy, may be contextualized in a particular culture or civilization but is not essentially driven by them. Some of the norms of modernity, such as rationalism, pragmatic search toward workable solutions, and scientific inquiry are value-neutral in our view, a view some Muslim scholars may not be comfortable with. [1]

Pakistan is a big country, a nuclear power, and at the intersection of three geo-strategic regions. It is both in the eye of the violent storm and in the eyes of the world for being the second largest Muslim country located at the edge of raging sectarian fires in the Middle East at the crossroads of energy resources and economic corridors. The latter present big opportunities to integrate with China and Central Asia while maintaining its traditionally Western orientation. The real challenge is how it charts its own course of action toward stability and economic development. It requires reviving, rebuilding and normalizing within itself and with the neighboring states, specifically with Afghanistan with whom its future prospects are tied.

Pakistan has accumulated a large number of problems, which hit its citizens hard in the face every day. We have examined quite a few of them in the previous chapters—terrorism, political apathy of the ruling elite, rampant

corruption, issues of legitimacy of ruling elites, a questionable law and order situation, and a ballooning population with a heavy youth bulge. All these problems and many more have kept the country on the brink of failure. In fact, some of the major actors in the Pakistani drama of power politics—the political elites—for decades have deliberately been working hard to keep the country unstable, ungovernable, and in perpetual crisis. While they and their masters benefit from the chaos, the common Pakistani suffers and pays the cost. Is there a way out? The answer is unequivocally yes, but it will require a new breed of leadership, progressive vision, political courage, and capacity to build consensus on vital reform issues. These are some of the political goods that are in short supply. In the following pages we look at some structural issues that may impede Pakistan's revival as a moderate and progressive state but also examine some of the successes, signs of hope, and opportunities in this quest.

CONFRONTING VIOLENT GROUPS

No state or society can maintain its integrity and sovereignty without social order and political peace, let alone develop true to its potential. Pakistan has lost the opportunity to develop itself for many reasons with political violence being one of the primary reasons. For the last two decades, many types of religious, political, sectarian, and ethnic groups have chosen violent means to achieve their political and ideological ends. This is a reflection of weak state capacities from the implementation of law and order to the judicial system. The country and its society have endured the pain of violence for too long. The hardiness of the Pakistani society—something that observers inside and outside the country often refer to—is not enough.[2] In Pakistan's context, "hardiness" means the ability of Pakistan to trudge along while carrying the heavy load of extremism, political violence, and wide proliferation of networks of militancy. Violence, in its many forms in the Pakistani society, is a much broader and much deeper political issue. Violence is a willful act perpetuated for multiple purposes, depending on the character of the organization and its politics. Among them, religious, sectarian, ethnic, and political forms of violence have shaped the strategies of violent groups.

The actors and forces behind violence have chosen their means by reasons of the prevalent culture of impunity. There is the belief among these groups that they can get away with violence because of the weaknesses of the political order, weak capacity of the state institutions or those who control these institutions. For decades, the deterrent and punitive capacity of the state has been declining for well-known reasons of apathy and the self-centered agenda of power groups. In fact, violence pays them well in terms of money, power, influence, and ideological and political agenda, it has inspired more

groups to organize along these lines. The vicious nexus between power and violence has continued to reinforce itself, in some places more than in others, depending on the presence and effectiveness of the state institutions.

Despite the exposure to the elements and the ensuing rust, the steel frame of the Pakistani state is still very strong in the institutional sense. It can strengthen this frame further and use it more effectively to mobilize national resources and social energies to salvage the country from violence and extremism. The country has made a good beginning, rather turned a page, with the much-awaited and desired operation in North Waziristan in 2014 aimed at the Taliban sanctuaries to end their rule over the local populations. But going after the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in select geographies, which indeed is a must in winning the war against violent groups, may not be enough. The state must address the root causes of the emergence of violent groups from social inequities, injustice, to poor delivery of social services, and justice. It also needs to combine hard power with the soft power of its culture, traditional institutions, modern education and employment opportunities. The National Action Plan, a consensual and comprehensive program of action to deal with violent groups, lends hope that all spots infested by terrorists, criminal gangs, and mafias would be cleared. The lesson Pakistan must learn from its own painful history and from the experience of other nations is that tolerance of one form of violence breeds other forms of political violence. Therefore, the issue is not that what type of violence has a more urgent call to be addressed but all forms, everywhere and no matter what its sources are, need to be addressed. Whether there are genuine grievances leading to violence, or the mayhem is part of a deliberate design to pull the country down, both must be confronted.

RETHINKING GEOPOLITICAL REALISM

Since Pakistan's independence, the common theme in scholarship pertaining to national security has been fear and sense of insecurity. Embedding this fear was the perception of the security planners in the early years, when the strategic environment of the country was insecure on account of an imbalance of power and the adversarial intentions attributed to India. In the later decades, a weak Afghanistan was seen providing space and facilities to Pakistan's adversaries. Pakistan's assumptions of regional geopolitics and what shaped its responses to it were based on a realist outlook on national security discourses. Not all of this is fiction or fictitious because some hard historical facts support it—the Indian occupation of the Kashmir region in the early years of independence, intervention in East Pakistan, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the many secret wars that the two countries have fought

on Pakistani soil give a lot of support to the realist understanding of the world which is popular among the security analysts.

However, understanding the nature of threats and where they are coming from and why, is just half of the work. The real challenge is how to diffuse and end the threats, and in case they persist how to fight them effectively on one's own terms. While no country in the world can hope to change its neighbors or easily persuade them to value peace and cooperation, it is possible to change their bilateral conduct by certain policies and specific kinds of politics. In the context of internal and external security threats to Pakistan today, it is not easy to reject traditional notions of geopolitical determinism, but they must be revisited with some critical reevaluation. More attention should be accorded to the opportunities that might be changing the regional climate than on the conventional constraints. Pakistan has a choice to live in the past or live in the present and future—the first may keep it embroiled in conflict, the second option may lift it up.

One of the sources of Pakistan's troubles is its sense of regional location—where it happens to be and where it wants to go. It is a question of regional identity: Pakistan's South Asian identity, and its cultural, historical, and religious heritage is linked to this vast region and it cannot be rejected nor is it desirable to do so. A rising India with a thickening strategic partnership with the United States and the rising power and arrogance of the conservative Hindu nationalists dominating the security establishment of India, should be, and are, concerns for Pakistan. But the choice should not be between capitulation and confrontation and requires a pragmatic approach in seeking mutual benefits more through the vision of the future than the problems and grievances of the past. One important text of realism that many countries around the world, including Pakistan, tend to ignore is that change is a permanent law of the historical process.

Changes within the country, such as those in science, technology, society, economics, in the regional landscape, and the world affect bilateral and multilateral relationships. It is as a result of these changes that we see the United States, a three-time strategic partner of Pakistan, moving closer to India. To the credit of India and its leadership, they understood the logic of change in the international environment. Pakistan can do the same and is capable of doing it and it can transform its geopolitics of fear into geopolitics of opportunity through three ways. First, it must pursue a coherent national reform agenda in every field with a focus on the economy, development of natural resources, and political stability. It is a matter of debate as to who can or will do this, but this has to be undertaken, as Pakistan cannot escape the logic of history, globalization, and regional transformations. Second, Pakistan must make effective use of diplomacy to create a peaceful neighborhood with economic interests at the center of it. Finally, Pakistan should look north-west, toward China and Central Asia, for policy prescription with

trade, energy, and power corridors offering vast opportunities. In the process, it can become an important and vibrant link between these regions and the Subcontinent.

BACK TO PLURALISM

Since very old times, the region that now constitutes Pakistan has been pluralistic. Multiple faiths, creeds, religions, ethnicities, castes, and tribes have lived together, more or less, in peace and harmony although, never completely free from tension or the possibility of an eruption of conflict. Besides a shared historical heritage, there are other layers such as culture, language, social group solidarity and, more than anything else, individual and group interests that can help keep a pluralistic society together. Pakistani pluralism, since the inception of the country, has been under stress and continues to be so for several reasons.

Pakistan as a common homeland for all faiths would have been a far better place to live for citizens than the popular idea of Muslim Pakistan at the time of Partition from the British Indian Empire in 1947. The momentous events that led to the Partition gave a deathblow to religious pluralism in many parts of Pakistan, mainly in Punjab that was the largest province and the social and political trendsetter. It is besides the point to go into explanations of communalism, violence, and the migration that took place at that traumatic time.[3] The historical continuity of thousands of years broke down in a matter of months; they were no longer members of a single human community with common bonds of culture, language and city, town and locality but instead became alien to one another through becoming members of two new nations. Transmigration of populations was never a part of the partition plan, but the communal frenzy, collapse of the state institutions, and partiality of the police spread fear, insecurity, and violence against the minority communities on both sides of the borders.

The forced migration of Hindus and Sikhs from provinces constituting Pakistan was violent, arbitrary, and mostly driven by greed for reasons of grabbing property and business, as it was on the other side of the new border. But religious difference became an identity-marker of a new nation and the newly formed countries witnessed fanaticism and bigotry. While India, being large and diverse, has generally succeeded in maintaining its diversity and pluralism, outbursts of violence against minorities by majority communities are also common there. However, its democracy has given a voice to its minorities that is necessary to seek balance and protection through the ballot box and law. With the thousands of problems that India faces today, its diversity and pluralism, though mind-boggling, are not in as bad health, as they are in Pakistan.

In Pakistan, religious minorities have constitutional and legal safeguards, but quite often, they are not effective in the climate of intolerance. Actually, minorities are not protected enough by the state institutions and find themselves insecure. Their sense of insecurity is not unfounded; they are attacked, humiliated, and framed under laws with a religious imprint. The Sikhs who had a dominant presence in Punjab are no longer visible, except in limited places, mostly clustered around *gurdwaras* (temples). It is only in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and, to some degree, in Sindh that they are visible. Ironically, the Punjab, which is now devoid of Sikhs, contains the greatest number of their holiest shrines.

Ahmadis, claiming to be Muslims, were declared non-Muslims by an elected government in 1974 through a constitutional amendment.[4] Their constitutional declaration as non-Muslims followed many acts of violence against them and since then, the killing of their members and destruction of their properties has continued. Christians, as descendants of lower castes, have sought peace in social and economic marginality and suffer some of the worst discrimination in Pakistan. Hindus are so few in Punjab, that it is hard to see or meet one. Sindh and Balochistan have remained pluralistic even during the worst of times but even there minorities do not feel secure and consequently have started migrating to India and other countries.[5] The lesson Pakistan must draw is that stressing religious and ethnic diversity produces intolerance and creates even more points of conflict. This is evident from sectarianism within the fold of Islam and the power play of ethnic majorities against minorities in different parts of the country.

The solution lies in reconstructing Pakistan as a pluralistic society, which would mean true respect and acceptance of diversity of sects within Islam and of other religions in the country. It is going to be a long and arduous process but it is the only path to modernity. Pakistan can start with making equal citizenship under one law more effective than it currently is and by protecting religious freedoms and minorities rights with great vigor and resolve than one can see today. Pakistan's pluralistic culture with roots in regional ethnicity, languages, and transmigration provides a social base for the accommodation of pluralism. The variety and richness of all the cultural streams of Pakistan get better expressed through regional electronic media today than ever before.

Pluralism, however, is much broader and inclusive than culture or religion alone. It is about social identities of individuals and groups, political ideas and views, and the choices they make to live their lives as free and unrestrained within the limits of law.

CASE FOR MODERNISM

We have made a strong argument for Muslim modernism as a defining idea behind the struggle for Pakistan and also a way forward for reviving and securing the country. What does then modernism mean in the social, political, and historical context of the Islamic society of Pakistan? It means rationalism in Muslim thought and practices including religious reformation through *ijtihad* (interpretation) and *ijma* (consensus). As suicide bombers and radical Islamists sponsoring and supporting terrorism in Pakistan and throughout the world justify their horrible acts in the name of Islam, this violent form of fascism needs to be countered not only through secular rational argument of humanism but also through declaration of such acts as being repugnant to Islamic laws, theocratic spirit, and the classical understanding of the ideology of jihad.[6] It is as much the responsibility of the clerics as much as it is of the state institutions.

Muslim societies that are caught in the duel between the modern world and the traditional interpretation of Islam, as Pakistan is, may remain the battleground of ideas for decades to come. The result of this battle of ideas, whether victory goes to the modernist-rationalist Muslims or the radical Islamists, will determine the future peace and stability within these Muslim societies and those linked to them. The starting point of the debate on reviving Pakistan must center on modern education, universal literacy, distributive justice, positive social change and most important on the construction of a liberal political order. India and other South Asian countries are better examples to learn from with respect to their social reforms and achievements. India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have better rates of literacy, access to education, and economic growth.[7] Both have much stronger and more effective state institutions and have used them as an agency of reform, development, and social order.

Pakistan's own record in the first three decades is a good example of development, modernity, and keeping the state both neutral in religious affairs as well as an effective tool of positive social change.[8] But economic development is only one of the aspects of modernity. We need to avoid considering economic growth and political modernization as separate and independent human spheres. Rather, in each given historical context, they must be packaged together and programed to reinforce each other through public policy and political institutions. Many Muslim countries have fallen into this trap by promoting economic modernism through capitalist ideas and market economy, while suppressing political rights and social freedoms.[9] Over the debris of military regimes espousing this approach, painfully, we have found that this has not worked in Pakistan and it will never do so in future. The legacies of political fragmentation, social inequities, and institu-

tional disruptions have produced chaos and anxieties and led to the rise of violent movements.

In deliberating on modernity, the question of individual identity and self-expression- particularly of the Muslim women, social choice, and empowerment of younger generations are perhaps more important than the issue of economic growth and accumulation of wealth. In our view pursuit of these objectives is not in conflict and does not constitute an either or choice for policymakers. Economic growth is necessary to effect change in the society, but can be counterproductive to stability, order, and peace, as it raises questions about unfair distribution of rewards, illegal accumulation of wealth by corrupt means, and inequality. Growth that enriches and strengthens only the old ruling classes further breeds contempt for political authority and generates anger and disillusionment. Behind the religious zeal of the Taliban are these factors that have influenced the minds as they come from the poorest and most disenfranchised sections of the society. The Pakistani autocracy that is a stratified elite system, corrupt to the core, has generated violent dissent and militancy of the dispossessed.

In our view, it can be only through the empowerment of the citizens, male and female, that trust in the modern nation state can be restored and ownership of political order can be created. All humans, religious or otherwise, in many ways, are utilitarian in their pursuits. At the end of the day, the question that hits many disillusioned people is what the prevalent political system holds for them. They also ask if the system is fair and based on social norms of equity and justice. The despondency and alienation of the Pakistani youth, particularly its disappointment with democracy, is a reflection of corruption, manipulation, and domination of the political process by the elites.[10] The ruling classes that dominate the political system, and use economic and political resources for personal and class interests, are in many ways responsible for why some younger sections of the society are embracing the fold of radical Islam.

One more misconception of modernity that needs to be debunked is its representation through building huge structures of concrete and steel, and consumerism—an artificial and abhorrently skewed view of modernism, displayed through the Dubai syndrome that caricatures modernity. Unfortunately, in Pakistan high-rise buildings, roads, and new towns are paraded as modernism. And while these symbols reflect progress, a populous country such as Pakistan with a heavy young population needs human-centered modernization to cater for basic needs, establish a quality social delivery mechanism, and appropriate development according to the natural resources that are available.

Pakistan must apply an integrated and nuanced understanding of modernity in vital areas of social, economic, and political dimensions with learning of science and mastering of technology as two central pursuits. In our times,

there appears to be a global consensus on the fact that economic progress is not possible without integrating individual initiatives and market forces. But in the case of Pakistan, a country that has seen conflict, unending political mobilization, and has lived through a culture of humiliation at the hands of its own ruling elites, trickle down effects of conservative economic ideologies, it will take too long a time. Balancing growth and capital accumulation, on the one hand, and social welfare and distributive justice on the other, becomes necessary in the context of Pakistan.

Like evolution and orientation of a culture, social modernity—narrowly defined in terms of personal freedoms and social choices—is path dependent, and not a free agent of change itself. The path it follows is that of economic progress which enables conditions of social mobility and economic autonomy for individuals and communities that get the chance to get into the modern productive processes. Material progress produces better institutions and social processes that in turn reinforce material development of a society. In a way, Pakistan might be paying the price for not only flawed domestic and foreign policies but also for neglecting social and human development. For instance, one may think of hundreds of young men from tribal zones that joined the suicide brigades and thousands more that formed the fighting force of the Taliban. They were not born to be the angels of death and through modern education, economic development, and opportunities to succeed in life; they could have been constructive agents of change—engineers, doctors, artists, and businessmen.

A LIBERAL FRAMEWORK

Our argument has been that without a liberal democratic framework, neither economic nor social changes advance with stability and continuity, without provoking social discontent. From an essentialist view, liberal democracy would be culturally neutral, universalistic, and possess a humanizing political order in spirit as well as in its philosophical moorings. The main elements of this essentialist view would include constitutionalism, true representative government, rule of law through impartiality of the judiciary, and legal and political accountability of public office holders. Undoubtedly, it is the only peaceful and proven political route to resolving old issues of locating and adjusting religion and politics in Muslim societies. Contrary to popular interpretation of liberalism in Pakistan, much touted by ill-educated media persons and conservative religious sections, liberalism is not against any religion. On the contrary, philosophically and historically, it considers religion as a fundamental unbridgeable right. Two liberal ideas make the conservatives uncomfortable. First, it is the equality of all religions and equal rights of all persons to pursue the religion they wish to, including the choice of not

professing any religion at all. Second, is the issue of social choices that some individuals make that may run counter to some of the dominant social ideas; this is true whenever freedom of choice counters a dogmatic view of life. Such social cleavages are inevitable and part of the historical process of change and continuity, which requires a culture of pluralism and appreciation of difference as a mark of freedom.

In fact, the rule of law, justice, and individual rights despite being a Western historical experience, are very close to Islamic ideas of just society, just social order, and a just individual.[11] Pakistan in particular had a huge positive endowment of modernist political ideas, institutions, and practices that the colonial state building process had left in the Subcontinent. Therefore, unlike Afghanistan, Central Asian states, and most of the Middle Eastern Muslim states, Pakistan started with a rich historical foundation and not with meager institutional inheritance. The point we have tried to examine and emphasize in this book is how feudal oligarchic and military elites diverted Pakistan from that inheritance and perverted political institutions to sustain their respective authoritarianism. What we have argued is that by breaking this cycle of authoritarianism, Pakistan can get back to constitutionalism and rule of law tradition, which would serve as essential institutional tools for the electoral elites to obtain social and political support to counter the raging forces of radical Islam.

Who has a greater stake in the renewal of the country and how best can it be done are debatable points and may invoke different responses from different quarters, domestic as well as international. In our view, the peoples of Pakistan, particularly its civil society, the professional associations, and the more politically aware sections have the primary responsibility of redirecting the country on the path of modernity. The common man in Pakistan, honest and hardworking, has a stake in the constitutionalist and democratic Pakistan, and he has, within his social limits and capacity, always tried to put the country on this track. It is a simple calculation, the revival of Pakistan as a moderate, peaceful state would mean a better future for the people and their coming generations; on the other hand, radical Islam will isolate the state and society from the world, create conflict among various social groups, and keep society chaotic, as has been the case on at least the fringes with frequent incursions into its heartland.

FORCES OF HOPE

Despite facing multiple challenges Pakistan's economy, political institutions, and state machinery have survived many crises and rejuvenated. A good example of this is bouncing back from the lowest point in its history when it lost one-half of the country in 1971. Pakistan represents conflicting and

confusing trends of chaos and order, pessimism and optimism, corruption and integrity, failures and successes. The trends make it clear that neither its direction nor its path has been chosen carefully, and those ruling it have had little wisdom, prudence, and vision. The most remarkable contrast is between a failing state and a very resilient society that continuously manages to fill the gaps left by the state through philanthropy and private initiatives. In contrast to other countries, it is the private sector that is a model for the state, instead of the state being a model for the private sector. In the 1960s, it was other way around when the state showed the way to the private sector. Practically, both complement each other, and the state plays a big role in regulation as well as in enforcing some standards. The progress of Pakistan, overall, has not been dismal after all the failures and problems that we have examined; it could have certainly done better. Neither is the syndrome of chaotic order or ordered chaos irreversible in Pakistan. There are already some forces of hope that have emerged as a consequence of economic and social change. These include the rise of the middle class, free and proliferating media, emergence of vibrant civil society, and a successful transition to democracy.

Pakistan's gradual takeover by a coalition of bureaucratic-military establishment and feudal oligarchy has begun to provoke an intellectual, social, and political reaction from the middle class and civil society. The emergence of a large middle class both in the rural and urban areas, which is estimated to be 80,000,000 strong, roughly 44 percent of the population is a result of relative modernization, urbanization, and the political economy of immigrant workers.[12] What is the relative power and position of the new social forces and how they might be instrumental in reshaping the political identity of Pakistan from praetorian-feudal oligarchy to a constitutional democratic state, is an important question. They have great potential and are the only bottom-up force of change. The social location of these forces is of great sociological and strategic significance, as they are articulate, urban, and professional, and they are politically autonomous of the traditional power structures. They have also developed a strident voice on national issues, particularly on making Pakistan a truly representative democracy, seeking an impartial process of accountability, and pursuing a responsive government that delivers. The issue of rights, from women to minorities and marginalized groups, is far more visible today in social debates and political circles than one could think of a few decades back.

These are some of the signs of new activism that may take society to the next stage of social and political development, on the route toward reconstructing Pakistan as a true liberal-democratic state. The rising power and influence of the new social forces of the country were reflected in the social movement for the restoration of an independent judiciary (2007–8) against emergency rule imposed by Pervez Musharraf, and in the removal of checks on media. The groups associated with the dominant structures of power and

privilege, directly or indirectly, take a pessimistic view of the new social forces by generally denying their existence or by interpreting their ideas about social and political transitions as too idealistic. In doing so, they take a structural view of social change, believing that the ruling groups using their dominant social and political position would continue to manipulate the political process the way they have done in the past. In our view, history and social change do not run in circles but move forward with the pace depending on vision, social energies, and quality of leadership. The vision, energies, and leadership of the new social forces can make a positive contribution to a progressive and reform-oriented Pakistan.

With the emergence of new social forces, the power to determine the path for Pakistan is no longer reserved for the traditional classes—the feudal oligarchy and dynastic political parties. There is clearly a three-way contest over capturing the soul of Pakistan, among the traditional ruling classes, Islamists, and the new social forces. However, neither the social boundaries nor the ideological lines are clearly drawn among the contesting groups. Members of these roughly drawn categories and their sub-layers may support Islamists or traditional classes. What is salient and interestingly a new phenomenon, is a trend of the new social forces toward a liberal and democratic Pakistan.[13] An even bigger change is in the reorientation of the security establishment of Pakistan from aligning itself with the Islamists to going after the radical militant outfits.[14] The security establishment's choices for a liberal project is because of the threat militant radical Islam poses to the country, and the security establishment's bitter experience of fighting this menace.

The civil society, media, and professional associations represent the new reformist and progressive outlook of the new social forces for Pakistan. They have been engaged in the long war of ideas and continue to focus their efforts on catalyzing a rule-bound, moderate, and open society. Some of its members, the activists, have paid a heavy price by losing their lives at the hands of the militants.[15] Even big losses have not silenced these voices of change. Even though Pakistan continues to be a divided society and remains polarized on vital issues, the liberalist vision, which is articulated through the politics of rights and demands for accountable and responsible representative government, and less by philosophical exegesis in Pakistani social climate, adds a positive dimension to political pluralism.

The struggle for a truly representative and constitutional government is as much an intrinsic character of the new middle classes as it is a form of political resistance against radical Islam and the feudal oligarchy, and it is bound to serve both ends. For the new social forces of Pakistan this is an imminent struggle that they can neither put on hold for the next generations, nor leave to the broadly de-legitimized oligarchic, dynastic political rulers. The new social forces rightly fear that the alternative to the traditional ruling

classes of Pakistan is Islamic radicalism; and while they have managed to retain some dignity and rights under autocratic rules they would lose everything under any form of Islamic/religious theocracy.

There can be legitimate questions about the strength of the new social forces to set Pakistan on a democratic-constitutionalist path, but to question their existence or to say that they can easily be cornered, would be a misreading of Pakistan's changing social and political scene. Generally, the discourse in Pakistan and abroad focuses on radical Islam, militancy, and the oligarchic-military elites, but the activism of the new social classes gets little or no attention. The strength of the new social forces lies in the open debate that happens on media about every issue from a narrow local one to broad national problems, and also on the platforms of the of civil society organizations that have emerged in every part of the county with tens of thousands. Owing to advancements in technology, they are better organized, better skilled and have found many ways of expressing themselves, organizing protests when necessary and voicing their concerns and point of view on the media. Increasingly, high visibility of leaders and activists of the new social forces has gradually transformed them into a vital social and political element. The extent to which their views and ideas are accommodated in mainstream politics, legislation, and policy formulation is another matter. [16] Their success and relevance in policy making will depend on the nature of issue, coalition building, and the instruments they use to influence public policy or legislation. So far, the progress is slow and has had small achievements.

A major reason for stifling the voice of new social forces is the patronage politics of traditional ruling classes; they have created an underworld of journalists, public intellectuals, and media mouthpieces to defend their brand of politics and policies through using public resources. A section of the media functions as an essential appendage of the old social order with the primary task of defending it. Such media persons take a recognizable conservative view of social change, spread pessimism about new forces, and glorify even the most corrupt dynastic politicians. They often try to disorient the debate on the media and attempt to drown voices urging for a just and participatory society through the pretext of tradition and religion. The expansion of the space for voices of feminists, minorities, marginalized ethnic communities and the urban middle classes has provided an effective channel of political communication that cannot easily be suppressed by the apologists of the dynastic political classes.

Interestingly, Pakistan's ruling elite classes are abundantly familiar with liberal ideas and institutions and they are also aware of the transformative power they may have on society. The reason they resist the liberal, democratic and constitutionalist ideology of the Muslim modernists is out of the fear that rights, justice and equality, would upset the traditional social and political order that works in their interest. No dominant social class in history has

given up its privileged position without a struggle. In every social setting, no change has ever come about without a persistent struggle against the old dominant classes who have tried to preserve existing systems. The dialectics of change and resistance is an old story of human civilization; Pakistan is no exception to it.

The Pakistani elites are oblivious to the emerging social resistance against them and live in the delusion that they can defend themselves and their corruption, misrule, and poor record of governance.[17] This may not be possible as in the age of open and free mainstream media and social media that have national and international outreach. There is a popular disgust with the rule and role of the traditional political establishment. The over-confidence of the Pakistani elite rests in their history of getting away with massive corruption and political manipulations, which has made them blind to the changing co-relations of forces. Driven by the dynamics of constituency politics based on patronage, the individual parliamentarian is not sufficiently bothered by the loud voice of critique of the present hybrid political order based on authoritarianism and procedural shades of democracy. He knows that the public vote works along narrow family, caste, and tribal lines with social networks being more important than the character and ideology of the candidate. The new social movement of Pakistan wants to block radicalization by transforming the country into a true democracy with fair political and judicial accountability of public office holders.[18] Their interest is contesting and blocking the influence of radical Islam through liberal ideas of democracy, which they believe are also in the interest of the old ruling classes of the country.

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

The transition to democracy has taken many forms, paths, and modes; there are many things that impact this transition from history, culture, to the political interests of various social classes. The most important factor is whether or not the salient sections of society accept notions of representative government and rule of law as fundamental political values. Democracy is a revolutionizing idea; not in terms of the revolutionary context, but in the sense of being radical idea in the climate of third world traditional Islamic societies. It is primarily a system of governance based on the consent of the governed and accountability of those who govern. When the basic constitutional arrangements of democracy are in place, and have a consensus of the elites, democracy begins to grow and develops and perfects itself through a political game where different layers of society perpetuate their interests. Therefore, democratic changes have never occurred as a single package or at once. They have come incrementally through a series of invisible revolutions, social move-

ments and protests, and sometimes, in major shifts in power such as the French and American revolutions. Our argument has been that constitutionalism and representative governments are two important foundational ideas of Muslim modernism and the only way Pakistan can revive and recover itself, would be through reworking and reforming its democracy.

There are a number of factors that should make one optimistic about growth and development of democracy in Pakistan. First, is a general elite consensus that we have repeatedly alluded to; it is both an ideological as well as a pragmatic interest of the traditional classes to support democracy. It helps them legitimize their traditional social power, brings them into the parliament and enables them to push the agenda of development for their respective constituencies. Simply, electoral politics is their political signifier and brings them more influence and power. It is another thing that they often abuse power and resources, as there is no effective system of checks and balances. Second, some of the democratic institutions and practices are as old as the early British electoral and constitutional reforms in the Subcontinent. Political parties, elections, local council, provincial and central legislatures, and the idea of constitution were rooted in the first half of the twentieth century. Pakistan has continued to maintain some of these institutions and traditions over the past seventy years. Third, the ideas and political institutions, like free press, freedom of speech, political and civil society activism, and open debate and competitive politics have survived even during military and civilian authoritarianism. Today, the social and political climate for the development of democratic and civic political culture in Pakistan is far better than it has been at any time in the past, on account of the emergence of new social forces discussed above and a peaceful political transition, from one party to another in 2013.

Finally, since imperial times a liberal political thinking has been in the making, though confined to urban, literate, and affluent middle classes. The liberal and modernist political consciousness has gone through many phases and has been under stress, but has never been fully suppressed. The ideals of fundamental rights and freedom have no native home or country; they are universal, and natural aspirations of all living men and women, irrespective of faith or region of domicile. These are two core ideas that have shaped the modern world. Since these are powerful ideas that liberate individuals, groups and society, they are often resisted in the name of religion, tradition, or on the excuse of unique national circumstances. There are powerful sectors of society in Pakistan that view liberal ideas as alien, essentially a Western political construct. The familiar line of the apologists of authoritarianism is that Pakistan's social structures cannot embrace universal ideas of liberty, human equality, rights, and dignity. The religious parties and radical Islamists confuse the issue by making the argument that the Islamic faith has the answer for every old and new problem, and one does not need to emulate the

Western trajectory of political development or institution building to achieve progress.

In our view, the arguments of the religious right and cultural determinists confuse the universal impulse for freedom, equality, and rule of law by conditioning it to tradition and religion. We have heard these arguments before in other societies with different religions and cultures. It is important to remember that religion and social structures have been common weapons of obstruction that similar forces in the other parts of the world have used against the movement for human liberty and equal rights on the basis of citizenship. Most of the critique of liberal democracy in Pakistan rests on either ignorance or a lack of clarity about the philosophical roots, evolution, and practice of these ideas. Despite critique in certain conservative circles, democracy, if not liberalism, has gained national acceptance. In contemporary Pakistan, we see a serious, albeit vague, engagement with discourses on social and political reform and ideological questions pertaining to constitutionalism, rights, and freedom.[19] It is a sign of change itself that there is a fresh exploration of ideas and new activism is taking place after decades of cynicism, passivity, and conscious de-politicization of society. It is a consensual view among observers and scholars, both domestic and foreign, that religious parties and Islamic radicals gained a lot of power via alignment with the military during the Zia and Musharraf years when there was a democratic vacuum in the country.[20] More democracy would generate diversity of views and pluralism resulting in opening the ideas and outlook of the religious parties to greater scrutiny than they have faced in times of authoritarian suffocation.

However, in this long historical journey Pakistan has yet to achieve complete transition to democracy. No democracy in the world is perfect, let alone a developing and transitional democracy such as the one in Pakistan. There is no better expression to explain the problem of democratic development than the famous remark made by Winston Churchill: "Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."[21] It is quite common in Pakistan to see complaints against democratic governments over major and minor issues. There is widespread public disappointment with the performance of governments today, but this has always been the case with elected governments anywhere in the world. A universal critique of democratic governance goes like this: democracy is slow, politicians are self-centered and special interests capture greater space than the common good.[22] This is truer in Pakistan when we see dynastic leaders, political parties, the electoral elite, political families, and powerful political groups, in every region of Pakistan, showing very few achievements and little success to the public.

What is the alternative to the bad, often dysfunctional democracy of Pakistan? Frankly speaking, there is none. After four military interventions and

more than four democratic movements along with the restoration of the Constitution, democracy has emerged as a default position for Pakistan. Pakistan's institutional endowment for democracy and civic culture is far stronger than that of any other Muslim state, and it has a long history of development of political and state institutions. The country has acquired the social means and energies to improve conditions under democratic rule and it can certainly transform its crises-ridden democracy into a better one, as other nations have done. Pakistan's future progress, order, stability, and coherence depend on a democracy that works, that is responsive and serves the public. On the other hand, misrule and corruption in the name of democratic legitimacy, as every elected government is guilty of, may produce disaffection and a legitimacy vacuum that in turn may breed despondency and extremism, as it has in the past. Our argument has been that there is a link between systematic corruption, absence of effective justice, and generally bad governance and rise of extremism, terrorism, and militant ethnic nationalism. Misrule is perhaps a polite and benign expression for the massive plunder of Pakistan done by the ruling elite, often elected on the strength of illegal monies, and strong political networks. Most of the ruling elite have little respect for the people of the land or any real interest in the development of society. They are a part of the political system for the easy money they can make, and when the going gets a little tough, they escape to their safe havens abroad with their investments secure in dubious offshore companies.[23]

As we have discussed in the previous chapters, among many causes for the rise of radical Islam, the major one is failure of the state institutions in providing education, establishing rule of law and governing according to good universal values and best practice. Unlawful behavior of the elite and the immunity they enjoy through their social power and political clout, have in turn produced many forms of illegalities in the society. The deterioration of values, the decline of institutions, and the weakening of laws and their implementation continue affecting every sector of the society. The institutions of accountability have failed to nab the powerful and influential members of the political class. Their exercise of power has created a vacuum of ethical legitimacy that has been effectively exploited by radical ideologues who argue that the failure of the ruling elite is actually the "failure" of Western democracy, and that elected public figures are nothing but "tools" of Western powers. This narrative is attractive to a section of younger population at the lower levels of the society that lacks adequate education and consequently has limited employment opportunities and avenues for personal progress. These are all serious problems and may continue to pull Pakistan down, thus resolving these, very pressing social, national issues will help revive the capacity of state and its institutions. In the regional climate of extremism and radical Islamic militancy, ignoring these problems, which are often associated with democracy and "democrats," is not an option anymore.

THE LONG WAR

The radical Islamists have forced upon Pakistan an unavoidable war, which has been one of the longest and costliest wars waged by Pakistan. It is the war to re-establish the writ of the state; but it is also a war of ideas, between militant radical Islam and the democratic constitutional political order. For stability and national unity, Pakistan will have to recover its lost moderate identity. In our view, there are three essential means to win this war gradually but consistently. The first is the significant role of the security forces that will prove instrumental in defeating radical Islam, as this requires continued use of force. Pakistan's security forces have made tremendous gains in this war and have succeeded in destroying the mini fiefdoms of the Taliban. Similarly, the civilian governments and parties have also been successful in reaching a consensus with the military and among each other on the National Action Program to end extremism and terrorism. Most important, there has been a change in the "ally" status of the radical Islamists who are no longer considered by the security establishment as resources, as had been the case in the past where they were encouraged and supported to assist the Taliban in Afghanistan and militants in the Indian-administered region of Jammu and Kashmir.[24] There are, of course, skeptics in Pakistan and outside the country that argue that the distinction between "good" and "bad" Taliban still is made in some strategic calculations.[25] However, there is a visible clash between the Pakistan that wants to revive, stabilize, and achieve progress and the proponents of radical Islam that thrives on creating a chaotic and conflict-ridden country. The radical Islamists have a religion-based ideology, fixed agenda, and inflexible worldview. Previously, the Pakistani state had a strategic interest in using such groups as proxies. Till the interests of the two converged, the state allowed them to recruit, train, equip and send fighters across the borders. This practice continued for more than a decade not only in Pakistan but also in the Middle East where radical Islamist elements shared Pakistan's interest in defeating the Soviet Union. However, as subsequent events have revealed, their motives and political interests were not bounded by time or events. The Islamists had bigger objectives to pursue—liberation of all Muslim lands perceived to be occupied by non-Muslim powers, challenge American power in the Middle East, and capture power in the Muslim states by all necessary means. These policies have had deep and un-ignorable backlash for Pakistan.

The second important means to win this war is the changing perception of radical Islam among the people of Pakistan. Pakistani society is moderate at its core and has never been extremist as in the image of radical Islam, which itself is an unintended consequence of Islamization at home and fallout of the Afghan wars. Public opinion has never been with the Taliban or the radicals. In the wake of hundreds of acts of terrorism the local population, and the

general public opinion, have turned against the Taliban and Talibanization attempts quite decisively. This has also put the religious parties that used to defend the Taliban in the media and the mosques on the defensive, at least in their public appearances. These achievements are important first steps, but Pakistan has a long way to go toward recovering itself from religious militancy. This will require sustained efforts of reconstruction in the war-affected zones in the tribal region and an initiation of thoughtful political, legal, and administrative reforms to bring these areas in the national stream. The bigger task is introducing wider structural reforms in every area of national life. Problems, from an informal criminal economy to the justice system, are so deep and complex that no government or leader has found enough courage or support of the fellow political elites to address them head-on. Complacency and expediency has driven the Pakistani public to hopelessness and pessimism, generating distrust of the political authority, the state, and the political process. The democratic governments will have to perform better on development, governance, justice, and equality to re-establish the trust of people. This is essential to prevent the disillusioned young falling into the hands of the radical elements.

Finally, the ideas for reshaping Pakistan cannot be different than those that have engendered good society, progress, and prosperity in other parts of the world. We know that the historical and cultural context within which modern ideas have to be situated and rooted is important. Some of these ideas, such as religious pluralism, tolerance of other faiths, scientific inquiry, and rational outlook have always been part of the Islamic heritage and civilization. The Pakistani state bears great responsibility toward recovering some of these elements as universal values. Pakistan needs more clarity about its national identity as a pluralistic Muslim majority state with a greater focus on pursuing modernity within the framework of constitutional democracy. This means equal rights for all ethnic, religious, and regional categories. This process may help the country resolve many contradictions of identity politics that have crept into debate as well as policy areas, domestic as well foreign policy and national security issues.

The real energies and political will for reviving or transforming Pakistan will have to come from within, but at the moment, it cannot succeed without international support and cooperation. Why should the international community, primarily the Western countries, be interested in nudging and assisting Pakistan in strengthening its democracy, rule of law, and development policy areas? The answer is simple; a democratic, modernist, and progressive Pakistan would remain integrated with the globalizing world and would be a peaceful regional player with its interests tied to material benefits. In view of the central place Pakistan occupies both in the battle of ideas between modernity and radical Islam and between regional stability and conflict, reviving the Pakistani state and society is a necessity, and no longer a choice. Reviv-

ing Pakistan is hence not only in the interest of its own citizens as a self-interested community, but also a primary concern of the international community. The wars in Afghanistan, from the Soviet occupation to the American "liberation," have had a large role to play in the kind of resistance, radical thought, and movements their actions have produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The world has a pragmatic interest in supporting the state and critical social forces of Pakistan in structuring identity and improving governance and economy. It is not a misplaced fear that Pakistan's current and future troubles may spill over to other Muslim states in Central Asia and the Middle East, just as their conflicts have spilled over into Pakistan. This assessment is not a conjecture but based on hard facts of transnational radical movements and their networking beyond into the Western world. We know how the socially alienated Muslim youth in Europe has found inspiration in the stateless regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and has received training and support from the terrorist networks residing in these countries.[26] Therefore, the identity and character Pakistan takes in the coming years will matter for the stability or instability of not just its own society but also for many others in adjacent Muslim regions and beyond.

Pakistan is once again on the crossroads and confronts stark choices between the disorder that forces of radical Islam have produced and the ideal of human and material progress. As we have argued, Islam and the Islamic way of life, as traditionally understood and practiced in the Subcontinent, has never been in conflict with empowerment of individuals and groups or with the general idea of a progressive reform-oriented state and society. However, within reformist, revivalist Muslim thought, there have been two streams since the pre-independence era, that is Islamic revivalism and modernity. In the South Asian context, the two have found areas of convergence and conflict. The convergence is on empowerment, rights, and general concerns about failures of the Muslim community, but the conflict is on the means of identity, achieving progress, and relational issues with other communities. Pakistan was the dream of Muslim modernists and the achievement of their struggle, which also included convincing a good section of the Islamic revivalists to join the Pakistan movement. In this book, an attempt has been made to answer two fundamental questions: how Pakistan lost track of modernity and social progress, and why its identity and destiny have become nebulous, if not entirely disputed. Today, Pakistan does not have leaders with the strength, conviction, and moral fiber of Jinnah but embracing his ideas and those of other Muslim modernists would bring peace, stability and the economic progress.

Putting Pakistan back on the road of becoming a moderate state is a challenge especially in the shadow of three long cycles of war in Afghanistan and the rising wave of radical Islam throughout the Muslim world. The

growth of trans-border and transnational terrorist networks has blurred the lines between the first wave and the other two waves of political Islam. But we believe that the balance is still in favor of the modernist inheritance that can be defended and further recovered and strengthened by internal reforms and international cooperation. The challenge of radical Islam is not just a national issue; it is regional and in many ways global, as we have witnessed emergence of radical elements in the heart of the modern European world among the disaffected Muslim youth.

While Pakistan has no other option than showing resolve, especially as the military continues its operations against terrorists, it will have to achieve more progress on its national reform agenda. Education, health, economic restructuring, and governance are the most critical areas that will define the future of Pakistan. Stephen P. Cohen, who has studied and written about Pakistan extensively aptly remarks that "an educated population can be greater asset than oil or mineral resources, of which Pakistan has little, in any case."[27] The future growth and progress of Pakistan lies in building organic links across all regions and areas of Pakistan through improved performance in vital areas of social development, economic opportunity, equal rights, and recognition.[28] This will restore faith in the democratic political order and develop it further to become people-centered. The real challenge therefore stands in the realm of ideas—how to re-establish the salience of pluralistic, tolerant Islam, and a deeper faith in a constitutional democratic order by making it inclusive and responsive. This is a long road to the "promised land" of peace and progress, but it has to be traveled, better sooner rather than later.

NOTES

1. Ejaz Akram, "The Muslim World and Globalization: Modernity and the Roots of Conflict," in *Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition*, ed. Joseph E. B. Lumbard, revised and expanded ed. (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2009), 255–300.

2. Lieven, *Pakistan*.

3. Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Punjab Bloodied Partitioned and Cleansed: Unraveling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012).

4. M. Mahmood, *The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973*, 14th ed. (Lahore: Pakistan Law Research Academy, 2015), 1840.

5. Rana Tanveer, "Confusion Galore: Migration Suspicion Holds Up Hindu Travelers to India," *Express Tribune*, August 11, 2012.

6. Muhammad Tahir-ul Qadri, *Introduction to the Fatwa on Suicide Bombings and Terrorism,* trans. Shaykh Abdul Aziz Dabbagh (London: Minhaj-ul-Quran International, 2010).

7. UNDP, *Human Development Index, 20015*, 3–5.

8. Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,).

9. Thanassis Cambanis, "Syria's Future: A Black Hole of Instability," *New York Times*, April 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/opinion/sunday/syrias-future-a-black-hole-of-instability.html?_r=0; Tim Arango, "With Iraq Mired in Turmoil, Some Call for Parti-

tioning the Country," *New York Times*, April 28, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/middleeast/with-iraq-mired-in-turmoil-some-call-for-partitioning-the-country.html.

10. The British Council, *The Next Generation Voices*.

11. Mehdi Bazargan, "Religion and Liberty," in *Liberal Islam, A Source Book,* ed. Charles Kurzman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 73–84.

12. Kazim Alam, "Pakistan Has 18th Largest 'Middle Class' in the World: Report," *Express Tribune*, October 16, 2015.

13. Zahid Hussain, "Reclaiming Original Ideology," *Dawn,* November 25, 2016; Niaz Murtaza, "Elusive Liberalism," *Dawn*, April 12, 2016.

14. Nadim Hussain, "Pakistan's New Thinking on Security," *National Interest*, March 14, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/pakistans-new-thinking-security-15489.

15. "Director T2F Sabeen Mahmud Shot Dead in Karachi," *Dawn*, April 25, 2015; "Violence Against Journalists," *Dawn*, November 2, 2015.

16. "Civil Society Activists Affirm Support for Women Law," *Dawn*, March 17, 2016.

17. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Panama Leaks and Pakistani Politics," *Express Tribune*, May 1, 2016.

18. Fair and Free Elections Network is one of those organizations that work toward this end. There is also Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency.

19. Zahid Shahab Ahmed, "The Role of the Pakistani Mass Media in the Lawyers' Resistance against the Musharraf Dictatorship, 2007–2009," *Pakistaniat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies* 4, no. 3 (2012): 61–77.

20. Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005); Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan at the Cross-Currents of History* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2004); Iqtidar, *Secularizing Islamists?*; Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*.

21. Winston Churchill, November 11, 1947, Churchill Center, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/quotations/4039-the-worst-form-of-government.

22. Douglas A. Chalmers and Scot Mainwaring, *Problems Confronting Contemporary Democracies: Essays in Honor of Alfred Stepan* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012).

23. Umar Cheema, "Pakistanis in the Panama Papers: more names named," *News International*, May 9, 2016.

24. Khurram Hussain, "Is Pakistan Self-Correcting?" *Dawn*, March 10, 2016.

25. Thomas E. Ricks, "The Long-Term Dangers for Pakistan of Believing in Good and Bad Taliban," *Foreign Policy*, September 29, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/the-long-term-dangers-for-pakistan-of-believing-in-good-and-bad-taliban/.

26. For a detailed study, see Petter Nesser, *Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

27. Stephen P. Cohen, ed., *The Future of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press, 2011), 21.

28. I.A. Rehman, "Good Tidings from Lahore," *Dawn*, March 10, 2016.

Bibliography

BOOKS

Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*. London & New York: Routledge, 2005.

Afzal, M. Rafique. *Pakistan: History and Politics, 1947–1971*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009.

———. *A History of the All-India Muslim League, 1906–1947*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013.

———. *Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947–58*. Islamabad: National Institute of History and Culture, 1986.

Ahmad, Aftab. "Historical Antecedents of Corruption in Pakistan." In *The Political Economy of Corruption*, edited by Arvind K. Jain. London: Routledge, 2001.

Ahmad, Aziz and G. E. Von Grunebaum. *Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan 1857–1968*. Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2004.

Ahmad, Aziz. *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964*. London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1967.

Ahmad, Imtiaz. *Modernization and Social Change among Muslims in India*. Delhi: Manohar, 1983.

———. *Ritual and Religion among Muslims in India*. Delhi: Manohar, 1981.

Ahmad, Jamil-ud-din, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* 7th Edition. Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968.

Ahmad, Khalid. *Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and its links to the Middle East*. Oxford University Press Pakistan, 2012.

Ahmad, Mumtaz. "Madrassa Education in Pakistan Bangladesh and Bangladesh." In *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia*, edited by Satup. Limaye, Mohan Malik and Robert G. Wirsing. Honolulu. Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004.

Ahmad, Syed Nur. *From Martial Law to Martial Law: Politics in Punjab, 1919–1958*, edited by Craig Baxter. Lahore: Vanguard, 1985.

Ahmed, Akbar S. "Jinnah's 'Gettysburg Address'". In *The Jinnah Anthology,* edited by Liaquat H. Merchant and Sharif Al Mujahid. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009.

———. *The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013.

Ahmed, Ishtiaq. *The Punjab Bloodied Partitioned and Cleansed: Unraveling the 1947 Tragedy Through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Ahmed, Khaled. *Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and its Link to the Middle East*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011.

———. *Sleepwalking to Surrender: Dealing with Terrorism in Pakistan*. New Delhi: Penguin Books Limited, 2016.

Ahmed, Rafiuddin. "Redefining Muslim Identity in South Asia: The Transformation of Jama'at Islami." In *Accounting for Fundamentalists: The Dynamic Character of Movements,* edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Ajami, Fouad. "The Uneasy Imperium: Pax Americana in the Middle East." In *How did this Happen? Terrorism and the New War*, edited by James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose. New York: BBS, Public Affairs, 2001.

Akram, Ejaz. "The Muslim World and Globalization: Modernity and the Roots of Conflict." In *Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition*, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard. Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom, 2009.

Ali, Amir. "The Rationalist and Philosophical Spirit of Islam." In *Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam: A Reader*, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof. New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2002.

Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad. *The Emergence of Pakistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Ali, Chiragh. *The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and Other Mohammedan States.* Bombay: Education Society, 1883.

Ali, Imran. "Power and Islamic Legitimacy in Pakistan." In *Islamic Legitimacy in Plural Asia*, edited by Anthony Reid and Michael Gilsenan. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Ali, Shaukat. *Contemporary Religious Thought in Islam*. Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1986.

Ali, Syed Ameer. The *Spirit of Islam: A History of Evolution of Ideas of Islam with the Life of the Prophet*. London: Methuen, 1965.

Ali, Tariq. *Can Pakistan Survive*. London: Pelican Books, 1983.

Amjad, Rashid and Shahid Javed Burki, eds. *Pakistan: Moving the Economy Forward*. Lahore: Lahore School of Economics, 2013.

Amjad, Rashid. "The challenges of a resilient economy." In *Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and persistence*, edited by Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq London and New York: Routlege, 2017: 192–209.

Aslan, Reza. *No God but God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam*. London: Arrow Books, 2011.

Awan, Akil N. "Transitional Religiosity Experiences: Contextual Disjuncture and Islamic Political Radicalism." In *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: The British Experience,* edited by Tahir Abbas. London and New York: Routledge, 2011.

Ayaz, Babar. *What's Wrong with Pakistan*. New Delhi: Hay House, 2013.

Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam. *India Wins Freedom*. Madras: Orient Longman Limited, 1988.

Aziz, Khursheed Kamal. *A History of the Idea of Pakistan*. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987.

———. *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*. Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Publications, 2002.

Baxter, Craig. "Restructuring the Pakistan Political System." In *Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq*, edited by Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Bazargan, Mehdi. "Religion and Liberty." In *Liberal Islam, A Source Book,* edited by Charles Kurzman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Bell, Daniel. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

———. *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*. New York : Basic Books, 1976.

Bhatt, Chetan. *Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths*. New York and Oxford: Berg, 2001.

Binder, Leonard. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961.

Bokhari, Kamaran and Farid Senzai. *Political Islam in the Age of Globalization*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Bokhari, Laila. "Radicalization, Political Violence, and Militancy." In *The Future of Pakistan*, edited by Stephen P. Cohen. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2011.

Bosworth, Clifford Edmund. *The Ghaznavids 994–1040*. Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 1963.

Burke, S.M. *Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947–1948*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Chak, Farhan Mujahid. *Islam and Pakistan's Political Culture*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Chalmers, Douglas A. and Scot Mainwaring. *Problems Confronting Contemporary Democracies: Essays in Honor of Alfred Stepan*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.

Chaudhuri, K.N. *The Economic Development of India Under the East India Company*, 1814–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Chirot, Daniel. *How Societies Change*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 1994.

Cillespie, Michael Allen. *The Theological Origins of Modernity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Cohen, Stephan P. *The Pakistan Army*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

———. "Pakistan Arrival and Departure." In *The Future of Pakistan* edited by Stephan P. Cohen. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2011.

———. *The Future of Pakistan*. Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution, January 2011.

Cooper, John and Ronald L. Nettler. *Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2009.

Daalder, H. *The Role of the Military in the Emerging Countries*. The Hague: Mouton, 1962.

Dabashi, Hamid. *The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Theology of Discontent*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006.

Dar, Bashir Ahmad. "Wali Allah: His Life and Times." In *Shah Waliullah*, *1703–1762: His Religious and Political Thought*, edited by M. Ikram Chaghatai. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2005.

Desai, Meghnad and Aitzaz Ahsan. *Cross-Border Talks: Divided by Democracy.* New Delhi: Roli Books, 2005.

Dhulipala, Venkat. *Creating a New Medina: State Power, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Dobbin, Christine. *Basic Documents of Modern India and Pakistan 1835–1947.* London: Von Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970.

Ehtashami, Anoushiravan. "Islam, Muslim Polities and Democracy." In *Religion, Democracy and Democratization,* edited by John Anderson. New York: Routledge, 2016.

Elethy, Yasser. *Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy: Classical and Modern Interpretations*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Enayat, Hamid. *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.

Esman,, Vol. lxviii, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1-40.ma" International Islamic University, 2002).n South Asia (Islamabad: National Hijra Council Abigail R. *Radical State: How Jihad is Winning Over Democracy in the West*. Santa Barbara: Praeger 2010.

Esposito, John L. and Dalia Mogahed. *Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think.* New York: Gallup Press, 2008.

Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. *Islam and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Esposito, John L, Amara Sonn, and John O. Voll. *Islam and Democracy After the Arab Spring*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Esposito, John L. *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Fair, Christine C., Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Democratic Values and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan." *Report*. Princeton: Princeton University, November 27, 2012.

Farmer, Brian R. *Radical Islam in the West: Ideology and Challenge*. Jefferson, North Carolina: MacFarland & Company Inc. 2011.

Faruqi, Zia ul-Hasan. *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963.

Friedman, George. *America's Secret War*. New York: Doubleday, 2004.

Furnivall, J.S. *Colonial Policy and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948.

Gandhi, Rajmohan. *Understanding the Muslim Mind*. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1986.

Gauhar, Altaf. *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler.* Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications 1998.

Gerges, Fawaz. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Ghazi, Mahmood Ahmad. *Islamic Renaissance in South Asia, 1707–1867*: *The Role of Shah Wali Allah and His Successors*. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, 2002.

Grare, Frederic. *Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict, 1979*–1985. Karachi: Oxford University.

Gul, Sahar. *Women's Perceptions about Religious Extremism/Talibanization and Military Operation: A Case Study of Malakand Division*. Islamabad: National Commission for the Status of Women, Government of Pakistan, July 2009.

Hakim, Khalifa Abdul. *Islamic Ideology*. Lahore: Dr. Rashid Ahmad, 1998.

Haq, Farhat. "Pakistan: A State for the Muslims or an Islamic state?" In *Religion and Politics in South Asia*, edited by Ali Riaz. London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Haq, S. Moinul. *Islamic Thought and Movements in the Subcontinent, 711–1947*. Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1979.

Haqqani, Husain. *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding*. New York: Public Affairs, 2013.

———. *Pakistan Between Mosque and Military*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.

Hefner, Robert W. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Hroub, Khaled, ed. *Political Islam, Context Versus Ideology*. London: SOAS, 2012.

Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.

Husain, Zahid, *The Scorpion's Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan-And How It Threatens America*. New York: Free Press, 2010.

———. *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2007.

Hyder, Sajjad. *Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Reflections of an Ambassador*. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987.

Iqbal, Allama Muhammad. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 6th edition, edited and annotated by M Saeed Sheikh. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 2006.

Iqbal, Javed. *Islam and Pakistan's Identity*. Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan and Vanguard Books, 2003.

Iqtidar, Humeira. *Secularizing Islamists, Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-ud-d'wa in Urban Pakistan*. Berkeley, Chicago and New York: University of California, Columbia and University of Chicago Press, 2011.

Jabri, Mohammad Abed al. *The Formation of Arab Reason: Text, Tradition and the Construction of Modernity in the Arab World.* London: I. B. Tauris, 2011.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins*. London: Anthem Press, 2002.

———. *The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience*, translated by Cynthia Schoch. Gurgaon, India: Random House India, 2015.

Jahanbakhsh, Forough. *Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran, 1953–2000: From Bazargan to Soroush*. Leiden: Brill, 2001.

Jalal, Ayesha. *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*: *A Comparative and Historical Perspective.* Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1995.

———. *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

———. *The Sole Spokesman*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Jan, Tarik, ed. *Pakistan Between Secularism and Islam: Ideology, Issues and Conflict*. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1998.

Jones, Seth G. and C Christine Fair. *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010.

Kedourie, Elie. *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*. London: Frank Cass, 1994.

Kennedy, Charles H., "A User's Guide to Guided Democracy; Musharraf and the Pakistani Military Governance" in *Pakistan: 2005,* edited by Charles H. Kennedy and Cynthia Botteron. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006.

———. *Bureaucracy in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Kennedy, G. *The Military in the Third World*. New York: Charles Scribner, 1974.

Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry. *Pathway to Pakistan*. Lahore: Brothers Publishers, 1961.

Khan, Akbar. *Raiders in Kashmir*. Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1975.

Khan, Fazal Muqeem. *Pakistan: Crisis in Leadership*. Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1973.

Khan, Gohar Ayub. *Glimpses into the Corridors of Power*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Khan, M. Asghar. *We've Learnt Nothing from History: Pakistan, Politics and Military Power*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Khan, Muhammad Akram. *Millat aur Watan: A Debate Between Maulana Syed Husain Ahmad Madni and Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal* (Nation and Country: A debate between Maulana Syed Husain Ahmad Madni and Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal). Multan: Idara Rosenama Shams, 1938.

Khan, Muhammad Ayub. *Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Khan, Riaz Mohammad. *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Khan, Sardar Shaukat Hayat. *A Nation that Lost its Soul*. Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1995.

Khan, Shaukat Hayat. *The Nation that Lost its Soul: Memoir*. Lahore: Jang Group of Publishers, 1995.

Khan, Sir Syed Ahmed. *Maqālāt-i Sir Sayyid*, Muhammad Ismail Panipati ed. Lahore: Majlis-i Taraqqi-yi Adab, 1962.

Khan, Sir Syed Ahmed. *Selected Essays of Sir Syed Ahmad, Vol. 1.*, translated by Muhammad Hameedullah. Aligarh, India: Aligarh Muslim University Press, 2004.

Kurzman, Charles, ed. *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

———. *Modernist Islam, 1840–1940*: *A Sourcebook*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Landau, Jacob. "Turkey Opts Out, While India's Muslims Get Involved." In *The Politics of Pan-Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Lelyveld, David. *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Lerner, Daniel. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: Free Press, 1958.

Lewis, Bernard. *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Lia, Brynjar. *The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928–1942*. New York, Ithaca Press, 2006.

Lieven, Anatol. *Pakistan: A Hard Country*. London: Allen Lane, 2011.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince*. Irving, TX: University of Dallas Press, 1980.

Madni, Maulana Syed Husain Ahmad. *Naqsh-i-Hayat*, trans. Life History; An Autobiography. Karachi: BaitulTauheed, 1953.

Mahmood, M. *The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973*, 14th edition. Lahore: Pakistan Law Research Academy, 2015.

Malik, Hafeez. *Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963.

———. *Pakistan: Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001.

———. *Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Markey, Daniel S. *No Exist from Pakistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Maroney, Eric. *Religious Syncretism*. London: SCM Press, 2006.

Marx, Karl. *Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*. New York: Vintage Books, 1973.

Masud, Muhammad Khalid. *Atharween Sadi Esavi Mein Bar-e-Saghir Mein Islami Fikr key Rahnuma* (Leaders of Islamic Thought in the Subcontinent in the 18th Century). Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, 2008.

Maududi, Sayyid Abul A'la. *The Islamic Law and Constitution*. Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1980.

———. *Rasail-wa-Masail* (Issues and Problems), Vol. 02. Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, 1967.

———. In *The Islamic Way of Life.*, edited by Khuram Murad and Khurshid Ahmed. Translated by Khuram Murad and Khurshid Ahmed. Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1986.

———. *Islami Tehzib aur uske Usul'u Mabadi* (Islamic Civilization, its Principles and Foundations). Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966.

———. *Jama'at-i-Islami; Tarikh, Maqsad aur La'ihah-i' Amal.* Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1963.

———. *The Islamic State*. Translated by Khurshid Ahmed. Lahore: Islamic Publication, 1969.

Mazrui, Ali A. *Resurgent Islam and Politics of Identity*, edited by Ramzi Bdran and Thomas Uthup. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014.

McGrath, Allen. *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Merchant, Liaqat Ali and Sharif ul Mujahid, eds. *The Jinnah Anthology*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Mernissi, Fatima. *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1992.

Metcalf, Babara D. *Husain Ahmad Madani: The Jihad for Islam and India's Freedom*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009.

———. *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900*. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1989.

Mian, Hafiz Syed Muhammad, *Asiran-i-Malta* (Prisoners of Malta). Karachi: Shamsi Publishing House, 1976.

Miller, Judith. *God has Ninety-nine Names*. New York: Touchstone, 1997.

Moaddel, Mansoor and Kamran Talattof, eds. *Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Moaddel, Mansoor. *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse.* Chicago University Press, 2005.

Mondal, Anshuman A. *Nationalism and Post-colonial Identity: Culture and Ideology in India and Egypt*. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

Munir, Muhammad. *From Jinnah to Zia*. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980.

Murphy, Eamon. *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism*. London and New York: Routledge, 2013.

Musharraf, Pervez. *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. London: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

Myrdal, Gunnar. *Asian Drama*, Vol. 2. Middlesex: A Pelican Book, 1968.

Naipaul, V.S. *Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey*. New York: Knopf, 1981.

Najumi, Neamatollah. "The Rise and Fall of the Taliban." In *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, edited by Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008.

Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. *Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present*. Albany: SUNY Press, 2006.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*. New York: Oxford University Press,1996.

———. *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution, the Jama'at-e-Islam of Pakistan*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1994.

Nesser, Petter. *Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

———. "Joining Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe: Explaining Motivational Aspects of Recruitment and Radicalization." In *Understanding Violent Radicalization: Terrorist and Jihadist*

Movements in Europe, edited by Magnus Ranstrop. London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Newberg, Paula R. "Balancing Act: Prudence, Impunity, and Pakistan's Jurisprudence." In *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics,* edited by Paul Brass. London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Newberg, Paula R. *Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Niaz, Ilhan. *The Culture of Power and Governance in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Nichols, Robert. *A History of Pashtun Migration 1775–2006.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Ozcan, Azmi. *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877 – 1924.* Leiden: Brill, 1997.

Panipati, Maulana Mohammad Ismael. *Maqalat-i-Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan*. Lahore: Majalis-e-Tariq-e-Adab, 1961.

Peers, Douglas M. and Nandini Goopta. *India and the British Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Phares, Walid. *The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East*. New York: Threshold Editions, 2010.

Pipes, Daniel. *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power*. New York: Basic Books, 1983.

Pirzada, Sayyid A. S. *The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Pakistan, 1971–77*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000.

———. Ed. *Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents*, 1906–1947. Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1970.

Qadri, Muhammad Tahir-ul. *Introduction to the Fatwa on Suicide Bombings and Terrorism*. Translated by Shaykh Abdul Aziz Dabbagh. London: Minhaj-ul-Quran International, 2010.

Qasmi, Ali Usman. *The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan*. London, New York: Anthem Press, 2014.

Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain. *Ulema in Politics*. Karachi: The Inter Service Press Limited, 1972.

Qutb, Sayyid. *The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society,* edited by Albert J Bergesen New York: Routledge, 2008.

Rabbani, Mian Raza. *A Biography of Pakistani Federalism: Unity in Diversity*. Islamabad: Leo Books, 2014.

Rahman, Fazlur. *Islam and Modernity*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Rais, Muhammad Amein. *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Its Rise Demise and Resurgence.* Chicago: University Microfilms International, 2002.

Rais, Rasul Bakhsh, *Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008.

Raja, Masood Ashraf. *Constructing Pakistan: Foundational Texts and the Rise of Muslim National Identity, 1857–1947*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Rana, Muhammad Amir. *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan*. Translated by Saba Ansari. Lahore: Mashal Books, 2006.

Rashid, Ahmed. *Pakistan on the Brink*. London: Allen Lane, 2011.

Riedel, Bruce. *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, And the Future of the Global Jihad*. Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2011.

Ringer, Fritz. *Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Rizvi, Hasan Askari. *Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947–*1997. Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Publications, 2000.

———. *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986.

Rome, Sultan-i-. *Swat (1915–1969) from Genesis to Merger: An Analysis of Political, Administrative, Socio-political, and Economic Development*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Roy, M. N. *Historical Role of Islam*. Lahore: Sind Sagar Academy, 1974.

Rudolph, S.H. *Modernity of Tradition*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967.

Sayeed, Khalid Bin. *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857–1948*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Shafqat, Saeed. *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.

Shah, Aqil. *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.

Shaikh, Farzana. *Making Sense of Pakistan*. London: Hurst & Company, 2009.

———. *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860–1947*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Siddiqa, Ayesha. *Military Inc, Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Singh, Jaswant. *Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence*. New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2009.

Talbot, Ian. *Pakistan: A Modern History*. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1999.

Thurffell, David. "The Struggle to Stay on the Middle Ground: The Radicalization of Muslims in Sweden." In *Muslim Diaspora in the West: Negotiating Gender, Home and Belonging*, edited by Haideh Moghissi and Halleh Ghorashi. London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Toor, Saadia. *The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*. London: Pluto Press, 2011.

Tottoli, Roberto. Ed. *Routledge Handbook of Islam in the West*. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Tudor, Maya. "Enduring Challenges to Democracy." In *Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence,* edited by Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq. London and New York: Routledge, 2017.

Usmani, Shabbir Ahmad. *Pakistan aur Khutbat-i-Usmani*, (Pakistan and addresses of Usmani). Lahore: Shahid Book Depot, 1989.

Waseem, Muhammad. *Politics and the State in Pakistan*. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989.

Weiss, Anita M and S. Zulfiqar Gilani. *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Wilder, Andrew R. *Pakistani Voter*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Williams, Patrick and Laura Chrisman, eds. *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.

Wink, Andre. *Al-Hind-Making of the Indo-Islamic World*, Vol. 2. Leiden: Brill, 2002.

Winthrop, Rebecca and Corinne Graff, *Beyond Madrasas*: *Assessing the link between Education and Militancy in Pakistan*, Working Paper 2. Washington, D.C.: Centre for Universal Education at Brookings, June 2010.

Wirsing, Robert. *Pakistan's Security Under Zia*, 19977–88. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991.

———. *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998.

Wolpert, Stanley. *Jinnah of Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Young, Dennis O. "Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan," *Report*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007.

Yusfi, Khurshid Ahmad Khan. *Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam*, Vol. 4, 1946–1948. Lahore: Bazm-e-Iqbal,1996.

Yusuf, Moeed. *Decoding Pakistan's 'Strategic Shift' in Afghanistan*. Stockholm: SIPRI, May 2013.

Yusuf, Moeed, ed. *Pakistan's Counterterrorism Challenge*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014.

Zaheer, Hasan. *The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951: The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Zaidi, S. Akbar. *Contested Identities and Muslim Qaum in North India: C. 1860–1900.* PhD dissertation, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, 2009.

———. *Military, Civil Society and Democratization in Pakistan*. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2011.

Zaidi, Shabbar. *Pakistan is Not a Failed State*. Karachi: Zam Zam Publishers, 2014.

Zaidi, Syed Manzar Abbas. *Madrassa Education in Pakistan: Controversies, Challenges and Prospects*, Report No. 3. Kirkeveien, Norway: Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, March 4, 2013.

Ziring, Lawrence. *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1971.

PERIODICALS

Addi, Lahouari. "Algeria's Army, Algeria's Agony." *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 4 (Jul-Aug1998): 44–53.

Ahmed, Zahid Shahab. "The Role of the Pakistani Mass Media in the Lawyers' Resistance against the Musharraf Dictatorship, 2007- 2009."*Pakistaniat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies* 4, no. 3 (2012): 61–77.

Ali, Kamran Asdar. "Pakistani Islamists Gamble on the General" *Middle East Research and Information Project* 34 (Summer 2004). Accessed June 9, 2016. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer231/pakistani-islamists-gamble-general.

Anjum, Tanvir. "The Emergence of Muslim Rule in India: Some Historical Disconnects and Missing Links". *Islamic Studies* 46, no. 2 (Summer 2007).

Barber, Benjamin R. "Jihad vs. McWorld." *The Atlantic*, (March 1992).

Barrier, Norman G. Barrier. "The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab, 1894–1908." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 26, no. 3 (1967): 363–379.

Bergen,Peter and Swati Pandey. "The Madrassa Scapegoat." *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006).

Brahimi, Alia. "The Taliban's Evolving Ideology." *Working Paper* WP 02/2010. (London School of Economics: July 2010): 5.

Brass, Paul R. "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946–47: Means, Methods, and Purposes," *Journal of Genocide Research* 5, no. 1 (2003): 71–101.

Bray, John. "Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline?" *International Affairs* 73, no. 2 (April 1997): 315–331.

Chawla, Muhammad Iqbal. "Islamization in Pakistan: An Overview." *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan* 52, no. 1 (January-June, 2015): 276.

Cole, Juan R. I. and Deniz Kandiyoti. "Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia: Introduction," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, no.2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia, (May, 2002): 189–203

Fahm, Mishal al-Sulami, *The West and Islam: Western Liberal Democracy Versus the System of Shura*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Fair, C. Christine and Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan' War Within" *Survival* 51, no. 6 (December 2009-January 2010): 161–88.

Fair, C.Christine. "The Militant Challenge of Pakistan" *Asia Policy*, no. 11 (January 2011):105–37.

Fish, Steven. "Islam and Authoritarianism," *World Politics* 55 (October 2002): 4–37.

Fukuyama, Francis. "Transitions to the Rule of Law." *Journal of Democracy* 21, no.1 (January 2010): 38.

Ghiaz, Shoaib A. "Miscarriage of Chief Justice, Media and the Struggle for Judicial Independence" *Law & Social Inquiry* 35, no. 4 (July 20, 2008): 985–2010.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Will More Countries be Democratic," *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no. 2 (Summer, 1984): 193–218.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Political Development and Political Decay." *World Politics* 17.3 (1965).

Islam, Nasir. "Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangladesh." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13, no.1 (Feb., 1981): 55–72.

Jalal, Ayesha, "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, (1995): 73–89.

Jamat-i-Islami publications, *Tarjuman ul-Quran* 23, no. 4 (March 1950): 175

Karatnycky, Adrian. "Muslim Countries and Democracy Gap." *Journal of Democracy* 13, (January 2002).

Khurshid Ahmad. "Islam and Democracy: Some Conceptual and Contemporary Dimensions." *Policy Perspectives* 2, no. 1 (Islamabad. Institute of Policy Studies, date na).

Kizilbash, Hamid H. "Anti-Americanism in Pakistan." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (May 1988): 58–65.

Lapidus, Ira M. "Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 40, no. 4 (1997): 444–460.

Malik, Jamal. "Making of a Council: The Nadwatul Ulema." *Islamic Culture* 68, no. 1 (1994): 1–40.

Malik, Rizwan. "Muslim Nationalism in India: Ashraf Ali Thanawi, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and the Pakistan Movement." *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 18, no. 2 1(997): 76–82.

Marx, Nietzsche, Lerner and Bell in Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values", *American Sociological Review* 65, no.1 (Feb. 2000):19–51.

Maududi, Maulana Syed Abul A'la. "Matalba-i-Nizam-i-Isami." Demand for an Islamic System), *Tarjuman ul-Quran* 32, no. 1. (1959):12–18.

Mujahid, Sharif-al. "Pakistan: First General Elections."*Asian Survey* 11, no. 2 (Feb,1971): 159–171.

Mura, Andrea. "A genealogical inquiry into early Islamism: the discourse of Hasan al-Banna." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 17, no. 1 (2012): 61–85.

———. "The Inclusive Dynamics of Islamic Universalism: From the Vantage Point of Sayyid Qutb's Critical Philosophy." *Comparative Philosophy* 5, no. 1 (2014): 215–215.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Raza. "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism." *Political Science Quarterly*110, no. 2 (Summer, 1995): 261–285

———. "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics." *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 2 (2000).

Nguyen, Quynh T. and Dhushyanth Raju. "Private School Participation in Pakistan." *The Lahore Journal of Economics* 20, no. 1 (summer 2015): 1–46.

Nielsen, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen. "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we don't know." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, (2010): 797–814.

Noman, Omar. "Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy." *Third World Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (January 1989): 50–54.

Peceny, Mark. "The Social Construction of Democracy." *International Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (spring 19990.

Qasmi, Ali Usman. "God's Kingdom on Earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947–1969." *Modern Asian Studies* 44, no. 6 (November 2010): 1238–47.

Rehman, Fazlur. Muslim Modernism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 21, no.1 (1958): 91.

Rehman, Javaid. "Islam, War on Terror and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings." *Human Rights Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (November 2007): 845.

Resolution and Comments in *Islamic Studies* 48, no.1 (Spring 2009): 89–118.

Rizvi, Hasan Askari. "The Legacy of Military Rule in Pakistan," *Survival* 31 no. 3 (May-June 1989): 255–268.

Siddiqui, Rushda. "The Islamic Dimension of Pakistan's Foreign Policy." In *Islam and International Security Challenges and Responses*, edited by Efraim Inbar and Hillel Frisch. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Schmidt, John R., "The Unraveling of Pakistan." *Survival* 51, no. 3 (2009): 29–54.

Shapiro, Jacob N. and C. Christine Fair. "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy? *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010): 79–118.

Shin, Doh Chull. "Review Article: On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research." *World Politics* 47, (October 1994): 135–70.

Stern, Jessica. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture." *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (2000): 115–126.

Stokes, Eric. "The First Century of British Colonial Rule in India: Social Revolution or Social Stagnation?" *Past & Present*, no. 58 (February, 1973): 136–160.

Torwali, Zubair. "Swat-Paradise Lost." *The Friday Times* 25, no 28 (August 23–29, 2013).

Ullah, Farhat. "Policing with Passion—KP Police Initiatives," *Pakistan Journal of Criminology* 7, no. 1 (January 2015).

Weinbaum, Marvin, "Democracy in Pakistan", *Asian Survey* 36, no.7 (1996): 639- 654

Weinbum, Marvin G. "Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relati onship." *Asian Survey* 31, no. 6 (June 1991): 496–511.

Weinbum, Marvin. "Civic Culture and Democracy in Pakistan" *Asian Survey* 36, no. 7 (July, 1996): 639–654.

Zakaria Fareed."Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism." *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1(Spring, 2004): 1–20.

Ziring, Lawrence. "Pakistan: The Vision and the Reality." *Asian Affairs* 4, no. 6 (July-August, 1977): 386.

Index

About the Author

Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais is professor of political science in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, LUMS, Lahore. His publications include, *Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan* (2008), *War without Winners: Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition after the Cold War* (1996), *Indian Ocean and the Superpowers: Economic, Political and Strategic Perspectives* (1986). He is also the editor of *State, Society and Democratic Change in Pakistan* (1997), and co-editor with Charles H. Kennedy of *Pakistan 1995* (1996).